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Competing in the global marketplace implies that a national econ 
omy will be in a constant state of change, with new commodities and 
technologies supplanting old commodities and technologies. At the 
same time, the mobility of capital increasingly obliges workers in 
highly industrialized nations to compete with willing and cheap labor 
in developing countries around the world. While contributing greatly to 
economic well-being, this process of change generates each year large 
numbers of enterprise closures and business restructurings, each asso 
ciated with the permanent layoffs of experienced workers. The term 
"displaced" is applied to these unemployed workers because they face 
a low probability of being recalled to their old jobs or perhaps even to 
jobs in their old industries. Unfortunately, many displaced workers 
who received high wages to perform the repetitive tasks required by 
mass production technologies find, after a period of job search, that 
their reemployment options are restricted to less-well-paying jobs. Dis 
placed workers typically differ from other unemployed workers by the 
continuity of their prelayoff work experience, the duration of their 
postlayoff joblessness, and their lower wages upon reemployment.
The availability of the first biannual Displaced Worker Survey 
(DWS) in 1984 gave researchers and policy makers a much better han 
dle on the number and characteristics of displaced American workers. 1 
In these data, displaced workers are distinguished from other unem 
ployed workers by affirmative answers to a question asking whether 
within the last five years the respondent was separated from his or her 
job because of a plant closing, an employer going out of business, or a 
layoff from which the respondent was not recalled. Using three years 
of prelayoff job tenure as the cutoff point to further distinguish dis 
placed workers, the benchmark analysis by Flaim and Sehgal (1985) 
calculates a population of 5.1 million displaced workers during the 
January 1979 to January 1984 period.
More recent estimates of the size of the displaced worker population 
are provided by Ross and Smith (1993). Merging the five DWS data 
sets available for the 1984-92 period and using a slightly different 
definition of the displaced, they estimate that on average two million
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full-time workers were displaced from their jobs each year during the 
1980s. 2 Not surprisingly, the annual number of displaced workers is 
found to vary with the overall state of the economy. In the recession 
year of 1982, 2.7 million workers—about 1 of every 25 full-time wage 
and salary workers—lost their jobs and were not recalled. But even 
during the relatively strong labor market existing in 1988, 1.5 million 
workers—about 1 in every 50 full-time workers—are estimated to have 
permanently lost their jobs.
The governments of most industrialized nations, including that of 
the United States, have committed themselves to help shoulder the 
adjustment costs borne by displaced workers by providing an arsenal 
of both active and passive labor market programs. Active labor market 
programs are basically intended to shorten the duration of postdis- 
placement unemployment spells and to restore long-run earnings 
potential. These programs typically include job search assistance to 
sharpen job search techniques that may have grown dull from disuse, 
and retraining in job skills to enable workers to qualify for jobs open 
ing up in growing industries. In contrast, passive labor market mea 
sures provide income support to prevent unemployed workers and their 
families from slipping into poverty. Thus passive labor market pro 
grams are often collectively referred to as the "social safety net." 
Included among passive programs are unemployment compensation, 
pensions and early retirement benefits, continuation of health insur 
ance, and welfare benefits.
During the 1980s, concern over an increasing incidence of long- 
term unemployment as a fraction of total unemployment led many 
industrialized nations to shift their mixes of public expenditures toward 
active and away from passive labor market programs. The Organiza 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been 
instrumental in leading policy makers in member countries to redirect 
their focus toward active labor market policies. In the United States, 
events occurring during the first few years of the 1990s dramatically 
heightened the attention paid by policy makers to the needs of dis 
placed workers. These events include:
• job losses in the defense sector—both federal civilian and military 
personnel and private sector defense industry workers—associ 
ated with large-scale cutbacks in the defense budget;
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• concern that the implementation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) would cause U.S. producers to shift opera 
tions to other countries, thereby eliminating domestic jobs; and
• the perception that the corporate restructuring ongoing during the 
1990-91 recession and the years immediately following is, for the 
first time, substantially increasing joblessness among white-collar 
workers in services as well as blue-collar workers in manufactur 
ing (see, for example, Karr 1991). 3
This heightened attention to the needs of the displaced was apparent 
in policy deliberations leading to the very sizable expansion in the 
1994 fiscal year budget of the U.S. Department of Labor and to the 
drafting of the proposed Reemployment Act of 1994 (see, for example, 
U.S. Department of Labor 1993). Prominent issues considered in these 
deliberations include early identification of unemployed workers 
unlikely to be recalled to their old jobs, enhancement of the long-term 
retraining options available to displaced workers, establishment of 
national skills standards, imposition of a national payroll training tax, 
improvement of the school-to-work transition of youth, development 
of one-stop career centers supplying workers and employers better 
labor market information and career development services, and provi 
sion to states of the flexibility to offer unemployed workers reemploy- 
ment bonuses and self-employment programs.
Other highly industrialized nations possess a wealth of experience 
gained from the design and actual implementation of these kinds of 
active labor market policies in permanent, nationwide programs. The 
perspective taken in this monograph is that increased awareness of how 
active labor market programs operate in other nations can substantially 
improve the way in which we deal with worker displacement in the 
United States. Nations examined in detail are Sweden, Germany, 
Japan, Britain, Canada, and Australia. These countries fall naturally 
into two groups. The first group, consisting of Sweden, Germany, and 
Japan, provides their workers with stable, nationwide employment and 
training systems. On the other hand, the countries in the second 
group—Britain, Canada, and Australia—have all anticipated U.S. pol 
icy with recent major restructurings of their employment and training 
programs involving the shift of resources from passive to active labor 
market policies.
4 Introduction
Increased insight into the adjustment assistance needs of displaced 
workers, no matter in what nation they reside, requires a discussion of 
the costs of displacement. We turn to this issue next.
Costs of Worker Displacement
Some amount of job change plays a positive allocative role in assur 
ing that workers are appropriately matched with employers and that 
inappropriate matches are terminated. While it is widely perceived that 
society as a whole benefits from maintaining a dynamic, generally 
open domestic economy, it is also recognized that displaced workers 
bear the brunt of the inevitable adjustment costs. It is this recognition 
that has prompted the governments of many nations to provide special 
assistance to the displaced.
A large body of literature exists dealing with the identification of the 
private and social losses incurred by displaced workers (see, in particu 
lar, Hamermesh 1987, 1989). A worker is said to experience an eco 
nomic loss when an income stream expected to continue into the future 
is unexpectedly and permanently lost. Income streams considered in 
this literature are generated by either of two factors: (1) investment in 
human capital specific to the firm (or perhaps to the industry or geo 
graphic location), and (2) economic rents accruing to the beneficiaries 
of union-induced job queues. Upon a permanent separation from the 
firm, the private cost of displacement includes lost income streams 
generated by either or both of these factors, whereas a social cost of 
displacement arises only in the case of forgone returns to specific train 
ing. Both cost measures must also include the value of resources lost 
during the adjustment process. Special assistance to displaced workers 
is commonly rationalized on the basis of the first factor. The argument 
is that unless compensation is available, risk-averse workers and their 
employers will be discouraged from investing in specific human capi 
tal. The second factor also plays a role to the extent that compensation 
to displaced workers is needed to buy off unions and other politically 
powerful interests that would otherwise block socially desirable poli 
cies such as free trade and the introduction of labor-saving technology.
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The empirical literature measures economic losses incurred by dis 
placed workers in terms of length of postlayoff spells of unemploy 
ment and reduction in wages upon reemployment. Hamermesh (1989) 
summarizes the evidence found in thirteen studies of the effects of dis 
placement on wage and employment losses. Six of these studies utilize 
DWS data. A key finding in all of the studies is that workers with the 
longest tenure on the job from which they were displaced suffered the 
greatest losses in subsequent wages and time employed. Kletzer (1989) 
finds, using 1984 DWS data, that the direct relationship between pre- 
displacement tenure and wage loss is particularly strong for blue-collar 
workers since the returns to tenure for these workers are more job-spe 
cific, reflecting both job-match heterogeneity and specific human capi 
tal.
A second conclusion reached by Hamermesh (1989) is that poorly 
educated workers spend more time unemployed and suffer dispropor 
tionate wage losses. He reports no consensus, however, that particular 
demographic groups, such as women, minorities, or older workers, suf 
fer especially large losses from being displaced (though minorities are 
more likely to be displaced).
Several more recent studies generally reinforce these findings and 
add new insights. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b) 
examine a large sample of both displaced and nondisplaced Pennsylva 
nia workers for whom administrative data are available on quarterly 
earnings covering the 1974-86 period. Focusing on prime-age, high- 
tenure (six or more years of tenure) workers, their evidence suggests 
that studies based on data such as the DWS, which lack a long earnings 
history or an appropriate comparison group, are likely to understate 
earnings losses associated with worker displacement from distressed 
firms. The reason is their finding that earnings of displaced workers 
tend to be abnormally low in the year prior to separation. Without a 
longer earnings history or a suitable comparison group with which to 
measure normal predisplacement earnings, earnings losses would be 
substantially underestimated. These earnings losses are also long term, 
with little evidence of substantial recovery even after the third year fol 
lowing displacement. Similarly, Ruhm (1991) finds, using data for both 
displaced and nondisplaced workers, that while the initial rise in job- 
lessness associated with displacement dissipates after several years, 
there is a significant long-term loss of earnings potential. Ruhm's anal-
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ysis is based on the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) data set.
Three other findings supplied by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 
are of interest. First, they find that while earnings losses were substan 
tial for displaced workers who found new jobs in the same industries, 
losses were even greater for those who changed industrial sectors. 
Using 1984 DWS data, Addison and Portugal (1989) also report that 
wage losses associated with a change in industry or occupation, but not 
location, are greater than wage losses for displaced workers not 
obliged to make such shifts. 4 Similarly, Carrington (1993) finds, using 
1984, 1986, and 1988 DWS data, that much of the wage loss suffered 
by displaced workers is the result of downturns in entire industries 
rather than of firm-specific declines in demand. That is, displaced 
workers tend to be victims of "industrial restructuring."
A second additional finding by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan is 
that sizable earnings losses occur even in relatively strong labor mar 
kets. Finally, the authors find that earnings losses are substantial across 
a broad range of industries and firm sizes. Nevertheless, losses are 
especially large for workers separating from highly unionized indus 
tries and large firms. This finding suggests that loss of rents, including 
union wage premiums, may contribute to earnings losses of displaced 
workers.
Farber (1993) adds to these findings evidence on employment losses 
as distinct from earnings losses resulting from worker displacement. To 
provide a comparison group of nondisplaced workers, he appends to 
the 1984-92 Displaced Worker Surveys data from outgoing Current 
Population Survey rotation groups from 1982-91. Several of Farber's 
main findings should be highlighted. First, male displaced workers face 
a dramatically lower probability of reemployment compared with non- 
displaced males. Displaced females also face a lower reemployment 
probability, although the displaced/nondisplaced difference is not as 
great. Second, displaced workers are less likely to obtain full-time jobs 
upon reemployment; and this cost of displacement is especially great 
during recessions. Since part-time wage rates are substantially lower 
than full-time wages, the increased incidence of part-time employment 
during recessions is an important component of the cost of job loss to 
the displaced. Third, even conditioning on reemployment in a full-time 
job, displaced workers earn substantially less than either otherwise
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comparable nondisplaced workers or what they themselves earned 
prior to displacement. Moreover, length of previous job tenure and a 
less-than-high-school level of education are strongly and negatively 
related to wage change. In the case of job tenure, an additional year of 
predisplacement tenure is estimated to result in about 1 percent lower 
wage growth.
Finally, Farber finds that while the effects of displacement on the 
probability of reemployment and on full-time reemployment appear to 
be temporary, there is no evidence that the earnings gap between full- 
time reemployed displaced and nondisplaced workers narrows over 
time. This finding reinforces evidence on the persistence of earnings 
losses reported by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b) 
and Ruhm (1991). Farber's interpretation of the permanence of the 
full-time wage effect is that wage losses are directly related to tenure, 
and lost tenure is never recovered. It might also be noted that the wage 
loss is considerably larger for workers displaced in 1990-91 than it was 
for workers displaced earlier.
One last study, by Crossley, Jones, and Kuhn (1994), is noteworthy 
because it uses recently available Canadian data to examine the costs 
of displacement for women relative to men. Data analyzed by the 
authors are derived from a survey of 1,736 workers (612 women and 
1,124 men) laid off from their jobs in twenty-one establishments 
located in Ontario. For both male and female Canadians, postdisplace- 
ment wages are found to decline as predisplacement tenure increases. 
As noted, this is a common result in the literature utilizing U.S. data. 
More novel is the authors' finding that women lose more from dis 
placement than men, and that the magnitude of women's losses 
increases faster with tenure. For example, predicted hourly wage losses 
for workers with three to five years of service are 4 percent of predis 
placement wages for men and 13 percent for women. For workers with 
fifteen to twenty-five years of service these estimates rise to 15 and 26 
percent, respectively, for men and women.
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An Evaluation Framework
With this background on the costs of worker displacement, a next 
issue to consider is how government programs designed to reduce 
these costs are evaluated. Haveman and Saks (1985) point out an inter 
esting contrast between program evaluation in the United States and in 
other industrialized countries, particularly those in Western Europe. In 
Western European nations, stable, well-funded, and highly profes 
sional employment and training systems receive constant feedback 
from employers and workers on the quality of their activities. In these 
countries, there is little formal evaluation of marginal program 
impacts. In the United States, by contrast, government-sponsored pro 
grams are less stable, funding often fluctuates dramatically, and the 
professional quality of program managers is uneven. Program evalua 
tion in the United States is therefore largely based on statistical analy 
ses of program effects in limited-duration demonstration projects, and 
the United States clearly leads the world in the quantity and sophistica 
tion of its program evaluations. Even so, available evaluation evidence 
is subject to enough qualifications, particularly with respect to skill 
training, that it is not easy to draw strong policy recommendations.
In summarizing this situation, Wilensky (1985, p. 9) proposes as 
"Wilensky's law" the following proposition: the more evaluation, the 
less program development; the greater the number of demonstration 
projects, the less follow-through. Underlying his proposition are three 
problems Wilensky identifies with existing program evaluations: (1) 
evaluation research is typically quite narrow, politically naive, and 
often seriously flawed in design and execution; (2) research focused on 
a single program, which is usually the case, obscures the interaction 
and interdependence of many programs; and (3) evaluated success has 
little to do with program funding.
The United States is clearly at one extreme in terms of the applica 
tion of this proposition. At the other, Wilensky (1985, p. 3) points to 
Sweden as the country that combines the least program evaluation with 
the most action and greatest achievement in utilizing its human 
resources. Given its stable institutional structure, heavy national invest 
ment, and staff of well-trained professionals, it is quite likely that there 
are important lessons to be learned from the experience of Sweden as
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well as from other European nations about the design and implementa 
tion of active labor market policies. We can also gain insight from 
other non-European nations, including Britain, Canada, and Australia, 
that have preceded us in restructuring their employment and training 
systems.
In the absence of quantitative evaluations allowing program benefits 
and costs to be measured and compared, how might a discussion of the 
experience of other nations be made meaningful to U.S. policy mak 
ers? The approach taken in this monograph is to specify an evaluation 
framework against which alternative active labor market programs may 
be consistently assessed. The six criteria listed below, which make up 
the evaluation framework, are drawn from the current labor economics 
and labor market policy literatures. They are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.
1. Program services should facilitate the transition of displaced 
workers to jobs in expanding industries and growing sectors within 
existing industries. By definition, adjustment assistance services are 
intended to make it easier for displaced workers to respond to market 
signals by moving from markets in which there is an excess supply of 
labor to those in which there is an excess demand. Growing markets 
may be in entirely different industries from declining markets or, as 
appears to be the case in manufacturing, growth may be centered in 
small, nimble single-plant firms at the expense of large, centralized 
corporate giants. Clearly, the more complete the coverage of job 
vacancy information and the faster vacancy information is conveyed to 
unemployed workers, the more rapidly the reemployment process can 
be completed. Sweden's system of employment exchange offices rep 
resents a model to be studied for insight into how to improve the 
matching process between available workers and vacant jobs.
The flip side of this criterion is that labor market services that distort 
or retard the response to market signals should be substantially modi 
fied or eliminated entirely. As mentioned earlier, recent concern over 
rising long-term unemployment has led most industrialized nations to 
increase their emphasis on active labor market measures and to deem- 
phasize passive programs. Among active programs, moreover, funding 
for direct job creation programs has been reduced. Motivating this 
decision is the desire to decrease reliance on "make-work" schemes
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that over the longer run cannot ensure sustainable jobs, and instead to 
switch resources to measures that improve the skills of the workforce. 
Even the highly regarded Swedish adult training system has been criti 
cized for doing little more for some workers than keep them off the 
unemployment rolls.
2. Program activities must meet the needs of displaced workers. Two 
important factors emerge from discussions of the characteristics of dis 
placed workers and the costs of worker displacement. The first is that 
lengthy job tenure with the predisplacement employer often means that 
the job search skills of displaced workers will typically be rusty from 
disuse. Employment services, including job matching, assessment and 
testing, counseling, training in job search skills, and job development, 
are therefore an essential part of a comprehensive labor market system. 
As has been widely noted (see, for example, Marshall and Tucker 
1992, p. 223; and Baily, Burtless, and Litan 1993, pp. 136-37), the U.S. 
Employment Service is basically limited to the referral of unskilled 
workers to low-paying and often temporary jobs. In its current form, 
the Employment Service does not come close to offering the employ 
ment services provided in other nations.
The second factor is that displaced workers are interested in jobs, 
not training. An immediate implication of this point is that on-the-job 
training may be preferred to classroom training as a vehicle for provid 
ing job skills. However, targeted employment subsidy programs have 
not always proven successful in attracting a sufficient number of 
employers willing to provide on-the-job training opportunities. Volun 
tary employer participation in the firm-based German and Japanese 
training systems is especially important to study for insight into how to 
increase the interest of American employers in supplying on-the-job 
training opportunities. An interesting policy initiative to be considered 
in the context of stimulating firm-based training is the payroll training 
tax recently imposed in Australia.
Regarding skill training provided in a classroom setting, workers' 
interest in jobs rather than training suggests that classroom training 
programs be designed with three goals in mind. First, training courses 
must be timely and flexible. Circumstances such as layoffs that gener 
ate a demand for retraining can occur at any time, and training pro 
grams should be designed to be available on a timely basis and flexible
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enough to fit into workers' schedules. Second, training programs must 
demonstrate to enrollees a clear connection between skills learned and 
employment opportunities. This goal is especially important, albeit dif 
ficult to accomplish, in the context of basic education programs. 
Finally, since most adult workers support families, the tuition charged 
for training courses must be low or paid for by government subsidies. 
Strong consideration should also be given to providing trainees with a 
form of income maintenance while they are engaged in training.
3. Programs must serve the entire spectrum of displaced workers, 
not just those easiest to place. Evidence for the United States suggests 
that only a small fraction of the eligible displaced worker population is 
served by Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) programs. 5 Of those 
served, in addition, relatively few displaced workers are provided with 
skills training and even fewer eligible workers receive basic education 
(see Levitan and Gallo 1988, pp. 57-62). This is a not unexpected 
result since basic education is expensive relative to other adjustment 
assistance services and program administrators have a natural propen 
sity to "cream" (i.e., to select those individuals who are the most job- 
ready) in the applicant selection process.
Yet on equity grounds the case can be made that it is adults at the 
low end of the skill distribution who should be first in line for access to 
training services. With the possible exception of Japan, the displaced 
worker populations of the countries considered include a substantial 
fraction of workers in need of basic education. Swedish experience 
offers some insight into the operation of basic education programs, and 
the limited formal education and vocational skills of British workers 
make the ongoing restructuring of the employment and training system 
in the United Kingdom especially interesting to study. Guidance on the 
design and operation of basic education programs can also be gained 
from evidence generated from state welfare employment demonstra 
tion projects in the United States.
4. Training programs must supply marketable skills to program 
graduates. As suggested in the discussion of criterion 2, it is reason 
able to suppose that firm-based training is more likely to enhance labor 
market opportunities than classroom training, since it is directly 
demand-related. Clearly, one of the most difficult problems in design-
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ing classroom training programs is to guarantee that the training will 
supply program completers with job skills currently in demand in local 
labor markets. All of the countries examined recognize that some 
degree of employer involvement is necessary to solve this problem. 
Most countries, including the United States in the JTPA program, 
involve employers in helping to set policy and provide feedback. In 
Britain, for example, this type of employer involvement is a major 
emphasis of the national network of Training and Enterprise Councils 
(TECs) recently established to deliver training services and promote 
small business development at the local level. Sweden has gone one 
step further in seeking to decentralize decision making and increase 
responsiveness to changes in market demand. Created in 1986, the 
Swedish National Employment Training Board is responsible for being 
financially self-sufficient through the sale of training services to any 
customer willing to buy.
5. Programs should effectively utilize existing educational and train 
ing institutions. The existence of an extensive postsecondary schooling 
system makes it most unlikely that the United States will follow the 
Swedish model in establishing a government-funded adult training sys 
tem independent of the regular educational infrastructure. Rather, the 
presumption for our country, as well as for Britain, Canada, and Aus 
tralia, is that existing institutional training providers will be heavily 
utilized in supplying adult training services. This presumption raises 
the issue of how to encourage third-party providers to adapt to the spe 
cial needs of adults while supplying training that leads to job place 
ment.
The contractual mechanism often used to deal with this issue is per 
formance-based contracting. This form of contracting is used in the 
JTPA program in the United States and in contracts entered into by 
TECs and the training providers with which they subcontract in Brit 
ain. The operation of performance-based contracting in JTPA pro 
grams, in the British network of TECs, and in an important state 
program, California's Employment Training Panel, will be examined 
for direction in establishing policies that preserve the incentive to pro 
vide training leading to job placement while restraining the incentive to 
cream in the participant selection process. Also to be considered is the 
role of nationally recognized credentials in Sweden, Germany, and
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Britain in certifying the quality of program graduates to employers and 
in helping potential trainees make informed choices between training 
curricula and institutional providers.
6. A broadening of the concept of job skills should be encouraged. 
Reports of recent national commissions and discussions in the popular 
press and professional journals stress the need for a radical change in 
skills that workers should possess in order for American firms to be 
competitive in the international marketplace. 6 As recently described by 
Lynch (1994, p. 63), concern during the 1970s over how to absorb 
"overeducated Americans" into the labor market shifted during the 
1980s to how to stimulate the skill development of "undertrained 
Americans." Rather than simply achieving competency at a particular 
narrowly defined job, it is frequently argued that American workers 
need to be able to think creatively and solve problems, work effectively 
in teams, adapt flexibly to rapid shifts in product demand, and engage 
in lifetime learning. Frontline workers in this model, termed "high-per 
formance work organizations" by former Secretary of Labor Ray Mar 
shall and Marc Tucker (1992), often operate in teams and are expected 
to substantially supervise themselves while assuming responsibility for 
quality control, equipment maintenance, ordering supplies, and many 
other functions traditionally reserved for management and technical 
staff. Countries that are often presented as being far ahead of the 
United States in developing most or all of these productive characteris 
tics in their workers are Japan and Germany.
Empirical evidence is just beginning to appear on the extent of 
upskilling within the American labor market. For goods-producing 
industries in particular, this evidence indicates that the breadth of skills 
required of American workers is in fact increasing. Using data col 
lected by Hay Associates, Cappelli (1993a) examines changes in skill 
requirements for production jobs in ninety-three manufacturing estab 
lishments between 1978 and 1986 and for clerical jobs in 211 firms 
between 1978 and 1988. His results for manufacturing indicate a 
highly significant upskilling within all but one of the ten production 
job families considered. (The lone exception is "housekeeping.") For 
eight clerical job families, on the other hand, there is an even split 
between job families experiencing significant upskilling and those
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experiencing deskilling. New office technologies appear to explain the 
deskilling of specific clerical jobs.
In a second recent study, Osterman (1994) finds that about 35 per 
cent of the 694 manufacturing establishments he surveyed in 1992 
made substantial use of "flexible work practices," which he defines as 
the use of teams, job rotation, quality circles, and Total Quality Man 
agement. Moreover, Osterman is able to isolate several important fac 
tors that are highly correlated with the adoption of flexible work 
practices. These include an international product market, a complex 
production technology, a "high-road" competitive strategy (one that 
emphasizes service, quality, and variety of products rather than low 
costs), and a commitment to increasing the well-being of employees' 
families.
Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 provides an overview of labor market policies in place in 
the seven countries examined (including the U.S.). The purpose of this 
overview is to supply the necessary background for understanding 
basic differences between countries in their labor market institutions 
and in the levels and mixes of their active and passive labor market 
program expenditures. The chapter also investigates a possible linkage 
between these countries' labor market policies and differences in their 
unemployment rates and especially in the incidence of long-term 
unemployment.
With this background, chapter 3 reviews the evaluation evidence 
available for demonstration projects and experiments implementing 
various kinds of active labor market programs in the United States. 
This evidence includes evaluation reports on five major displaced 
worker demonstrations and on a number of additional experiments 
implementing three proposed reforms of the unemployment insurance 
(UI) system. The proposed UI reforms involve (1) enhanced employ 
ment services and stricter enforcement of job search requirements, (2) 
reemployment bonuses paid to UI recipients who find jobs quickly, and 
(3) self-employment as an alternative reemployment strategy. Also dis 
cussed in this chapter are selected evaluation reports examining the
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effectiveness of training and basic education programs in demonstra 
tion projects targeted to economically disadvantaged workers (i.e., 
welfare recipients).
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the design and operation of particular 
active labor market programs in other countries. Adult retraining pro 
grams are considered in chapter 4. Beginning with classroom training, 
this chapter investigates in detail the operation of the highly regarded 
government training model in Sweden and Britain's employer-led/ 
school-based model with its requirement of performance-based con 
tracting. Concerning on-the-job training, the firm-based training sys 
tems in place in Germany and Japan are discussed, with emphasis on 
the questions of how best to give employers an incentive to provide on- 
the-job training opportunities and whether important features of these 
firm-based systems might be transferable to the U.S. labor market. 
Also considered in this chapter are the payroll training tax imple 
mented in Australia and the national skill certification system in Brit 
ain.
Chapter 5 focuses on employment services, including the traditional 
labor exchange function matching unemployed workers to job vacan 
cies, as well as more proactive job search assistance services. Carefully 
examined are the job matching system provided by the Swedish public 
employment service and job development services supplied by the 
Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service. This chapter concludes with a 
consideration of recent policies implemented in Britain, Canada, and 
Australia to link eligibility for income support payments to participa 
tion in active labor market programs in order to maintain the work 
incentive of the unemployed.
A final chapter pulls together the findings presented in chapters 2 
through 5 and outlines an agenda for assisting displaced Americans.
NOTES
1. DWS data sets are supplements to the January Current Population Surveys (CPS) produced 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2. In defining the displaced, Ross and Smith count only workers who lost full-time jobs and 
ignore length of prelayoff job tenure.
3. Farber (1993) presents empirical evidence supporting the impression that recent events have 
changed the demographic and industrial composition of the displaced worker population. Using 
DWS data from the 1984 through 1992 surveys, he compares the nature of job losses during the 
1990-91 recession to job losses during the earlier 1982-83 recession and the more prosperous
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1984-89 period. While job loss is still disproportionately concentrated in the goods-producing 
sector, Farber's evidence indicates that displacement was more common during 1990-91 than dur 
ing the 1982-83 recession in important and growing nongoods-producing industries. In addition, 
the rate of job loss among older workers during the 1990-91 recession is found to be higher than 
during the earlier recession, especially for college-educated men.
4. Addison and Portugal also attempt to model the simultaneity noted by Hamermesh (1989) 
between unemployment duration and postdisplacement wages resulting from worker search 
behavior and to relax the strong restriction imposed by identifying the tenure coefficient with the 
return to firm-specific training investments.
5. The major federal program providing reemployment services to displaced workers is Title 
IIIofJTPA.
6. Examples of national commission reports are the Secretary's Commission on Achieving 
Necessary Skills (1991) and the Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency 
(1989). In the academic literature, Bound and Johnson (1992) conclude from their study of the 
dramatic changes in the U.S. wage structure during the 1980s that the rise in the relative wage 
position of women and the highly educated stems largely from an increase in the relative demand 
for skilled labor stimulated by changes in computer-based technology.
2
Fundamental Differences Between 
Nations in Labor Market Policies
A useful way to begin analyzing international differences in labor 
market policies is to look at the level and mix of government expendi 
tures on active and passive labor market programs. As discussed in 
chapter 1, passive programs provide a social safety net to prevent 
unemployed workers and their families from slipping into poverty. In 
contrast, active programs are intended to speed up reemployment and 
to improve long-run earnings potential. Active programs are commonly 
broken down into three categories: employment services, including job 
search assistance and job placement; adult training programs; and job 
creation and employment subsidies.
Table 2.1 displays, for the nations mentioned in chapter 1, OECD 
estimates of public expenditures on active and passive labor market 
programs expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. 1 
Annual averages calculated over the 1985-88 period are presented. 
Table 2.2 links these expenditure estimates to national unemployment 
rates and measures of the incidence of long-term unemployment for 
the same years. The 1985-88 period is chosen to represent a period of 
relative economic and political stability just prior to the disruptions 
created in the early 1990s by the worldwide recession and the breakup 
of the Soviet Union. Unemployment rates generally fell during the lat 
ter half of the 1980s, bottoming out in 1989 or 1990. Except for Japan 
and western Germany, unemployment rates then rose in 1991 and 
1992. 2 This rise was moderate for the United States and more pro 
nounced for Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Par 
ticularly striking is the rapid increase in the Swedish standardized 
unemployment rate from 1.5 percent in 1990 to 4.8 percent in 1992 and 
9.0 percent in the first quarter of 1994 (Economist Intelligence Unit 
1994b). Forslund and Krueger (1994) offer an analysis of the dramatic 
rise in Swedish unemployment during the 1990s in which they predict 
that the unemployment rate will remain at historically high levels for at 
least the next few years, and probably longer.
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Table 2.1 Public Expenditures on Active and Passive Labor Market











































SOURCE: OECD (1989, table A.I).
a. Includes unemployment compensation and early retirement for labor market reasons.
b. For 1987 and 1988.
c. For 1986-88.
Table 2.2 Unemployment Rates and Incidence of Long-Term 




































SOURCE: OECD (1989, tables 1.5 and M). 
a. As a percentage of total labor force, 
b. As a percentage of total unemployment.
Fundamental Differences Between Nations in Labor Market Policies 19
Among the seven nations, Sweden and the United Kingdom are 
reported in table 2.1 to have the highest total expenditure ratios on 
active and passive programs combined. The expenditure mix is dramat 
ically different between the two countries, however, with Sweden's 
active program expenditure ratio more than double the ratio for passive 
programs while just the opposite is true for Britain. At the same time, 
Sweden enjoyed the lowest unemployment rate shown in table 2.2 and 
the United Kingdom suffered the highest. Long-term unemployment is 
a particularly severe problem in Britain, as it is in Germany. At the 
other end of the spectrum, Japan ranks lowest among the seven nations 
in terms of public expenditures on both active and passive labor market 
programs. The Japanese unemployment rate, nevertheless, is also very 
low at 2.7 percent, a rate that is only slightly higher than Sweden's rate 
(2.3 percent). Labor market program expenditure ratios for the United 
States are seen to be only slightly higher than those for Japan, while 
the U.S. unemployment rate is roughly in the middle of the pack at 6.4 
percent. Long-term unemployment is a relatively minor problem for 
American workers.
This chapter provides background information intended to help in 
understanding the differences across nations in labor market program 
expenditures and unemployment rates shown in tables 2.1 and 2.2. The 
discussion is divided into four main sections, which contrast the histor 
ical development of labor market programs in Western Europe, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and North America and Australia. The Western 
European model is illustrated by programs in Sweden and Germany. A 
final section summarizes the discussion.
The Western European Model
The centerpiece of the Western European model is a comprehensive 
and stable institutional structure for addressing employment and train 
ing issues. Haveman and Saks (1985) characterize this structure as fol 
lows:
1. A single primary agency established by the national government 
but often independent of it.
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2. An extensive network of local offices emphasizing outreach to 
employers and workers.
3. Participation in policy formulation and implementation by 
employer groups and trade unions.
4. Substantial expenditures on developing a large professional staff 
of placement, counseling, and training personnel.
Along with a stable institutional structure for implementing labor 
market programs, most Western European countries maintain an indus 
trial relations system that imposes advance notice and severance pay 
requirements on employers who dismiss workers and that encourages 
adjustment of work hours in lieu of layoffs.
The structure of the Western European model can be understood 
more clearly by examining labor market programs in place in Sweden 
and Germany. As indicated in table 2.1, Sweden and Germany ranked 
one and two, respectively, in the level of public expenditures devoted to 
active labor market programs during the second half of the 1980s.
Sweden
The Swedish labor market has long been identified with centralized 
collective bargaining. Milner (1990, p. 85) remarks that by the 1930s 
the labor movement in Sweden had transformed itself from "a network 
of organizations designed to defend workers from capitalist exploita 
tion to a confident alternative source of national leadership." Vande- 
walle (1991) estimates that currently about 95 percent of Sweden's 
blue-collar workers and some 80 percent of salaried workers are part of 
the Trade Union Confederation.
In the immediate postwar period, Swedish union leaders faced a per 
plexing dilemma (see Rehn 1985). On one hand, they could pursue a 
militant wage policy that would contribute to inflation and ultimately 
erode away the real wage gains of their members. On the other, they 
could present moderate wage demands and be judged as ineffective by 
a rank and file interested in a union movement that delivered the goods 
in terms of rising money wages.
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The solution hammered out by the Trade Union Confederation in 
1951 to solve this dilemma is known as the "Rehn-Meidner model." 
There are three main elements to the model.
1. Maintenance of a level of aggregate demand necessary to avoid 
inflation.
2. Implementation of a "wage solidarity" policy requiring wage 
equalization across industries and regions.
3. Protection of workers from the unemployment that would other 
wise result from limited aggregate demand management (element 1) 
and rigid wages (element 2) by active labor market programs intended 
to facilitate worker mobility across industries and regions.
The second of these elements reflects the Trade Union Confederation's 
position that allowing wage differentials across labor markets amounts 
to subsidizing firms and industries with low productivity and profits 
while restraining the growth of highly productive firms and industries. 
At the same time, a policy of wage equalization has the unfortunate 
side effect of eliminating market signals that encourage the efficient 
movement of labor from contracting to expanding industries. 3 As a 
substitute for wage differentials responsive to market forces, the active 
labor market policy called for by the third element seeks to equip laid- 
off workers to locate and qualify for new jobs in growing industries. 
An active labor market policy reflects the central place of work in the 
Swedish value system. Work is perceived as part of living a normal 
life; income transfers cannot replace employment for the able-bodied 
and even for those who are handicapped (Milner 1990, p. 101). Thus, 
Swedish labor market policies have historically been strongly oriented 
toward satisfying the first of the six evaluation criteria outlined in 
chapter 1.
By the mid-1950s, the Swedish government was persuaded to 
implement the Rehn-Meidner model. The active labor market policy 
called for by the model is administered by the National Labor Market 
Board, which consists of a national board and twenty-four regional 
boards. Each board is composed of labor, employer, and government 
members, with representatives of labor and employer organizations 
dominating the decision-making processes of the boards. The national
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board administers the local boards and the national Employment Ser 
vice, while regional boards administer local employment exchange 
offices. Also administered under the National Labor Market Board is a 
nationwide system of employability institutes, which is responsible for 
serving the occupationally handicapped.
Created in 1986, a parallel institution—the National Employment 
Training Board (AMU)—was given responsibility for operating Swe 
den's nationwide system of 100 skill training centers. 4 Like the 
National Labor Market Board, the AMU is composed of a national 
board and twenty-five regional boards, each board consisting of 
employer, union, and government members. The AMU does not 
receive direct government funding. Instead, it sells training services to 
any customer willing to buy, although the Employment Service is its
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primary customer. Figure 2.1 summarizes the organizational structure 
of the Swedish labor market system.
The broad range of Swedish labor market programs can perhaps be 
best visualized in the list presented below. 5
1. Counseling and Job Placement
2. Supply-Side Programs 
a. Employment training
•Vocational training and basic education courses taught at 
AMU employment training centers
•Vocational rehabilitation at employability institutes
•In-house employment training—grants paid to companies to 
subsidize the cost of sending employees to training courses 
b. Relocation grants paid to workers
3. Demand-Side Programs
a. Relief work—public sector jobs lasting no more than six 
months
b. Recruitment subsidies—a subsidy of up to 60 percent of wage 
costs for six months targeted to job seekers aged 18-24, the 
hardcore unemployed, and unemployed workers whose unem 
ployment benefits are about to expire
c. Youth traineeships—a 100 percent wage subsidy for six 
months targeted to workers under age 25
d. Start-up grants—grants to assist unemployed workers to start 
up their own small businesses
e. Wage subsidies—subsidies of up to 100 percent to assist the 
placement of disabled persons in public- or private-sector jobs
f. Sheltered employment—subsidies of 75 percent of labor costs 
to municipal employers who hire the occupationally handi 
capped
4. Income Support to the Unemployed
a. Benefits from an unemployment insurance society 
b. Unemployment assistance
An unemployed Swedish worker typically encounters a sequence of 
active labor market programs. Initially, job seekers pass through a 
series of counseling and placement services provided at a local
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employment exchange office of the Employment Service. The system 
of employment exchange offices is the focal point of Swedish labor 
market policy. The system is completely computerized, and by law all 
job vacancies (with certain exceptions) in both the public and private 
sectors must be registered with the Employment Service. If a job for 
which an unemployed job seeker is qualified is not available in the 
local area but is available elsewhere in the country, the employment 
office will pay the cost of travel to interview with the potential 
employer and will subsidize moving expenses if a job is located.
Those who remain jobless are placed in a training program in a 
nearby skill center where they are retrained to qualify for jobs in grow 
ing industries. Training is free to participating workers, and trainees 
are eligible to receive an income-maintenance allowance, the size of 
which depends on number of dependents. For handicapped workers, 
the system of employability institutes offers vocational rehabilitation 
and intensive counseling. As emphasized in table 2.3, adult training is 
the active labor market program that, by international standards, is 
funded at an especially high level. Since training through the AMU is 
widely used by Swedish workers—those employed as well as the job 
less—to enhance their labor market skills, government training is a key 
element in the Swedish concept of lifetime learning.
Retrained workers who have still not been placed in a job are eligi 
ble for temporary employment in relief work projects (typically public 
construction projects) and wage-subsidy (or "recruitment") programs 
intended to create jobs in both the public and private sectors. These 
demand-side programs are designed especially to increase the employ 
ment opportunities of youth, the disabled, and the hardcore unem 
ployed. In terms of table 2.3, these measures show up in the large 
expenditure ratios for youth and disabled worker programs, as well as 
in the substantial expenditure ratio for direct job creation/employment 
subsidy programs. It should be noted that the OECD includes subsidies 
for in-house workplace training in the adult training category of the 
table rather than in the job creation/employment subsidy category.
The Swedish Institute (1990) estimates that 3 to 4 percent of the 
labor force is involved in a government-sponsored active labor market 
program at any point in time. The impact of this level of labor market 
program participation on Sweden's unemployment rate is vividly
Table 2.3 Breakdown of Public Expenditures on Active Labor Market Programs as a Percentage of GDP, Seven 






























































SOURCE: OECD (1989, table A.I).
a. Categories may not sum to total because of founding error.
b. For 1987 and 1988.
c. For 1986-88.
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brought out in a recent analysis by Sorrentino (1993), in which she cal 
culates alternative measures of unemployment for nine countries in 
1989. As seen in table 2.4, Sweden's unemployment rate in 1989 rises 
sharply from 1.4 percent (the official or U-5 measure) to 3.4 percent 
(the U-6 measure) when involuntary part-time work is treated as at 
least partial unemployment.6 But an even bigger change from the U-5 
rate occurs when account is taken of the absorption by active labor 
market programs of persons who otherwise would be either unem 
ployed or discouraged workers. Sorrentino (1993, p. 17) estimates that 
Sweden's official unemployment rate in 1989 would have more than 
tripled to 4.5 percent if all labor market program participants had oth 
erwise been unemployed. Similarly, the U-7 rate would have increased 
from the 3.8 percent shown to 7.3 percent if all program participants 
would otherwise have been either unemployed or discouraged workers. 
While a U-7 rate of 7.3 percent would have ranked Sweden in a virtual 
tie with Japan as the lowest among the countries analyzed, it is much 
closer to the U.S. U-7 rate of 7.9 percent than are the two countries' U- 
5 rates.












































SOURCE: Sorrentino (1993, table 1).
NOTE: alternative unemployment indicators are defined as:
U-l: long-term (13+ weeks) unemployment rate,
U-2: job loser rate,
U-5: conventional unemployment rate,
U-6: unemployment rate including per sons working part-time for economic reasons, and
U-7: U-6 plus discouraged workers.
n.a. indicates not available.
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Workers who remain jobless even after their exposure to govern 
ment employment services, training programs, and demand-side pro 
grams are eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits. Most 
unemployment insurance coverage in Sweden is administered by 
unemployment insurance societies associated with labor unions. In 
addition, the government offers unemployment assistance (known as 
KAS) to workers who are not members of insurance societies, to new 
labor market entrants, and to unemployed workers older than age 60 
who have exhausted insurance benefits (see Burtless 1987, pp. 131- 
33).
At this point, it may be useful to pause a moment to emphasize the 
distinction between the unemployment insurance (UI) and unemploy 
ment assistance (UA) programs found in Sweden and many other 
industrialized countries, especially in Western Europe (see table 2.5). 
As described by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991, pp. 1688-97), UI 
plans are broadly characterized by the following provisions:
1. Benefits are not paid to persons who enter unemployment volun 
tarily.
2. Benefits may not be paid for an initial period.
3. Benefits are conditional on the person making a genuine effort to 
search for new employment.
4. Refusal of suitable job offers, beyond some specified number, 
leads to disqualification for benefits.
5. Benefits are contributory, meaning that eligibility depends on the 
past record of insured employment.
6. The amount of benefits received may depend on past earnings.
7. Benefits are paid for a limited period of time.
8. Eligibility for benefits is not affected by the level of income of 
other household members.
Failure to satisfy provisions 1, 3-5, and 7 typically means that a sizable 
fraction of the unemployed is not covered by UI.
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Unemployment assistance plans share provisions 1-4 with UI. The 
key difference between the two is that the amount of UA benefits 
received depends on other income and on assets via a means test. As a 
consequence, eligibility for UA benefits is not related to past employ 
ment, and benefits may be received for an indefinite period. In addi 
tion, UA benefits do not depend on previous wages but are affected by 
the earnings of other household members. Atkinson and Micklewright 
(1991, pp. 1693-94) comment that a particular country's unemploy 
ment compensation system is frequently difficult to classify as either a 
UI or UA plan or as a dual UI/UA plan. A case in point is the Swedish 
KAS scheme, which is intended for those who do not satisfy UI eligi 
bility requirements and is thus classified in table 2.5 as a UA plan. 
Nonetheless, KAS is of limited duration, is not means-tested, and 
depends on employment history—all characteristics of UI.
Germany
Germany's "dual system" of apprenticeship training is well known 
for producing highly skilled frontline workers. At the same time, table 
2.1 shows that Germany ranks second only to Sweden in terms of 
active labor market program expenditures and third behind Britain and 
Canada on passive labor market expenditures. One other consideration 
is that both table 2.2 and the U-1 measure in table 2.4 indicate that Ger 
many faces a relatively high incidence of long-term unemployment.
Marshall and Tucker (1992, p. 206) argue that key to understanding 
the paradox of a highly skilled workforce coexisting with relatively 
large labor market program expenditures and high long-term unem 
ployment is the strong identification of German workers with a trade or 
occupation that develops over time as they progress from apprentice to 
journeyman to master craftsman. This system clearly produces excep 
tionally well-qualified workers. Moreover, the high skill level of the 
workforce when coupled with restrictions on layoffs imposed in indus 
trial relations and by law provides employers a strong incentive to 
make further investments in firm-specific training. 7 The consequence is 
a workplace that is highly flexible in terms of both the tasks that can be 
taken on by workers and the freedom enjoyed by employers to intro 
duce new technology. The downside of this system is that increased job 
security with the firm ("internal flexibility") is accomplished at the
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Sweden UI and UA 14 months
Germany UI and UA Indefinite
Japan UI only
U.K. UI and UA Indefinite







UI for 60 weeks if age under 55; 90 
weeks if age 55 or older. UA (KAS 
benefits) dependent on employment 
history for 150 days (longer if age 55 
or older).
UI for between 6 and 32 months 
depending on employment history 
and age. UA instead of UI or 
following UI.
UI subsidy paid to employers to keep 
temporarily laid-off workers on the 
payroll. UI paid directly to 
permanently laid-off workers.
UI for up to 12 months depending on 
employment history. UA instead of, 
during, or after UI.
Up to 50 weeks depending on 
regional unemployment rate and 
employment history.
UI for up to 6 months depending on 
the state, employment history, and 
unemployment rate.
SOURCE: Atkinson and Micklewright (1991, tables 2 and 3) and discussion in text.
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expense of employment security provided through the market ("exter 
nal flexibility"). That is, workers who are laid off or seek a voluntary 
job change face a difficult transition in moving to jobs comparable in 
wages and responsibilities in other occupations or industries.
Apprenticeship training
Formal vocational training in Germany dates back to the middle 
ages. 8 Medieval craft guilds established the concept of Master Crafts 
man or Meister, whose responsibilities include the task of training 
apprentices. By the end of the nineteenth century, Crafts Chambers and 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce assumed the role of coordinating 
apprenticeship training programs; and in 1938 a law was passed requir 
ing all apprentices to receive formal schooling in conjunction with 
their on-the-job training. The Vocational Training Act of 1969 estab 
lished the legal framework for the German apprenticeship approach to 
training. Under this act, most high school graduates not going on to 
college become apprentices at the age of 15 or 16 in one of 378 classi 
fied occupations. Wilfried Prewo, chief executive of the Hanover 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce, reports that some 70 percent of 
young Germans sign up for apprenticeship training, and that 6.5 per 
cent of the labor force in 1992 was enrolled in apprenticeships (see 
Prewo 1993). It is not unusual for the chief executive officers of large 
German companies to have begun their careers as apprentices with 
their firms.
The dual system for training apprentices is based on a partnership 
between schools, labor unions, employers, and the government. A sec 
ondary school graduate who wishes to receive training applies for an 
apprenticeship position with an employer. Obtaining an apprenticeship 
with a desirable employer depends on the applicant having a strong 
academic record and good recommendations from his or her teachers. 
If the application is successful, the employer enters into a contract to 
provide the apprentice with training in accordance with the provisions 
of the Vocational Training Act. Length of training varies from two 
years to three and one-half years, depending on the occupation. Under 
the terms of the contract, the employer must provide accredited train 
ing that combines on-the-job training supervised by a Meister at the 
employer's workplace with one or two days per week of off-the-job 
training at a state vocational school (a Bemfsschule). Program accredi-
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tation is the responsibility of self-governing Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce. Because of the obligation to ensure that the apprentice is 
properly trained, employers have a strong motivation to maintain close 
contact with vocational schools and the curricula they offer. All direct 
costs associated with workplace training are borne by the firm supply 
ing the training, and the apprentice receives a monthly allowance. 
Monthly allowances for the first year of an apprenticeship vary 
between 20 and 27 percent of the earnings of a fully trained worker and 
increase yearly to between 27 and 53 percent by the fourth year (Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate 1991, p. 20). The government supplies a means- 
tested supplement to employer-provided allowances, which shows up 
as the major component of the "special youth measures" expenditure 
category in table 2.3.
At the end of the contract period, the apprentice faces a written 
examination and a careful review of selected samples of his or her 
work. Apprentices who successfully pass their final examination are 
awarded a certificate, honored by employers throughout Germany, 
which certifies that they possess the skills required to assume journey 
man status in their trade or occupation. Responsibility for the develop 
ment, administration, and grading of exams rests with the Chambers. 
The apprenticeship system substantially eases the school-to-work tran 
sition of young Germans, making the ratio of youth unemployment to 
adult unemployment in Germany by far the lowest of the nine counties 
examined by Sorrentino (1993). Lerman and Pouncy (1990) argue per 
suasively that a German-style apprenticeship program could substan 
tially benefit non-college-bound American youth by strengthening the 
link between schooling and work and establishing ties with adult men 
tors.
Once they have completed an apprenticeship, adult workers have the 
opportunity to continue their training in a Meister or a Technician pro 
gram. To become a Meister, a skilled worker may attend a full-time 
course at a Meister training center for one or two years or a part-time 
course for up to three years. It is interesting to note that all businesses 
providing services that fall within the 378 classified occupations cov 
ered by apprenticeship training must employ at least one Meister (Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate 1991, p. 15). Technician courses are usually full 
time for two years. Lynch (1993a, p. 27) observes that there is a current
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debate in Germany on whether further training should be subject to the 
same degree of regulation as apprenticeships.
Other labor market programs
As suggested by table 2.3, the German dual system of apprentice 
ship training provides initial training in a much larger system of labor 
market programs. Germany offers workers an unemployment compen 
sation system that is fully integrated with its job matching and training 
programs. The system is operated by the Federal Employment Service 
(Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit), established in 1952 as a quasi-governmen 
tal agency governed by representatives of unions, employer associa 
tions, and public organizations.
The German government's employment and training policy, imple 
mented through the Federal Employment Service, is aimed at assisting 
the movement of labor from declining to growing industries. As is the 
case in Sweden, a system of national wage determination keeps the 
wages of German workers high and wage differentials small, thus lim 
iting the market's ability to signal labor shortages and surpluses. To 
facilitate labor mobility, the Federal Employment Service operates 
one-stop jobs centers called Arbeitsamt, located in cities and larger 
towns throughout the country, which serve as the universal intake point 
for the unemployed and for employed workers seeking to upgrade their 
skills. These jobs centers offer counseling and assessment services 
along with job matching with local employers. In addition, relocation 
grants are available to enable unemployed workers to expand the geo 
graphic scope of their job search.
Lynch (1994) points out that while the incidence of firm-based train 
ing for German workers 20 to 24 years of age is the highest in the 
world, it is much less common for workers older than age 24. Job seek 
ers who require services beyond job matching and relocation allow 
ances are eligible for financial assistance to enroll in a retraining 
program supplied by an institutional training provider. There is no cen 
tral adult training agency like the Swedish AMU. Unemployed workers 
undergoing retraining are eligible for unemployment insurance benefits 
(Arbeitslosengeld), and the unemployed may be disqualified from 
receiving benefits for refusal to relocate or to participate in a retraining 
program. In addition, unemployed workers undergoing training are eli 
gible for a subsistence allowance to cover part or all of their costs of
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tuition, educational supplies, travel, and lodging if trainees are away 
from home. Those who cannot be matched to vacant jobs even after 
completing a retraining program may be referred to a temporary public 
service employment program or to a private-sector wage-subsidy pro 
gram.
Abraham and Houseman (1993, pp. 26-27) comment that beginning 
in the mid-1980s, the German government implicitly began to subsi 
dize retirement at earlier and earlier ages by changing the rules about 
UI coverage for older workers. As of 1987, the maximum period of 
benefit eligibility was set at 18 months for workers aged 42 or 43, 22 
months for those aged 44 through 48, 26 months for those aged 49 
through 53, and 32 months for those aged 54 and over. A popular early 
retirement program allows workers aged 60 who have contributed to 
the retirement system for at least 15 years and who have been unem 
ployed for at least 52 weeks out of the last year and a half to start 
receiving government retirement benefits. Thus, a worker aged 57 
years and four months can be dismissed and receive UI, possibly sup 
plemented by a company pension, for 32 months, and then begin col 
lecting government retirement benefits at age 60.
As noted in table 2.5, unemployed Germans are eligible for two sep 
arate systems of jobless pay. Unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosen- 
hilfe) furnishes income support for an indefinite period to the 
unemployed who have exhausted their unemployment insurance bene 
fits. Currently, unemployed workers with children receive 67 percent 
of their previous after-tax earnings in UI benefits, while childless cou 
ples and single individuals receive 60 percent (Wessel and Benjamin 
1994). UA benefits provide as much as 57 percent of previous earnings 
for those with children and 52 percent for those without. In contrast to 
these percentages, unemployed American workers are eligible for up to 
six months of UI benefits that rarely exceed half of what they previ 
ously earned.
UI and UA rank one and two among the expenditure categories the 
OECD reports for Germany under the heading of unemployment com 
pensation (see OECD 1988, p. 101). Short-time work compensation is 
the third major unemployment compensation program component. To 
avoid layoffs by encouraging work sharing, German employers, with 
the approval of works councils and the Federal Employment Service, 
may reduce employees' hours of work, and employees working
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reduced hours are eligible to collect prorated UI benefits. Work sharing 
and the strong legal protection against layoffs cause employers to treat 
layoffs as a strategy of last resort. It is typical in German "employment 
plans" for redundant workers to remain with their employers at wages 
subsidized by public funds while they are being retrained. In a highly 
publicized recent example, Volkswagen announced in November of 
1993 that it had reached an agreement with local government officials 
and its works council to introduce a four-day workweek for 100,000 
VW employers. This plan would prevent—or at least delay—the laying 
off of 30,000 redundant employers who would receive retraining ser 
vices while remaining on the company's payroll.
Burtless (1987, p. 146) concludes that the much higher incidence of 
long-term unemployment in Germany than in the United States arises 
because the generous German unemployment compensation system 
allows the unemployed to be more selective about the jobs they find 
acceptable. At the same time, as argued by Marshall and Tucker 
(1992), the internal flexibility of German firms decreases the number 
of job vacancies available to experienced workers from the outside. 
The consequence is that the unemployment rates appearing in tables 
2.2 and 2.3 for Germany and the United States are very similar 
because, although German workers are less likely to lose their jobs 
through layoffs than Americans, their rate of reemployment is also 
lower, thereby increasing the incidence of long-term unemployment.
The Japanese Model
Japan's employment laws and practices, like those of Sweden, are 
aimed at preventing unemployment; and table 2.2 indicates that at 2.7 
percent, the unemployment rate in Japan during the 1985-88 period 
exceeds only that of Sweden. Unlike Sweden, which relies primarily 
on government labor market policy, the Japanese model is based on a 
commitment of private sector employers to bear the major responsibil 
ity for maintaining a low level of unemployment. Tables 2.1 and 2.3 
reflect this commitment, indicating that the Japanese government 
spends relatively little in public funds on both active and passive labor 
market measures and virtually nothing on adult training.
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The Japanese firm-based model builds on a foundation of well- 
developed training provided by the educational system in the native 
language, science, and mathematics. Japanese high schools success 
fully retain a very high percentage of the population until age 18 and 
produce graduates who are homogeneous in basic knowledge, willing 
ness to learn new skills, and ability to work with others. Hashimoto 
(1994) notes that employers stress academic achievement in their hir 
ing decisions and often establish ongoing arrangements with individual 
high schools to help in recruiting their graduates year after year.
Young workers are hired on the expectation that job-specific skills 
will be learned in the workplace. It is important to emphasize, however, 
that learning does not end once a worker has achieved competency in a 
particular task. Rather, managers in large firms are responsible for 
designing work experience and training opportunities that continue 
throughout a worker's career. The Japanese practice of continuous 
improvement in skills is known as kaizen. Critical in the Japanese tra 
dition of hierarchical training is the attitude instilled in senior workers 
that it is their duty to train younger, less-experienced workers. Instead 
of being considered a threat to the job security of incumbent workers, a 
successful trainee is regarded as a credit to the senior employee who, in 
turn, is judged to be all the more valuable to the employer. In this con 
nection, Brown et al. (1993, p. 434) suggest that Japanese
[P]erformance appraisal procedures reflect a delicate balancing of 
individual and group incentives. While it is individuals who are 
evaluated and rewarded, an important part of what is evaluated is 
contribution to the group. . . . The appraisal system explicitly 
encourages teaching of subordinates.
Firm-sponsored training in Japan can be broken down into three 
main components. First and most important are general but still firm- 
specific skills acquired primarily by rotation through various jobs 
within the firm. The rotation may be across different departments (e.g., 
new engineers spend time in sales and in rotations between research 
and manufacturing) as well as between related jobs in the same depart 
ment that are grouped together in quality circles. Self-study of training 
manuals is an important aspect of on-the-job learning. A second com 
ponent is training off the job, usually in special centers organized by 
the company. Few workers ever return to external educational institu-
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tions for further training. Third, workers develop skills by enrolling in 
correspondence courses, with the employer often underwriting the cost 
of the courses.
The underlying presumption of the Japanese model is that workers 
are expected to learn throughout their careers with an employer. The 
result is a broadly trained workforce capable of adjusting rapidly to 
changes in product demand, unforeseen problems on the shop floor, 
and the introduction of new technology. Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow 
(1989, p. 91) furnish an interesting example involving workers 
employed by Nippon Steel. In a major corporate restructuring, the 
prior computer experience acquired by production line workers 
allowed them to be placed in jobs in new businesses established by the 
company as it diversified out of steel. The authors report that in Nip 
pon's new electronics and communications companies, 2,000 out of 
2,500 new employees were former Nippon Steel workers. That is, blue- 
collar workers formerly engaged in producing steel were sufficiently 
well trained in computer skills to be hired in the new enterprises as 
programmers.
The discussion thus far of the broad-based training possessed by 
Japanese workers applies most directly to so-called regular employees 
of large firms (those covered by lifetime employment guarantees) in 
export-oriented industries. In the case of a demand shock, these work 
ers are not typically laid off from their jobs. Rather, a slot is found for 
them in another department within the firm, in a subsidiary, or even in a 
different firm. Ono (1993) explains that redundant employees kept on 
the payroll but given no tasks to perform under Japan's lifetime 
employment system are said to be shown the "window seat," and he 
reports estimates that there are currently one million Japanese workers 
being supported in this way until they retire at age 60.
Nonregular workers and workers employed by small and medium- 
sized firms are more subject to layoffs during an economic downturn. 
Major categories of workers whose employment is governed by fixed- 
term contracts include part-time and so-called temporary workers—so- 
called because they may have been employed by the same firm for 
years. Although it is difficult to pin down with precision, there is little 
doubt that the proportion of Japanese workers covered by lifetime 
employment guarantees is declining. Williams (1994) reports that the 
lifetime employment system, which covered about half of all Japanese
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employees in the mid-1970s, now extends to roughly one-quarter of 
workers. Focusing on just part-time employment, Schlesinger and 
Kanabayashi (1992) write that nearly 20 percent of the Japanese work 
force is believed to be part time—a proportion that has nearly tripled 
over the past twenty years. In the manufacturing sector, Houseman and 
Abraham (1993, p. 46) add that the percentage of part-time workers 
(most of whom are women) has increased rapidly from 4 percent of 
manufacturing workers in 1978 to 9 percent in 1988.
Once laid off, part-time workers—especially women and older 
workers—tend to drop out of the labor force. 9 In table 2.4, Sorrentino 
calculates a more than threefold jump from the U-5 or official Japanese 
unemployment rate to the U-7 rate which treats discouraged workers as 
unemployed rather than labor force drop-outs. This dramatic increase 
is driven by the U-5 and U-7 rates for females (not shown), which are 
2.8 percent and 12.3 percent, respectively.
Because Japanese employment practices make it difficult for dis 
placed workers to be reemployed, government adjustment assistance 
programs are designed to prevent workers from ever being unem 
ployed. There are three major programs (see Dore, Bounine-Cabale, 
and Tapiola 1989, annex; and OECD 1992, p. 139).
In the first of these programs, an Employment Adjustment Subsidy 
is paid to employers as an incentive to keep redundant workers on the 
payroll on a short-term basis. Hashimoto (1993) reports that following 
the 1973 oil shock, the Employment Insurance Law of 1975 shifted the 
usual concept of unemployment insurance benefits paid directly to 
unemployed workers to a system in which subsidies are given to 
employers who, in turn, provide compensation to workers on furlough. 
A novel feature of this law is that it enables furloughed workers to 
remain "employed" by the firm. The law also provides an employment 
subsidy to employers who wish to implement short-time work sched 
ules involving reduced days per week or per month. Hashimoto (1993, 
p. 145) estimates that if all Japanese workers who were employed but 
not currently working were counted as being in fact on temporary lay 
off, the Japanese unemployment rate of 2.5 percent in 1988 would rise 
to 3.8 percent. That is, as much as 43 percent of the gap between the 
U.S. unemployment rate of 5.5 percent in 1988 and the Japanese unem 
ployment rate is due to the difference in the statistical treatment of tem 
porarily laid-off persons.
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Longer-term adjustment assistance in Japan is provided through a 
second program—the Subsidy for Industrial Employment Stabiliza 
tion—which is restricted to employers in designated depressed indus 
tries (i.e., industries that have undergone a 10 percent decrease in 
output or employment). Forms of assistance provided are (1) a subsidy 
to existing employers to keep redundant workers on the payroll while 
they are enrolled in a training program sponsored by a public training 
center (the training center may subcontract training to a private 
employer or an employer association), and (2) a wage subsidy of up to 
two-thirds of the first year's salary paid to receiving employers who 
hire eligible displaced workers. To qualify for longer-term assistance, 
an employer must satisfy the Employment Service that it has a realistic 
plan that will lead to permanent employment for affected workers. 
Both subsidy programs are funded by a 0.35 percent payroll tax 
assessed on employers.
The third major program is intended to accelerate the reemployment 
of especially disadvantaged workers. Known as the Subsidy for 
Employment Development for Specified Job Applicants, this program 
provides a subsidy to employers who hire handicapped workers, single 
mothers, and workers older than age 45 who have been displaced from 
designated depressed industries.
The government also provides unemployment insurance benefits in 
the event of a job loss although, as table 2.1 indicates, resources com 
mitted to unemployment benefits are meager. Early in their unemploy 
ment spell, job seekers receive a short placement/counseling interview 
primarily intended to speed up the job matching process. In 1985, 
Japan introduced a reemployment bonus program to stimulate active 
job search by the unemployed (see OECD 1992, annex 3.A). The 
reemployment bonus works as follows. An unemployment insurance 
recipient who finds a job during the first half of his or her benefit enti 
tlement period is eligible to receive a lump-sum bonus equivalent to 
between one-third and two-thirds of the total value of the remaining 
benefit entitlement. For example, if the original entitlement to benefits 
is 90 days, an unemployed worker who found a job within the first 45 
days would be eligible to receive a lump-sum bonus equivalent to 30 
days of benefits. Evidence from several reemployment bonus demon 
stration projects carried out in the United States is reported in the next 
chapter.
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The United Kingdom
As indicated by table 2.2 and the U-l unemployment indicator in 
table 2.4, the United Kingdom has the dubious distinction of having 
the highest unemployment rate and, along with Germany, the greatest 
incidence of long-term unemployment of the nations considered. At the 
same time, Britain's combined expenditures on active and passive 
labor market measures displayed in table 2.1 are almost as high as 
those in Sweden. But while Swedish active program expenditures 
exceed passive expenditures by more than 2 to 1, the same ratio is less 
than 0.5 for the United Kingdom.
As in Germany, the British unemployment compensation system 
consists of two programs. First, unemployed workers are eligible for 
regular unemployment insurance benefits for up to 12 months. The size 
of these benefits hinges on previous commitment to the labor force. In 
addition, workers who are still unemployed after one year are eligible 
for the Income Support program, which provides benefits related to 
family size for an indefinite period and a housing allowance. The 
OECD (1992, annex 3.B) notes that for family heads, Income Support 
benefits exceed after-tax earnings from low-wage jobs. Given the gen 
erosity of the unemployment compensation system, it is not surprising 
that discussions of the economic malaise existing in many of Britain's 
industrial cities emphasize the long-term dependency of workers on 
safety net programs (see, for example, Horwitz 1991). 10
Turning to active labor market policies, table 2.3 shows that Brit 
ain's expenditure ratio on job creation/employment subsidy programs 
is a close second to that of Sweden. For much of the postwar period, 
Britain has lagged behind other industrialized nations in economic 
growth and labor productivity. Trebilcock (1986, ch. 4) comments that 
despite the government's sensitivity to the challenges posed by indus 
trial decline, Britain's industrial and labor market policies have been 
notable for their ad hoc attempts to preserve the status quo. In particu 
lar, a consequence of the joining together of the interests of politically 
powerful labor unions and employer organizations is government labor 
market policies that emphasized employment maintenance rather than 
reducing the adjustment costs of redundant workers. Such policies are
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clearly inconsistent with the criterion of encouraging worker mobility 
out of distressed industries.
An example of an active labor market policy that reduced rather than 
encouraged labor market mobility was the Temporary Employment 
Subsidy introduced in Britain in 1975. That program made a wage sub 
sidy of £20 per worker per week available to firms that agreed to fore 
stall laying off ten or more workers. At the time, £20 was equivalent to 
one-half the level of standard benefits available under the unemploy 
ment compensation program. Although the wage subsidy was limited 
to one year, further assistance for an additional six months was avail 
able under a supplementary program. Trebilcock (1986, p. 199) sug 
gests that the government's inability to insulate itself from political 
pressure was particularly heightened when declining firms were con 
centrated in depressed regions or when the firms were nationalized.
Retraining in the United Kingdom has taken a similar industry-spe 
cific approach. The 1964 Industrial Training Act made the retraining of 
redundant workers in a particular British industry the responsibility of 
employers in that industry through the formation of tripartite Industrial 
Training Boards (ITBs). Each ITB was empowered to impose a payroll 
tax on employers in its industry to fund an industry-specific training 
program, with additional funding from the national government. In 
1969, twenty-seven ITBs covered 15 million workers and levied hun 
dreds of millions of pounds in taxes, which were then returned to 
employers in the form of grants for approved training programs (see 
Department of Employment 1988, p. 34). The ITB approach was 
apparently successful in attaining the objective of encouraging 
employers who had been poaching skilled employees from other firms 
in their industry to provide more training themselves. However, con 
cerns were raised about whether the quality of training matched the 
quality provided by major competitors in other nations.
In 1979 the Thatcher government came to power and implemented a 
number of reforms broadly intended to restrict institutional interven 
tion in product and labor markets and to stimulate market competition 
and entrepreneurship. In the labor market, the new government criti 
cized ITB training on the grounds that it reinforced a narrow, craft- 
based approach to work organization in a world calling for more flexi 
ble arrangements (see Cappelli 1993b, p. 10)." By 1981 government 
subsidies to Industrial Training Boards were ended, and member com-
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panics were asked whether they wanted their ITBs to continue as 
totally industry-funded entities. Most firms declined, and by 1988 just 
seven ITBs remained.
For adult workers, two new programs implemented by the Thatcher 
government during the second half of the 1980s are especially note 
worthy. The first establishes a national network of Training and Enter 
prise Councils (TECs) intended to decentralize the provision of 
training services to the local level and to increase the impact of the 
business community on training program decision making. TECs are 
business-led community partnerships responsible for the operation of 
programs providing training opportunities and training allowances to 
youth and unemployed adults, temporary public service employment, 
and self-employment assistance to unemployed adults. The second new 
program seeks to integrate job placement at the local level with the 
unemployment compensation system. These innovations are discussed 
in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.
Looking specifically at young workers, a final point to note in con 
nection with table 2.3 is Britain's very high expenditure ratio for spe 
cial youth measures. This largely represents spending on the Youth 
Training Scheme (YTS) introduced in 1983 to remedy a high rate of 
youth unemployment and a low rate, relative to other advanced OECD 
nations, of British youth enrolled in education and training programs. 
As described by Cappelli (1993b), YTS provided out-of-school youth 
with general work skills through programs that integrated employer- 
based job training with off-the-job classroom education. Operated by 
locally based Area Manpower Boards, the objective of the YTS pro 
gram was to assist participants in working toward earning nationally 
recognized occupational credentials. In 1986, the National Council for 
Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ) was created to rationalize the 
diverse set of existing occupational qualifications. NCVQ accreditation 
is based on competencies determined by employers in the industry sub 
ject to the requirement that training be of sufficient breadth to provide a 
basis for further personal development (Department of Employment 
1988, pp. 32-33).
Cappelli (1993b, pp. 16-17) notes that in 1988 the government con 
cluded that the Youth Training Scheme was a "resounding success." Yet 
YTS was basically dismantled in 1989 and replaced by the Youth 
Training (YT) program. Reflecting a shift in political priorities due to a
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temporary decline in youth unemployment and a general lack of 
employer support, Youth Training reduced the length of training pro 
grams available to youth and cut back on the on-the-job training com 
ponent. YT is currently one of a number of government-funded 
employment and training programs operated under the employer-led 
TEC framework.
North America and Australia
Compared to Western European and Japanese employers, custom 
and national labor market policy make it much more likely that 
employers in Canada, Australia, and the United States will respond to 
demand shocks by laying off workers rather than by adjusting compen 
sation or hours of work. At the same time, workers in these nations are 
typically expected to prepare for and to locate vacant jobs with rela 
tively little government assistance. For Canada and the United States, a 
high incidence of layoffs and an emphasis on worker self-reliance in 
locating new jobs is reflected in table 2.4 in the relatively high U-2 
unemployment indicator measuring the unemployment rate only for 
job losers and the relatively low (especially for the United States) U-l 
or long-term unemployment rate. Table 2.2 also captures the relatively 
low incidence of long-term unemployment in Canada and the United 
States. Australia, on the other hand, does face a relatively high level of 
long-term unemployment.
Canada
Referring to table 2.1, probably the most dramatic difference 
between Canada and the United States is that Canadian expenditures 
on passive labor market programs are more than triple those of the 
United States. This difference reflects the much more comprehensive 
and generous unemployment insurance system in place in Canada. 12 
One consideration is that unemployed Canadians are eligible for UI 
benefits for up to 50 weeks, whereas UI is available to American job 
seekers in most states for no more than 26 weeks. Another is that work 
ers who quit their jobs are eligible for UI in Canada but not in the
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United States. Still another consideration is that in many parts of Can 
ada individuals are eligible for unemployment benefits after working a 
minimum of just 10 or 12 weeks a year. American workers, by contrast, 
are typically eligible for UI only after having worked a minimum of 20 
weeks per year.
Green and Riddell (1993, p. SI 14) point out that an unemployed 
Canadian worker is more than three times as likely to receive UI bene 
fits than an unemployed American, and that this difference has been 
growing since 1982-83. In addition, Card and Freeman (1994) provide 
evidence that, also in the early 1980s, Canada's unemployment rate 
jumped above that of the United States and continued above the U.S. 
rate for the remainder of the decade. The authors' analysis of this 
"unemployment gap" of 2 to 3 percentage points is that in Canada, but 
not in the United States, there was an increase in the fraction of jobless 
individuals reporting themselves as seeking employment, thereby 
increasing the count of the unemployed.
Turning to active labor market programs, the Canadian government 
has for over sixty years provided unemployed workers with employ 
ment information and job placement services delivered through a joint 
federal-provincial network of Canada Employment Centers (CECs). 
Table 2.3 indicates that Canada, along with Sweden and Germany, has 
the highest expenditure ratio for employment services of the seven 
nations considered. Beginning in 1966, the federal government initi 
ated, in addition, a series of training programs intended to improve the 
reemployment prospects of adult workers through the purchase of 
classroom training from community colleges and other training institu 
tions and of on-the-job training from private-sector employers. Class 
room training and on-the-job training programs were augmented in 
1982 by a third national program intended to expand the capacity of 
the economy to train workers for jobs in shortage occupations.
A change in administrations at the federal level resulted in 1984 in a 
comprehensive review of all federal labor market policies. The out 
come of this review was the creation in 1985 of an umbrella program 
called the Canadian Jobs Strategy (CIS). The CIS was designed to pro 
vide labor market assistance to those clients (individuals, employers, 
and communities) perceived to have the greatest need for federal labor 
market intervention. As a consequence, the CIS includes in a single 
comprehensive initiative five major component programs designed to
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assist the following client groups: (1) the long-term unemployed, (2) 
women and youth who face difficulty in making the transition to full 
participation in the labor market, (3) employed workers whose job 
security is threatened by technological or market changes, (4) employ 
ers who need workers possessing skills in short supply, and (5) com 
munities with chronic high unemployment or faced with major layoffs. 
It is worth noting that in assisting these client groups, CIS programs 
serve employed workers in need of skill enhancement in addition to 
jobless individuals. The Skill Investment program assists experienced 
workers (client group 3) to retain their jobs by enabling them to update 
their skills. The Skill Shortages program subsidizes employers (client 
group 4) to train workers in high-demand occupations in order to head 
off likely shortages of skilled workers.
In 1991, the Canadian government introduced a restructuring of the 
CIS intended to make the program more responsive to the needs of 
workers at the level of the local labor market. A second initiative 
announced two years earlier in 1989 was designed to reform the Cana 
dian UI system. Specifically, the UI initiative proposed to tighten the 
work requirements for UI eligibility and to shift resources from income 
maintenance to active training and job search assistance programs. 
More detail on both of these initiatives is presented in chapter 5.
The United States
Beginning with passive labor market programs, an issue of concern 
to U.S. policy makers is the downward trend over the postwar period in 
the fraction of the unemployed who receive UI benefits. Particularly 
notable declines in this fraction occurred in the early 1960s and again 
in the early 1980s. At present, although over 90 percent of employed 
workers hold jobs that are covered by the UI system, less than 30 per 
cent of the unemployed receive UI benefits.
A careful analysis by Blank and Card (1991) makes use of annual 
Current Population Survey data to decompose changes in the fraction 
of insured unemployment into three components, due to (1) changes in 
state UI laws, (2) changes in the eligibility-determining characteristics 
of unemployed workers, and (3) changes in the take-up rate for UI ben 
efits. Their analysis suggests that, over the 1977-87 period, there was 
no significant change in the fraction of unemployed workers eligible
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for benefits. Rather, the decline in the fraction of workers who received 
regular UI benefits in 1980-82 is mainly due to an abrupt decrease in 
the take-up rate. In turn, this take-up rate decrease is primarily the 
result of changes in the regional distribution of unemployment. States 
in the Northeast have significantly higher take-up rates for UI benefits 
than states in the South, so as the distribution of unemployment shifted 
away from northeastern to southern states, the national take-up rate 
declined. Still to be explained is the wide historical variation in UI par 
ticipation across states.
Like Canada, the United States has had lengthy experience with the 
design and implementation of active labor market programs. Haveman 
and Saks (1985, p. 36) characterize this experience as lurching from 
one direction to another, developing some high-quality but many low- 
quality programs. With few low-quality programs ever terminated, the 
consequence is a proliferation of active labor market programs directed 
to assist jobless workers. Recent congressional testimony by Crawford 
(1993) reports that the U.S. General Accounting Office has identified 
125 federal programs administered by 14 departments or independent 
agencies that spend over $16 billion annually to provide employment 
and training services.
By most accounts, one of the low-quality programs is the federal- 
state Employment Service (ES), created in 1933 to provide job match 
ing services. Job seekers must register with the ES to obtain unemploy 
ment insurance benefits. Employers are under no obligation to list job 
vacancies, however, and the ES caters mostly to the hard-core unem 
ployed. Comparing the U.S. Employment Service to the Swedish 
employment exchange system, Burtless (1987, p. 149) comments that 
the ES is relatively ineffective in aiding and monitoring the search for 
jobs. Since the Swedish government requires employers to register all 
job vacancies with its Employment Service, it is quite simple to refer 
insured job seekers to suitable jobs and penalize workers who refuse to 
engage in search or accept available job offers. In contrast, the U.S. 
Employment Service is unaware of most available vacancies and is 
therefore in a weak position to enforce UI job search requirements. 
Marshall and Tucker (1992, p. 223) also criticize the ES for failing to 
computerize many of its offices and note that inadequate funding pre 
vents the agency from doing a serious job of counseling the unem 
ployed.
46 Fundamental Differences Between Nations in Labor Market Policies
The federal government's first attempt to design an adult training 
program dates back to 1962 with the passage of the Manpower Devel 
opment and Training Act (MDTA). MDTA represented the response to 
a rising national unemployment rate coupled with a growing concern 
over the effects of automation and new technology on the employment 
options of mid-career adult workers. By the mid-1960s, however, an 
improved labor market and reduced concern over automation led to a 
shift in interest and funding away from the employment problems of 
displaced workers and toward the employability of economically dis- 
advantaged youth and adults. 13 In 1973 MDTA was consolidated into 
the newly created Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA). Two distinct types of programs were funded under CETA. 
Title I provided disadvantaged workers a program mix including class 
room training, on-the-job training, and public-sector work experience. 
In contrast, Titles II and VI offered public service employment (PSE) 
to workers who had recently lost jobs in high-unemployment geo 
graphic areas. As unemployment rose during the 1970s, CETA expen 
ditures shifted away from Title I training programs toward the 
provision of PSE jobs offering little or no formal training.
In addition to MDTA, the year 1962 saw the creation of a second 
major federal program specifically intended to assist displaced workers 
—the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. TAA provided 
income support and, to a lesser extent, retraining to workers who lost 
their jobs as a consequence of trade agreement concessions. Legisla 
tion passed in 1974 removed the linkage between tariff reductions and 
job loss by making workers eligible for adjustment assistance if 
expanding trade alone was an important contributor to layoffs. 14
The CETA program expired in 1982, with the economy mired in the 
trough of its deepest recession since the 1930s. Once again, the dis 
placement of experienced adult workers became an important national 
issue. Rather than renewing CETA with its widely criticized emphasis 
on PSE programs, Congress enacted a broad new program—the Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA)—intended to train and place workers 
in private-sector jobs. Overall responsibility for administering the pro 
gram was given to state governors, who then delegated authority for 
designing and administering local programs to business and labor rep 
resentatives on what are called Private Industry Councils (PICs). The 
important role assigned PICs gives local JTPA programs something of
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the tripartite flavor of the Western European model. The federal gov 
ernment monitors the performance of local site operators by means of 
enrollment requirements and performance standards. Available empiri 
cal evidence on the effectiveness of performance standards imposed 
under JTPA is reviewed in chapter 4.
Title III of JTPA relates specifically to the adjustment assistance 
needs of displaced workers. 15 Services provided include skills training, 
job placement, worker relocation assistance, and support services such 
as child care and transportation while in training. However, because of 
limited funding, at most 7 percent of eligible workers received any 
JTPA Title III program services through June 30, 1986, according to 
the U.S. General Accounting Office (1987). Moreover, most Title III 
participants received relatively inexpensive job placement assistance, 
rather than more intensive and expensive classroom skills training and 
on-the-job training.
In 1986 a task force appointed by the U.S. Secretary of Labor issued 
a report recommending development at the state level of the capacity to 
respond quickly to plant closings and mass layoffs with the coordi 
nated delivery of adjustment assistance services offered on-site (see 
U.S. Department of Labor 1986). 16 Acting on the recommendations of 
the task force, Congress passed the Economic Dislocation and Worker 
Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) act of 1988, which amended the 
existing Title III of JTPA. EDWAA's main impact is to require states to 
develop displaced worker units with the ability to react to major layoffs 
and plant closures with on-site offers of job search assistance and 
retraining. Funding for displaced worker programs increased sharply 
from just $200 million in 1987 to about $517 million annually in 1991- 
93 (see Ross and Smith 1993, p. 31). A second piece of legislation 
passed in 1988—the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act—made 
appropriate training an entitlement for all TAA-certified workers and 
required that recipients of income-maintenance benefits participate in 
retraining unless they received a waiver from this requirement. 17 The 
TAA program now essentially extends the duration of UI benefits to up 
to one and one-half years for eligible workers undergoing retraining. 
Nevertheless, Bednarzik (1993) estimates for the 1982-87 period that 
among manufacturing industries deemed import-sensitive, only about 9 
percent of the long-term unemployed were certified for TAA benefits.
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Expenditures on TAA benefits were $116 million in 1991, which is 
down substantially from about $1.5 billion annually in 1980 and 1981.
During the 1980s, the small fraction of displaced workers actually 
assisted by JTPA Title III and TAA programs suggested an important 
gap between perceived need and available federally funded services. 
Virtually all of the states developed programs attempting to fill this 
market niche. As discussed by Leigh (1989), however, state programs 
differ from comparable JTPA programs in two key respects. First, state 
programs are not exclusively targeted to specific jobless groups such as 
displaced or disadvantaged workers. Rather, training is also made 
available to currently employed workers in order to avoid layoffs and 
plant closures. Second, training programs are usually tailored to meet 
the needs of individual employers. That is, retraining is viewed as an 
economic development tool in addition to its traditional supply-side 
role of raising the level of workers' skills to enable them to compete 
for existing jobs.
Osterman and Batt (1993) group innovative state employment and 
training programs into what they term agency-based programs and 
public education-based systems. 18 As described in Leigh (1990, ch. 4), 
the largest and best-known state agency-based program is the Califor 
nia Employment Training Panel (ETP). In operation since 1983, ETP is 
noteworthy for being almost entirely employer-driven. Employers ini 
tiate the process by proposing individual projects to the Panel. If a 
project is approved and a contract negotiated, the employer selects 
trainees according to its own specifications, sets standards for success 
ful program completion, and approves the training curriculum if an 
outside training provider (e.g., a state postsecondary educational insti 
tution) is selected. In return for the training subsidy and the discretion 
given them in all aspects of the retraining process, participating 
employers must make a good-faith commitment to hire or retain pro 
gram graduates. Stringent performance standards mean that training 
providers receive full payment for their services only if program gradu 
ates find and remain in jobs that meet minimum wage standards.
Public education-based systems build on what in many states is a 
large, well-developed community college system. Osterman and Batt 
(1993, pp. 460-61) note that American community colleges are cur 
rently undergoing a transformation from feeder institutions to four- 
year colleges and universities to the major institutional source of
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retraining for adult workers. In addition to regular associate degree 
programs, many community colleges provide nondegree short courses 
for adults and create "customized" or "contract" courses in which they 
develop special training programs tailored to meet the needs of particu 
lar employers.
Australia
Australian labor market policies in many ways represent a hybrid of 
the policies described for Britain, Canada, and the United States. Table 
2.1 shows that Australian expenditures on passive labor market pro 
grams are distinctly higher than in the United States but lower than in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. As in Britain, table 2.2 indicates that 
Australia faces a significant long-term unemployment problem. Active 
labor market program expenditures in Australia are only slightly above 
those for the United States and substantially lower than those in Can 
ada and Britain. But like Britain, the largest component of Australia's 
active program expenditures is seen in table 2.3 to be job creation/ 
employment subsidies.
Trebilcock (1986, ch. 5) suggests that Australia's labor market poli 
cies since the 1960s can best be understood in the context of the high 
level of import protection provided to important domestic industries, 
notably manufacturing. The government's policy of high barriers to 
imports reflects, at least in part, the inherent limitations of a small 
domestic market and the high costs of penetrating distant export mar 
kets. Beginning in the early 1970s, a policy of trade liberalization car 
ried out to encourage greater efficiency and productivity in protected 
industries was made politically palatable in highly unionized Australia 
by labor market programs designed to assist workers made redundant 
by policy changes. Like the TAA program in the United States, the first 
of these programs—the Structural Adjustment Assistance program— 
was designed to provide income-maintenance assistance to workers 
directly and adversely affected by the relaxation of tariffs on imported 
goods. But in a program review carried out in 1975, it was severely 
criticized for its effect of reducing efficient labor mobility and its 
favoritism of unemployed workers in particular industries over others 
who were equally needy. The program was terminated in the early 
1980s.
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Despite these criticisms, the Structural Adjustment Assistance pro 
gram was followed in 1982 and 1986 by two other targeted programs. 
The Labour Adjustment Training Arrangements program created in 
1982 provided retraining and income-maintenance allowances to 
workers displaced from their jobs in the steel industry. That program 
was later extended to cover coal mining and auto and auto parts manu 
facturing. The basic rationale for targeting special assistance to work 
ers displaced from their jobs in these industries is that displacement is 
especially likely to be the outcome of mass layoffs and plant closings, 
and these events present communities with the difficult problem of 
absorbing large numbers of workers with similar skills who are all 
dumped on the local labor market at once. In 1986, the Heavy Engi 
neering Labor Adjustment Assistance program was introduced as part 
of an industrial assistance package intended to revitalize the "heavy 
engineering" industry (i.e., the capital goods industry). This program 
assists displaced workers by subsidizing the costs of classroom and on- 
the-job training programs and providing relocation assistance. Workers 
undergoing retraining are also eligible for income-maintenance allow 
ances.
During the early 1990s, the Australian government legislated two 
initiatives designed to place greater emphasis on firm-based training 
and to realign the unemployment insurance system by making retrain 
ing or participation in some other adjustment assistance program a 
condition of income support. The first initiative, adopted in 1990, 
imposed on all employers with annual payrolls greater than $200,000 a 
payroll training tax called the Training Guarantee. The Training Guar 
antee required employers to spend 1.0 percent of their 1991 payrolls on 
training, with the tax rate rising to 1.5 percent beginning in 1992. An 
employer who fails to spend the required percentage on training is 
obliged to remit to the government the difference between the required 
tax and what was actually spent. This tax revenue, in turn, finances 
additional government-sponsored training. The payroll training tax ini 
tiative is discussed at greater length in chapter 4.
While income support has for some time been paid to displaced 
Australians enrolled in a retraining activity, the government imple 
mented in July 1991 a second initiative designed to fundamentally 
reform its unemployment benefit program by making income mainte 
nance more directly related to self-help. Termed Newstart, this pro-
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gram is a response to a growing number of long-term unemployed 
Australian workers. Instead of providing unemployed workers with a 
fixed number of weeks of income support and leaving it up to them to 
conduct their own job search, Newstart is intended to diagnose the dif 
ficulty the unemployed are having in locating new jobs and then to deal 
actively with their needs through retraining and other forms of assis 
tance. Australia's Newstart program will receive more attention in 
chapter 5.
Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the evolution of labor market 
policies in seven industrialized nations including the United States. 
Focusing on the latter half of the 1980s, much of the discussion was 
organized around differences between counties in the level and mix of 
their public expenditures on active and passive labor market programs. 
Measuring public expenditures as a fraction of Gross Domestic Prod 
uct, total expenditure ratios vary at the low end from 0.6 percent and 
0.8 percent, respectively, for Japan and the United States to, at the high 
end, 2.7 percent and 2.8 percent, respectively, for the United Kingdom 
and Sweden. Except for Sweden, the countries examined spent from 
one and one-half to over three times more on passive than active labor 
market policies. Public expenditure ratios for passive programs are par 
ticularly large for Britain, Canada, and Germany. Sweden, in contrast, 
spent more than twice as much on active than passive policies. Since 
the mid-1950s, the Swedish government has committed itself to active 
labor market policies intended to encourage the efficient movement of 
labor from contracting to expanding industries.
By far the most important component of passive labor market pro 
grams is unemployment insurance, and several of the nations examined 
also provide unemployment assistance payments to workers who have 
exhausted their eligibility for UI benefits. There is some indication 
looking across countries that more generous unemployment compensa 
tion systems prolong the duration of unemployment spells, even 
though the relationship may not be a simple one. Concern over a rising 
incidence of long-term unemployment is leading many countries,
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including Britain, Canada, and Australia, to more closely link receipt 
of unemployment compensation benefits to participation in active labor 
market programs. This linkage, in turn, necessitates a careful look at 
the kinds of active labor market programs—namely, employment ser 
vices and adult training—that are designed to reduce adjustment costs 
and increase the mobility of unemployed workers between declining 
and expanding industries.
Of the seven nations considered, Sweden, Germany, and Canada 
report the largest expenditure ratios on employment services. In Swe 
den and Germany, local employment service offices serve as the uni 
versal intake point for unemployed workers to initiate their job search 
process. Sweden is also noteworthy for spending a much larger share 
of its Gross Domestic Product on public adult training programs than 
any other nation considered, with Germany a distant second. There is a 
strong contrast between the permanent, integrated, and well-funded 
employment and training system in Sweden and the unstable, fragmen 
tary, and underfunded employment and training programs available to 
jobless Americans. But even the Swedish adult training system was 
reorganized in 1986 to decentralize decision making and increase the 
system's responsiveness to labor demand conditions. In 1988 a similar 
reorganization occurred in Britain, decentralizing the provision of 
training services to the community level and elevating the role of 
employers in formulating and implementing training policies.
At the other extreme from Sweden, an almost negligible public 
expenditure ratio for adult training is reported for Japan. But this statis 
tic certainly does not imply that adult training is neglected by the Japa 
nese. While Sweden operates a government training system, Japanese 
employers accept the responsibility for designing work experience and 
training opportunities that continue throughout a worker's career. 
Despite this fundamental difference in their approaches to adult train 
ing, both Sweden and Japan enjoyed very low national unemployment 
rates during the latter half of the 1980s.
The other example of firm-based training discussed in detail in this 
chapter is the German dual system of apprenticeship training. The dual 
system combines on-the-job training supervised by a master craftsman 
(or Meister) at the employer's workplace with one or two days per 
week of off-the-job training at a state-sponsored vocational school. 
Germany and Japan offer an interesting contrast in that apprenticeship
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training opportunities are available primarily to German youth, while 
on-the-job training continues over the working lifetime in Japan. Nev 
ertheless, as noted in chapter 1, both Germany and Japan are frequently 
pointed to as being far ahead of the United States in producing workers 
who can adapt readily to new production techniques and more flexible 
production systems.
NOTES
1. The OECD (1988, pp. 84-85) reports that its objective in collecting these data is to include 
all public outlays for relevant labor market programs, regardless of which branch or level of gov 
ernment is involved.
2. The Economist Intelligence Unit (1994a) reports a substantial rise in western Germany's 
unemployment rate from 6.6 percent in 1992 to 8.2 percent in 1993.
3. Ramaswamy (1994) argues that the current "crisis" of the Swedish economy is due in large 
part to the rigidities imposed by the system of centralized bargaining and solidaristic wages which 
preclude employers from tailoring their own internal wage structures to enhance worker produc 
tivity.
4. More detail on the decentralization and increased market responsiveness of the Swedish 
training system is presented in chapter 4.
5. The programs listed are described in more detail in the Swedish Institute (1992) and Tre- 
horning (1993, ch. 5).
6. Other unemployment indicators reported by Sorrentino but omitted from table 2.4 are U- 
3—the adult unemployment rate, and U-4—the full-time unemployment rate. Sorrentino does not 
calculate unemployment indicators for Australia.
7. Abraham and Houseman (1993, pp. 17-23) note that laws regulating permanent layoffs 
have deep historical roots in Germany, as in many other European nations. (There is no such thing 
as a temporary layoff in Germany.) Dismissals for economic reasons (i.e., permanent layoffs) are 
justified only if the affected individuals cannot be reasonably transferred elsewhere in the com 
pany and the company has exhausted all other means of avoiding layoffs, such as reducing over 
time or introducing short-time work. Worker-elected works councils must be consulted before 
every dismissal, and a "social plan" specifying compensation for laid-off workers must be negoti 
ated with the works council before a collective dismissal can be carried out.
Some feel for the reluctance of employers to lay off workers may be gained from the follow 
ing passage describing the situation facing the executive responsible for dismissing more than 
5,700 of the 15,000 workers at a western German plant (see Benjamin 1993, p. A8):
He did it the traditional German way: with fat payoffs. He persuaded 90% of those tar 
geted to take voluntary severance packages, which averaged about $16,500, or early retire 
ment, which was accompanied by unspecified payments. The rest were laid off and, by 
law, got packages running slightly under $16,5000.
Mr. Dittert [the executive] was vilified, he says. "My family was threatened. We got 
anonymous phone calls at home," a dramatic event in a culture where co-workers are so 
formal that, even after decades, they may not know each other's first names. . . . "In 
school," he says, "my kids were hassled by others who said, 'Your father is the one firing 
people.' This was by far the most unpleasant thing I've ever gone through in my profes 
sional life."
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8. The discussion of the German dual system is largely based on a report of Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate (1991). This document is the result of a visit in 1990 to the former West Germany of 
a group of British government officials. Also useful is a recent study of youth training in Germany 
by Steedman (1993).
9. Houseman and Abraham (1993) report evidence for the manufacturing sector, showing that 
Japanese women bear a disproportionate amount of employment adjustment compared to Japa 
nese men. Even so, the authors (1993, p. 50) suggest that Japanese women enjoy greater employ 
ment security than either American men or American women.
10. An additional program—The Family Credit Benefit—is designed to increase the incentive 
of family heads eligible for Income Support to work even at low wages. Restricted to persons 
working more than 16 hours per week, the benefit paid is subject to a marginal implicit tax rate of 
70 percent assessed against net earnings. Thus, Family Credit payments are received only when 
earnings are low or when one wage earner is supporting a large family (OECD 1992, p. 144).
11. Evidence related to the labor market effects of British apprenticeship programs and associ 
ated nationally recognized qualifications is presented in chapter 4.
12. In perhaps a bit of an overstatement, The Wall Street Journal ( 1993) writes that in Canada
[U]nemployment insurance is so generous that in some parts of the country it has 
become a way of life: three months of work and nine months on the dole. In the little prov 
ince of Prince Edward Island, the New Democratic party lays off its leader for three 
months each year so he can collect federal unemployment benefits and save the party 
about $3,100.
13. Economically disadvantaged refers to individuals who receive (or are members of families 
who receive) cash welfare payments or to members of a family whose total family income falls 
below the poverty line.
14. In addition to easing TAA eligibility criteria, the Trade Act of 1974 allowed qualifying 
workers to receive combined UI and Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) benefits that replaced 
70 percent of previous earnings, with a maximum benefit of 100 percent of previous earnings for 
workers in the manufacturing sector. Combined UI/TRA benefits could be received for up to 52 
weeks, and workers in an approved training program were eligible for benefits for an additional 26 
weeks. Legislation passed in 1981 restricted the level of cash payments to the level of UI benefits, 
and stipulated that TRA payments could begin only after UI benefits were exhausted.
15. The other major titles of JTPA are Title II-A, which funds employment and training ser 
vices to economically disadvantaged adults and youth, and the Title II-B summer youth program.
16. This recommendation is based on the task force's favorable assessment of the Canadian 
Industrial Adjustment Service program. Established in 1963, this is a federally funded agency 
which serves as a catalyst in bringing together local labor and management officials to help locate 
job opportunities for workers about to be laid off (advance notice of plant closings and layoffs is 
required by law). The Industrial Adjustment Service is discussed in chapter 5.
17. A third major piece of legislation passed in 1988 is the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act, requiring firms employing 100 or more workers to give 60 days' notice of a plant 
closing. In the case of a layoff, the bill requires the 60 days' notice if the layoff involves 50 or 
more workers representing at least one-third of the workforce at a place of employment.
18. The authors also distinguish a third category of state programs they call income-targeted 
initiatives, an example of which is the California GAIN program discussed in chapter 3. Income- 
targeted initiatives represent the approach that characterizes most current federal programs.
3
An Overview of Existing Evaluation 
Evidence for the United States
Chapter 1 noted that the evaluation of social programs in the United 
States is largely based on statistical analyses of program effects on eco 
nomic outcomes such as employment and earnings, as opposed to 
internally generated feedback from employers and workers on the 
quality of program services. This is clearly the perception of foreign 
observers. Schellhaass (1991, p. 104) comments that program evalua 
tion in Germany has never grown into a research industry as it has in 
the United States. Bjorklund (1991, p. 74) concludes his survey by not 
ing that, by American standards, Swedish evaluation research is not 
impressive. Riddell (1991, pp. 52-53) observes that in contrast to the 
United States, in which an important private-sector evaluation industry 
has developed, evaluation research in Canada is largely internal to gov 
ernment agencies with little involvement of the social science commu 
nity. In addition, he notes that experimental studies in which there is 
random assignment of eligible individuals to treatment and control 
groups is virtually unknown in Canada.
Fortunately, the range of programs that have been evaluated by 
American social scientists is sufficiently broad to cover most of the cat 
egories of active labor market programs summarized in table 2.3. The 
purpose of this chapter is to synthesize what can be learned about the 
labor market effects of active labor market programs from U.S. evalua 
tion studies. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first reviews 
the evaluation evidence available for displaced worker programs that 
offer a reasonably comprehensive menu of services to clients. These 
displaced worker programs include four federally funded demonstra 
tion projects carried out in particular states or communities during the 
1980s. Also described is a recent evaluation of the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) program.
The second section of the chapter focuses on evaluation evidence 
available for three proposed reforms of the unemployment insurance 
(UI) system. The first UI reform emphasizes enhanced job search assis 
tance and tighter monitoring of job search, while the second reform
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involves implementation of the reemployment bonus concept. Assis 
tance to help unemployed workers to start up their own small busi 
nesses is the third reform considered.
In the third section of the chapter, additional evaluation results are 
presented for on-the-job and classroom training and basic education 
programs targeted to economically disadvantaged workers. In contrast 
to displaced workers, the economically disadvantaged are typically 
defined as individuals with limited work experience who are eligible 
for cash welfare benefits.
The final section summarizes what we can learn from these three 
sets of evaluation studies and points out some gaps in the evidence.
Displaced Worker Studies
During the early 1980s, rising unemployment and an increasing 
number of plant closures led the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) 
to fund a series of demonstration projects intended to test the effective 
ness of alternative reemployment services in placing displaced workers 
in private-sector jobs. In chronological order, these projects are (1) the 
Downriver, Michigan program; (2) the Buffalo program of the Dislo 
cated Workers Demonstration Projects; 1 (3) the Texas Worker Adjust 
ment Demonstration (WAD) projects; and (4) the New Jersey 
Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project.
Later in the decade, the USDOL responded to legislative changes 
made in the TAA program in 1981 and 1988 by initiating a major study 
to assess the labor market impact of TAA extended benefits (called 
Trade Readjustment Allowances or TRAs) and retraining services. 
During the 1970s, as described in chapter 2, TAA provided generous 
income-maintenance payments, and relatively few displaced workers 
received retraining. This situation changed substantially in 1981. In 
addition to increased funding for retraining, income-maintenance ben 
efits were reduced to the level of workers' regular UI benefits and 
made available only after a worker exhausted his or her UI entitlement. 
Legislation passed in 1988 continued the emphasis on adjustment ser 
vices by requiring that TRA recipients participate in an approved
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retraining program unless they qualified for a waiver from this require 
ment.
Study Characteristics
Table 3.1 furnishes an overview of some of the main features of the 
five displaced worker evaluation studies. One common element is the 
type of reemployment services provided. As the table indicates, the 
demonstrations supplied a mix of services including job search assis 
tance (ISA), classroom training (CT), and on-the-job training (OJT). 
ISA services typically included initial orientation and assessment ses 
sions, a job search workshop, and job development and referral ser 
vices. The New Jersey UI Demonstration added to this mix a cash 
bonus for early reemployment. Only in the case of the TAA program 
were extended income-maintenance benefits provided along with 
retraining.
An important difference among the studies is the approach program 
designers followed in distinguishing displaced workers from other 
unemployed workers. In the Downriver and Buffalo projects, workers 
displaced from their jobs by large layoffs in local auto and steel plants 
are targeted for program services. Displaced workers served in these 
two demonstration projects are male blue-collar workers with lengthy 
job tenure who enjoyed high wages prior to being laid off. Program 
services were provided promptly after plant closings to Downriver par 
ticipants, while in Buffalo there was a long period of postlayoff unem 
ployment prior to program participation.
Rather than targeting services to workers displaced from their jobs 
by particular mass layoffs, the Texas WAD, New Jersey UI, and TAA 
studies identified displaced workers by their eligibility for an ongoing 
adjustment assistance program. The Texas WAD project served work 
ers eligible for JTPA Title III programs, while the New Jersey project 
was targeted to UI claimants older than age 25 who had at least three 
years of tenure with their prelayoff employer and who could not pro 
vide a date at which they expected to be recalled. 2 Targeted in the TAA 
study are TRA recipients. These are laid-off workers typically receiv 
ing UI who, as a group, have been certified by the USDOL as having 
suffered trade-related injuries.
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Of the six WAD projects operated between 1983 and 1985, two 
projects in El Paso and one in Houston are available for evaluation. As 
noted in table 3.1, WAD program services were provided to groups of 
displaced workers other than the mostly white male steel and auto 
workers targeted for assistance in the Downriver and Buffalo projects. 
The Houston WAD project also served white males, but sizable groups 
of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are represented among sample mem 
bers. Over 90 percent of the workers sampled in El Paso are Hispanics, 
with about equal numbers of men and women. In the New Jersey UI 
project, workers laid off from jobs in the trade and services industries, 
as well as in manufacturing, are included among UI claimants who met 
the eligibility conditions. Men and women are about equally repre 
sented in the eligible population, which also includes sizable propor 
tions of blacks and Hispanics and workers age 55 and older. TRA 
recipients in the TAA study are predominantly white men and women 
between the ages of 25 and 54 who were displaced from jobs in manu 
facturing. Corson et al. (1993) point out that relative to UI exhaustees 
in manufacturing and to respondents in the Displaced Worker Surveys 
of 1988 and 1990, TRA recipients received high weekly earnings and 
had lengthy tenure in their prelayoff jobs. TRA recipients were also 
much more likely to be unionized.
Results
Table 3.2 presents net impact and cost estimates for the Downriver, 
Buffalo, Texas WAD, and New Jersey UI studies. (Results for the TAA 
study do not fit conveniently into this table's format and are reported 
later in table 3.4.) As indicated in the table, the evaluation design dif 
fers sharply between the Downriver and Buffalo projects and the Texas 
WAD and New Jersey studies. The two earlier projects used a treat 
ment group/comparison group design where the two groups of laid-off 
workers were drawn from different plants. In contrast, the two later 
programs implemented a true experimental design in which program 
participants were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups.
Before getting into the details of the empirical results, a brief discus 
sion of some methodological issues involved in program evaluation 
might be useful. To measure the effect of a particular program on a 
labor market outcome variable such as earnings, the key problem is
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Tier I: $1,460-2,072 
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SOURCES: Downriver: Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984, tables 3.4 and 3.6); Buffalo: Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985, table IV.4); Texas WAD:
Bloom (1990, table 8.2); and New Jersey: Corson et al. (1989, tables 2, 3, and VII. 1).
a. Measured weekly for Downriver and Buffalo, annually for Texas WAD, and quarterly for New Jersey UI. New Jersey estimates are measured for the
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b. Measured over 30 weeks for Texas WAD and over the benefit year for New Jersey.
c. Cost estimates are per worker who received services.
d. Target plant and non-target plant net impact estimates, respectively.
***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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that of obtaining a "counterfactual," that is, the level of earnings pro 
gram participants would have received had they not gone through the 
program. (A program's net impact is its effect on an outcome variable 
net of the change in that variable that would have occurred in the pro 
gram's absence.) Since a counterfactual can never be observed, it must 
be estimated using information for program nonparticipants. There are 
two main approaches to obtaining counterfactual estimates. 3 The non- 
experimental approach makes use of data for an externally selected 
comparison group of workers and attempts to adjust statistically for 
inherent differences between the two groups. An important difficulty 
with this approach is the selection bias that arises if those who choose 
to enter or are selected into the program possess unobserved character 
istics that make them likely to enjoy higher earnings even in the pro 
gram's absence. In the alternative experimental approach, random 
assignment of eligible workers to treatment and control groups means 
that there are no inherent differences between the two groups that 
might lead to a correlation between the participation decision and post- 
program earnings.
An influential paper by LaLonde (1986) provides evidence that non- 
experimental strategies involving the selection of comparison groups 
from alternative data sources and the application of available econo 
metric techniques fail to replicate experimentally generated results 
obtained by comparing the earnings of randomly assigned treatment 
and control group members. His conclusion that randomized experi 
ments are necessary to reliably determine program effects has been 
adopted by perhaps most labor economists, as well as by influential 
policy makers responsible for funding program evaluation studies. On 
the other hand, Heckman and associates have waged a persistent coun 
terattack, arguing that while in principle randomized experiments rep 
resent the most desirable approach to program evaluation, actual 
implementation of experiments typically creates new forms of sample 
selection that require the application of nonexperimental econometric 
procedures for making statistical adjustments (see, for example, Heck 
man, Hotz, and Dabos 1987).
The Downriver project
Eligible displaced workers who opted to participate in the Downri 
ver program initially received ISA services followed, for those judged
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likely to benefit, by some form of retraining (typically classroom train 
ing). Net earnings estimates for program participants are seen in table 
3.2 to range up to $122 per week after controlling for worker character 
istics and plant-specific variables. But the most striking aspect of the 
estimates presented by Abt Associates is their variability depending on 
the phase of the program and on the plants from which treatment and 
comparison group members were selected. The incremental effect of 
CT above that of ISA is not reported, but Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdor- 
fer (1984, pp. 90-92) conclude that classroom training did not signifi 
cantly improve participants' postprogram reemployment rates.
An interesting aspect of the Downriver program is the systematic 
approach taken by program designers in selecting classroom training 
curricula. Downriver staff first attempted to identify occupations for 
which demand was expected to grow in the local labor market. This 
task was accomplished by reviewing economic forecasts and studies 
conducted by local universities, studying trade journals, and analyzing 
labor market data collected by the Michigan Employment Security 
Commission. Next, the actual demand for labor in the occupations that 
survived this scrutiny was verified through interviews with local 
employers and representatives of trade associations. It is important to 
emphasize that Downriver officials sought to retrain workers for occu 
pations for which there was projected to be sufficient demand on the 
part of a number of employers so that participants' reemployment 
opportunities were not tied to the fortunes of a single firm. For the most 
part, the training curricula selected provided classroom instruction in 
blue-collar trades. In contrast, as mentioned in chapter 2, state-funded 
programs generally follow the opposite approach of supplying custom 
ized training tailored to meet the specific needs of individual employ 
ers.
The Buffalo program
After receiving ISA services, participants in the Buffalo project 
were channeled into either CT or OJT positions. A noteworthy feature 
of the Buffalo project is the relatively large percentage of OJT slots 
provided. Stratifying the data by type of reemployment service, table 
3.2 displays estimated program effects measured in terms of weekly 
earnings for the project's target-plant and non-target-plant samples. 
Looking at ISA services, for instance, estimated earnings effects are
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$134 and $15 per week for the target-plant and non-target-plant sam 
ples, respectively. For the six area steel and auto plants included in the 
target-plant sample, available program slots were rationed among laid- 
off workers through a formal lottery mechanism. The non-target-plant 
sample includes workers displaced from three other area steel and auto 
plants and from over 300 area establishments in a variety of industries. 
Members of the non-target-plant sample differ from those in the target- 
plant sample because they applied for the program and were offered 
program services on a first-come, first-served basis as slots became 
available.
The Buffalo evaluation raises the important distinction between net 
impact estimates obtained for all program-eligible workers (who may 
or may not have received program services) and for eligible workers 
who actually participated in program activities. Corson, Long, and 
Maynard (1985, pp. 98-100) point out that if an unbiased estimate of 
the program's impact on program eligibles can be obtained, a similarly 
unbiased estimate of the impact on actual participants may be calcu 
lated by dividing this estimate by the take-up rate of program services. 
This calculation follows on the assumptions that (1) comparison group 
members would, if offered program services, choose to participate at 
the same rate as program eligibles, and (2) the program has no impact 
on program-eligible nonparticipants.
Corson, Long, and Maynard acknowledge, however, that impact 
estimates calculated as simple differences in mean earnings between 
treatment and comparison group members are not likely to be unbiased 
because of the low take-up rates of program services (only 16 percent 
and 28 percent, respectively, for the target-plant and non-target-plant 
samples). Such low take-up rates suggest that displaced workers who 
chose to participate in program activities differed in significant ways 
from those who chose not to participate. The net impact estimates 
reported in table 3.2 for program participants thus control not only for 
differences in observable characteristics between program eligibles 
and comparison group members but also, using the Heckman two- 
stage procedure to correct for selection bias, for unobservable differ 
ences affecting the program participation decision.4
Estimated program effects are seen in table 3.2 to differ consider 
ably for the three program services, depending on the sample utilized. 
In particular, ISA is the only statistically significant treatment for the
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target-plant sample, whereas only JSA/OJT is statistically significant 
for the non-target-plant sample. The authors of the Mathematica Policy 
Research report place more confidence in the former results, however, 
because of the random selection of workers offered program services 
in the target-plant sample. There is no evidence from this sample of an 
incremental effect on average weekly earnings above that of ISA for 
either classroom or on-the-job training. Note also that the cost per par 
ticipant for the JSA/CT and JSA/OJT treatments is nearly four times 
that of JSA-only. It is clear, at least for the target-plant sample, that 
JSA is the only potentially cost effective treatment of those evaluated.
The Texas WAD projects
The experimental design of the Texas WAD projects randomly 
assigned eligible workers to either of two treatment groups or to a con 
trol group. The first treatment group was offered JSA services only 
(referred to as Tier I). Members of the second treatment group were 
offered JSA followed, if necessary, by more expensive classroom or 
on-the-job training (the Tier I/II sequence). Unlike the Buffalo pro 
gram, the take-up of program services was not a severe problem in 
evaluating WAD services, as 71 percent of those assigned to the treat 
ment groups chose to participate. While a simple comparison of treat 
ment and control group mean outcomes yields unbiased net impact 
estimates, Bloom (1990, p. 37) suggests that statistical precision can be 
improved using multiple regression to control for differences in 
observed individual characteristics. The impact estimates presented in 
table 3.2 are obtained controlling for differences in observed individual 
characteristics and adjusting for program take-up rates, so that the esti 
mates measure program effects for participants only rather than eligi 
ble workers. Judging from these estimates, only for women in El Paso 
is there evidence that the Tier I/II WAD program had a permanent 
effect in increasing annual earnings. For these women, the program's 
effect on earnings at the end of the first year slightly exceeds program 
costs. WAD also reduced UI benefits by an average of $227 per partici 
pant measured over a 30-week period.
For a combined sample of men from both El Paso and Houston, 
quarter-by-quarter earnings estimates reported by Bloom (1990, p. 
163) indicate that WAD participants were reemployed sooner than 
would have otherwise been the case. But ultimately, as seen in table
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3.2, the employment opportunities of male participants located at both 
sites were no better than for members of the control group. The Hous 
ton program also allows the differential effect of Tier I/II versus Tier I 
services to be estimated for males. Despite the higher costs of Tier II 
services (which were almost exclusively classroom training), the evi 
dence suggests that essentially no additional gains accrued from add 
ing Tier II services to job search assistance.
The selection of classroom training curriculums was carried out 
much less systematically in the Buffalo and Texas WAD projects than 
in the Downriver program. Corson, Maynard, and Wichita (1984, pp. 
75-77) point out in their overview report on all six displaced worker 
demonstration sites (including Buffalo) that the one-year duration of 
the project severely limited both the careful selection of high-growth 
occupations and the assessment and testing required to insure that par 
ticipants possessed the motivation and academic skills to benefit from 
formal classroom training. In general, CT was restricted to those occu 
pations and training deliverers amenable to short-duration, high-inten 
sity courses developed on short notice. Similarly, Bloom (1990, p. 139) 
points out that the disappointing results obtained for Texas WAD Tier 
II services do not necessarily demonstrate that supplementing ISA 
with occupational training cannot be an effective adjustment assistance 
strategy. Rather, he suggests that the blue-collar orientation of Tier II 
training curriculums available from a local community college was not 
well matched to the backgrounds and interests of the mostly white-col 
lar participants in the Houston WAD project.
The New Jersey UI Demonstration
All eligible claimants assigned to the three treatment groups in the 
New Jersey project were offered a common set of reemployment ser 
vices early in their UI claim period. The first of these services was an 
orientation session followed sequentially by testing, a job search work 
shop, and finally an individual counseling session. The purposes of the 
job search workshop were to help claimants deal with the loss of their 
jobs, to make self-assessments and develop realistic employment 
objectives, and to organize effective job search strategies, including 
effective job application and interviewing techniques. Counseling was 
intended to help each claimant develop a realistic reemployment plan. 
Following their counseling session, claimants in the ISA-only group
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were free to begin their job search subject to the expectation that they 
were to maintain periodic contact with the demonstration, either 
directly with individual staff members or by using a resource center 
located in each demonstration office. Resource centers contained job 
listings, telephones, and occupational and training literature.
Claimants in the ISA/retraining group were offered the opportunity 
to enroll in a classroom training or OJT program. Acceptable CT pro 
grams—which were offered by a wide range of public and private 
training providers—were subject to the restrictions that their expected 
duration not exceed six months and that remedial education be offered 
only if necessary to enable claimants to progress to vocational training. 
Finally, claimants in the JSA/reemployment bonus group were 
informed of the specifics of the bonus program and turned lose to begin 
job search.5
Corson et al. (1989) present net impact estimates of treatment 
effects for the first year following the date of filing the initial UI claim. 
Table 3.2 indicates that by the second quarter after filing, workers 
offered the ISA-only and JSA/reemployment bonus treatments enjoyed 
quarterly earnings that are significantly higher than the earnings of the 
control group. By the fourth quarter, however, the earnings effect of 
both treatments had tailed off to essentially zero. Looking at UI bene 
fits, the difference between the ISA-only and ISA/reemployment 
bonus estimates is positive ($83) and statistically significant indicating 
a sizable incremental effect of the bonus in speeding up reemployment. 
For ISA plus skill training, nevertheless, there is no evidence of either 
a permanent increase in earnings or expedited reemployment. (Esti 
mated net effects on earnings are even smaller in quarters 3 and 4.) The 
authors caution that this conclusion may be misleading because of the 
low take-up rate (15 percent) among treatment group members offered 
ISA/training. That is, any positive effect of training for claimants who 
actually received training services would be substantially diluted, 
because the vast majority of workers assigned to this treatment chose 
not to enroll in a training program.
The follow-up study of the New lersey program by Anderson, Cor 
son, and Decker (1991) is useful because of its longer postprogram 
observation period and more detailed look at the ISA/training treat 
ment, including separate net impact estimates for CT and OIT. Focus 
ing only on claimants who actually participated in a skill training
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program (as opposed to the random sample of all claimants offered 
skill training), classroom training is seen in table 3.3 to significantly 
reduce earnings in the initial two quarters. This result is expected since 
training is likely to be ongoing during these quarters. But in quarters 
four through ten, CT increases earnings by as much as $582 per quarter 
relative to the earnings of claimants receiving ISA-only. Even larger 
and highly significant incremental effects are observed for OJT train 
ees. The authors explain that the primary reason for these very large 
OJT estimates is that by the third quarter after the claim date, OJT 
trainees were employed for almost 11 of 13 weeks in that quarter as 
compared to less than 7 weeks of employment for JSA-only claimants. 
It must also be noted that only forty-five individuals actually received 
OJT services.
Table 3.3 Estimated Incremental Effects of Classroom Training and
OJT on the Quarterly Earnings of Training Recipients in the 


































SOURCE: Anderson, Corson, and Decker (1991, table III.4).
NOTE: Estimates are relative to those for claimants who received JSA-only services. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respec 
tively.
These results for skill training are clearly much more favorable than 
the evidence presented in the evaluations of the other three demonstra 
tion projects. Nevertheless, Anderson, Corson, and Decker (1991, pp. 
37, 51) suggest two reasons for caution in basing policy on their
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results. First, since claimants receiving training are self-selected, the 
evidence cannot be used to argue that training will increase earnings 
for a randomly chosen group of UI claimants. Second, evidence 
obtained for subgroups of claimants indicates that ISA/training has its 
largest impact for the same subgroups (such as high school graduates) 
that are affected to the greatest extent by the ISA-only treatment. That 
is, retraining has a larger impact for claimants who already possess 
marketable skills than for claimants who are less market-ready. This 
reason for caution is not particularly surprising, since the relatively 
low-cost classroom training courses provided in New Jersey were 
designed to upgrade claimants' existing skills rather than to provide 
training for a totally new occupation (see Corson et al. 1989, pp. 109- 
11). An example of skill upgrading cited in the evaluation report is that 
an individual with accounting skills might be trained to use a spread 
sheet package on a personal computer.
The TAA study
In the context of the short-duration training offered in New lersey, 
results obtained in the TAA study are especially relevant, since TAA 
funds longer-term retraining programs intended to equip displaced 
workers to enter entirely new occupations or industries. TAA partici 
pants also clearly exhibit the characteristics associated with displaced 
workers, namely, they are in most cases permanently separated from 
their prelayoff employers, typically because of a plant closing.
Drawing cases from ten states, the TAA evaluation study by Corson 
et al. (1993) is based on interviews with nearly 4,800 sample members 
broken down into three groups: (1) recipients of TRA income-mainte 
nance benefits; (2) TAA trainees, nearly all of whom were receiving 
TRA benefits; and (3) a comparison sample of UI exhaustees. Further 
disaggregation occurs for training received in 1987-88 and 1988-89. 
TAA trainees typically enrolled in programs intended to develop spe 
cific job skills in occupations different from the occupations of their 
prelayoff jobs. Most of these programs were supplied by either a voca 
tional training center or a local community college, and mean length of 
training exceeded one year for both the pre-1988 and post-1988 TAA 
trainee samples. A majority of TAA trainees failed to begin training 
until after they had exhausted their 26-week UI entitlement period. 
Thus many TAA trainees chose to enter training only after they were
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jobless for a substantial period of time, suggesting that entrance into a 
retraining program became an option only after workers recognized 
that finding a job in their old industrial sector was very unlikely. A 
$12,000 voucher allowed trainees to choose their own training program 
with the assistance of Employment Service staff. While over half of 
TAA trainees had been machine operators in their prelayoff jobs, fewer 
than 5 percent pursued training in that occupation. The occupations 
most frequently selected by trainees were technical, mechanical/repair, 
managerial/professional, and administrative support.
Table 3.4 presents net impact estimates for the twelfth quarter fol 
lowing the initial UI claim calculated for both the pre-88 and post-88 
samples and controlling for a variety of personal and predisplacement 
job characteristics. The first two rows of the table indicate that there
Table 3.4 Estimated Effects of TAA Program Services 12 Quarters After 
the Initial UI Claim
Outcome variables9



















-$416** -1.83 TRA recipients only 
152 4.88
SOURCE: TRA benefits: Corson et al. (1993, tables IV.5-IV.8) and training: Corson et al. (1993,
tables VI. 1 andVI.2).
a. Estimates are regression adjusted.
**Indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
are no significant differences between TRA recipients and the compar 
ison sample of UI exhaustees in either quarterly earnings or the propor 
tion of time employed. A comparison of unadjusted means of the 
outcome variables over the twelve-quarter observation period suggests
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that TRA recipients lagged UI exhaustees in terms of earnings and 
employment through quarter 4, after which they gradually began to 
catch up. The fourth quarter was a period in which most UI exhaustees 
could no longer receive UI benefits, but most TRA recipients were still 
receiving TRA benefits.
Figure 3.1 Mean Quarterly Earnings for the TAA Trainee and







TAA trainees Other TRA recipients
10 11 12 Average 
over all 
quarters
SOURCE: Corson, Decker, Gleason, and Nicholson (1993, figure VI.2). 
*Indicates a significant difference at the 5 percent level.
The lower half of the table reports net impact estimates for the same 
two outcome variables obtained comparing TAA trainees to all other 
TRA recipients. (Corson et al. 1993 suggest that the appropriate com 
parison group for TAA trainees is TRA recipients rather than UI 
exhaustees.) These results for the twelfth quarter indicate considerable
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convergence of TAA trainees to the labor market performance of other 
TRA recipients, especially for the post-88 sample. As shown in figure 
3.1, mean earnings of post-88 TAA trainees fall below those of TRA 
recipients in quarters 3 through 6; this would be expected since train 
ees were more likely to participate in long-term training, which would 
keep them out of the labor force longer. Thereafter, however, trainees' 
earnings rise faster than those of TRA recipients. This result is note 
worthy because TAA trainees are more likely to have moved to a new 
occupation or industry in the job they held three years after their initial 
UI claim. It might be recalled from chapter 1 that a common finding in 
the displaced worker literature is that workers who changed industrial 
sectors to find new jobs typically suffer greater earnings losses than the 
displaced who did not change industries. Thus, one interpretation of 
table 3.4 and figure 3.1 is that TAA training had a positive effect in the 
sense of causing the earnings of industry- and occupation-switchers to 
converge to the level of earnings of displaced workers less likely to 
have been obliged to make such switches. It may also be worth noting 
that some post-88 TAA trainees may have chosen to enter a training 
program to extend their benefit entitlement period rather than to build 
up their stock of human capital.
UI Reform Experiments
Supplementing the results obtained for job search assistance in the 
displaced worker demonstration projects is evidence gathered from 
experimental evaluations of proposed reforms of the UI system. The 
proposed reforms all have the dual purposes of speeding up the reem- 
ployment of UI claimants and reducing the budgetary costs of UI. One 
set of reforms focuses on enhanced services to improve the job search 
skills and employment opportunities of UI claimants and on stricter 
enforcement of the work search rules that determine continuing eligi 
bility for benefits. A second set examines the reemployment effects of 
cash payments to UI recipients who find jobs quickly and keep them 
for a specified time period. The final reform tests the effectiveness of 
self-employment as an alternative reemployment strategy.
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The Job Search Experiments
Evaluation results are available for six random-assignment job 
search experiments. 6 In addition to the New Jersey UI Demonstration 
discussed earlier, the experiments are the Nevada Claimant Placement 
Program, the Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Demon 
stration, the Nevada Claimant Employment Program, the Washington 
Alternative Work Search Experiment, and the Reemploy Minnesota 
Project. Except for the Charleston and New Jersey projects, the experi 
ments are similar in focusing on a cross section of UI claimants. 
(Charleston excludes victims of mass layoffs and New Jersey excludes 
those under age 25 with less than three years of tenure.) Some of the 
basic design features of the six experiments are presented in table 3.5. 
As seen in the table, all of the experiments seek to intervene reasonably 
early in the unemployment spell. The projects also all emphasize in 
varying degrees enhanced JSA services including job search work 
shops and resource centers, more frequent checks of claimant eligibil 
ity, and better coordination between Job Service personnel of the 
Employment Service (ES) and UI staff in providing services and moni 
toring eligibility. A novel aspect of the Washington State experiment is 
that one of its treatments eliminates all checks on work search activity, 
while the other two tailor claimants' work search requirements to their 
individual circumstances and local labor market conditions. (The tradi 
tional program requires three employer contacts per week for contin 
ued receipt of UI benefits.)
For each of the six experiments, table 3.6 reports estimates of treat 
ment effects on weeks of UI benefits received. Estimates in the first 
column are simple treatment group/control group differences in means, 
while the second column presents estimates adjusted for differences in 
individual characteristics using regression analysis. The two Nevada 
experiments and the Reemploy Minnesota program provided the most 
intensive services and had the largest impact in reducing UI duration. 
Results shown in the table for these three experiments suggest that the 
enhanced JSA services and improved ES/UI coordination reduced UI 
duration by between 1.6 and 4.3 weeks. Given the moderate cost of 
JSA services, these experiments have very favorable ratios of benefits 
to costs.
Table 3.5 Major Design Characteristics of the Job Search Assistance Experiments
Project Enrollment period Treatment(s) First contact
Nevada Claimant 
Placement
February 1977 to 
March 1978
Charleston Claimant February 1983 to 







July 1986 to 
June 1987
July 1988 to 
June 1989
July 1986 to 
August 1987
July 1988 to 
June 1990
One treatment: more intensive services, weekly After third UI payment 
interviews and eligibility checks, all services from 
same ES/UI team
Three treatments: (1) strengthened work test, 
enhanced placement services and a 3-hour job 
search workshop; (2) strengthened work test and 
enhanced placement services; and (3) 
strengthened work test
One JSA treatment: required follow-up contacts 
with ES staff, access to job search materials at 
resource centers
One treatment: higher quality ES and UI services, 
all services from same ES/UI team
After first UI payment
Apprximately 5 weeks 
after claim filed
4 weeks into benefit 
year
At interview following 
claim filing
Three treatments: (1) elimination of all work 
search requirements, (2) individualized work 
search requirements, and (3) individualized work 
search requirements plus attendance at a 2-day job 
search workshop
One treatment: intensive personalized JSA, all At claim filing 
services from same staff person






regressors UI benefits measured over8
Nevada Claimant Placement -3.90*** 
Charleston Claimant Placement
1. Strengthened work test, enhanced placement services, -0.70* 
and workshop
2. Strengthened work test and enhanced placement services -0.50
3. Strengthened work test -0.50
New Jersey UI -0.50**
Nevada Claimant Employment
Including trainees -1.60*** 
Excluding trainees -2.10***
Washington Alternative Work Search
1. No search requirements
2. Individualized work search
3. Individualized work search plus job search workshop
Reemploy Minnesota -4.32**
First spell of UI (12.4)







Benefit year (17.9) 
Not specified (14.5)
Benefit year (16.0)
Not specified (not available)
SOURCE: Meyer (1992, table 4).
a. Control group mean shown in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Unfortunately, Meyer (1992, pp. 35-38) raises several concerns 
about the Nevada and Minnesota experiments involving weaknesses in 
their experimental designs and the completeness of their evaluations. 
In the Nevada experiments, large estimated effects may be partly the 
consequence of differences in the ability of Job Service personnel 
rather than the effect of the ISA services provided. In Minnesota, ran 
domization may have been compromised by the inclusion in the con 
trol group of a substantial number of individuals with separation issues 
relating to the reason they left their last job that would lead to an 
administrative hearing. If these individuals tended to have longer spells 
of unemployment, they would account for some part of the over four- 
week difference in mean weeks of UI receipt.
The other three experiments appear to be more methodologically 
sound. Table 3.6 shows that for both the Charleston and New Jersey 
experiments, treatment services reduced UI receipt by about half a 
week. The combination of additional services and tightened eligibility 
checks in the New Jersey demonstration makes it difficult to determine 
which aspect of the program induced the reduction in UI duration. 
Results for the Charleston demonstration indicate, however, numeri 
cally small incremental effects above that of the strengthened work test 
(treatment 3) for enhanced placement services and the job search 
workshop (treatments 1 and 2). Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985, 
pp. 106-108) conclude in their evaluation report that there is no strong 
evidence that the treatments affected the reemployment success of 
Charleston claimants by either encouraging more active job search or 
helping claimants to find jobs more rapidly. Rather, it appears that the 
reporting requirements, coupled with the cessation of UI payments for 
failure to report, are the most important reasons why the treatments led 
to a reduction in UI expenditures. Claimants in Charleston tended to 
leave UI rolls either because they were formally denied benefits or they 
simply stopped claiming benefits.
Results shown in table 3.6 for the Washington State experiment indi 
cate that, compared to standard work search requirements, the suspen 
sion of search requirements (treatment 1) increased length of UI 
payments by over three weeks. At the same time, individually tailored 
job search requirements combined with a job search workshop (treat 
ment 3) produced a small but still statistically significant reduction in 
UI duration of about half a week, while individualized work search
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alone (treatment 2) had no effect. Johnson and Klepinger (1994) sug 
gest that the effect of treatment 3 on UI benefits might have either of 
two explanations: (1) the job search workshop made claimants more 
efficient in their job search, or (2) required attendance at the workshop 
acted as a deterrent to continued receipt of UI benefits by raising the 
perceived cost of remaining on UI. Hazard function estimates provided 
by the authors (not shown) are useful in distinguishing between these 
explanations. Consistent with the conclusion reached for the Charles 
ton demonstration, the hazard function estimates point quite clearly to 
the second explanation as the more important mechanism through 
which treatment 3 produced the observed decrease in UI benefits. That 
is, treatments providing more intensive ISA services that include a job 
search workshop reduce UI payments primarily by raising the costs of 
remaining on UI rather than by enhancing job search skills.
The Reemployment Bonus Experiments
To encourage active work search by UI claimants, an alternative to 
stricter monitoring of claimant search efforts is a reemployment bonus. 
To date, four random-assignment reemployment bonus experiments 
have been carried out. The first is a state-funded program in Illinois 
conducted between mid-1984 and mid-1985. Two reemployment 
bonus treatments were implemented as part of the Illinois program. 
The first paid a cash bonus of $500 to a random sample of new UI 
claimants who found a job within 11 weeks of the initial claim (the 
qualification period) and held that job for at least four months (the 
reemployment period). In the second treatment, another random sam 
ple of new UI claimants was told that, once a hiring commitment was 
made, the employer of each newly hired claimant would be eligible for 
a $500 cash bonus. Here the intent of the subsidy was to test the effect 
of a marginal wage-bill subsidy (or training subsidy) in reducing the 
duration of insured unemployment. The qualification and reemploy 
ment periods are the same for the employer bonus as for the claimant 
bonus.
As reported by Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987), large positive 
effects are found for the claimant bonus treatment but not the employer 
bonus treatment. The program's take-up rate is very high (84 percent) 
for those eligible for the claimant experiment, and the treatment is
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found to reduce UI benefits by $158 and UI duration by 1.15 weeks, 
where both outcome variables are measured over the benefit year. 
These estimates are obtained for all workers assigned to the claimant 
treatment, whether or not they agreed to participate and whether or not 
they actually received the bonus payment. Woodbury and Spiegelman 
calculate that UI benefits were reduced by a striking $2.32 for every $1 
paid out in bonuses to claimants. The authors also provide evidence 
that the favorable effect on UI duration is not due to participating 
claimants accepting a less favorable job match (thereby sacrificing 
earnings) in order to qualify for the bonus. On the other hand, the pro 
gram participation rate is considerably lower in the employer bonus 
treatment at 65 percent; and there is no significant treatment group/ 
control group difference in either UI benefits or duration of UI pay 
ments.
The very favorable results obtained for the Illinois claimant reem- 
ployment bonus experiment led to USDOL funding for three additional 
random-assignment experiments in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington State. These experiments were designed to provide evi 
dence on how to fine-tune the reemployment bonus concept by intro 
ducing more variation in the amount and timing of bonus payments to 
claimants. In the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration, the 
maximum reemployment bonus was specified to be one-half of the 
claimant's total UI entitlement, where UI entitlement was defined as 
the lump-sum payment capturing the stream of benefit payments to be 
received over the remaining weeks of UI eligibility. The maximum 
bonus could be collected by accepting a job during the first two weeks 
after agreeing to participate in the program at the assessment/counsel 
ing interview. After these two weeks, the size of the bonus decreases by 
10 percent per week, reaching zero at the end of the eleventh week 
after the assessment/counseling interview. To qualify for the bonus, the 
claimant's new job must be more than part time and the employer other 
than the previous employer. The Pennsylvania and Washington experi 
ments offered two and three levels of bonus payments, respectively, 
expressed as multiples of average weekly benefit amounts, combined 
with two levels of the qualification period. The reemployment period is 
about four months in all three post-Illinois experiments.
The New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington experiments are all 
found to have much smaller effects on UI expenditures than the Illinois
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claimant experiment. In New Jersey, the incremental effect of the 
reemployment bonus above that of ISA-only is 0.50 weeks less in UI 
duration and, as shown in table 3.2, $83 less in UI payments. 7 In Penn 
sylvania and Washington, similarly, the estimated effects of different 
combinations of bonus payments and qualification periods cluster 
around one-half of a week of UI payments. 8 As pointed out earlier in 
table 3.6, this is about the same effect achieved by more closely moni 
toring work search behavior in the Charleston and Washington State 
job search experiments, but at a much higher cost due to the bonuses. 
There is also a tendency for the larger bonuses and longer qualification 
periods to be associated with larger estimated effects, but these rela 
tionships are not strong. In the Washington experiment, for example, 
the high bonus payment level together with a long qualification period 
reduced UI receipt by 0.76 weeks and UI benefits by $138, both mea 
sured over the benefit year. Consistent with the Illinois results, finally, 
an encouraging aspect of the other three experiments is that there is no 
evidence that rate of pay on the new job is adversely affected by an ear 
lier return to work.
Following a flurry of excitement generated by findings of the Illinois 
claimant experiment, the less favorable results reported for the subse 
quent experiments caused an abating of labor economists' interest in 
the reemployment bonus concept. Nevertheless, a reemployment bonus 
was included among changes in the UI system recommended by the 
Clinton administration in its proposed Reemployment Act of 1994 (see 
U.S. Department of Labor 1993, p. 9).
Davidson and Woodbury (1991) attempt to provide an explanation 
of why the three later experiments obtained significantly smaller bonus 
impacts than were observed in Illinois. Their analysis indicates that the 
key factor in understanding this difference is that the reemployment 
bonus effect in Illinois combines a very large estimated impact for 
workers eligible for 12 weeks of federally funded extended UI benefits 
and a rather small impact for workers eligible for the regular 26 weeks 
of state-funded benefits. Workers eligible for extended benefits are 
expected to search less intensively than workers eligible for regular 
benefits because the additional period of benefits reduces the financial 
pressure to find a new job quickly. What seems to have happened in 
Illinois is that the reemployment bonus caused workers eligible for 
extended benefits to disproportionately increase their search effort rela-
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tive to those not eligible. The result is that the greater relative increase 
in the search effort of extended benefit recipients led to a reduction in 
UI duration in comparison to what it would have been had the extended 
benefit program not been available. In terms of policy implications, 
Davidson and Woodbury suggest a possible role for the reemployment 
bonus in Canada and in Western European countries where, as noted in 
chapter 2, workers are typically entitled to one year or longer of unem 
ployment compensation benefits, rather than just six months as is stan 
dard in the United States.
One final issue that may be addressed in the context of the reem 
ployment bonus experiments is termed the "displacement effect" in the 
labor economics literature. The basic problem is that even if a labor 
market intervention like the reemployment bonus enhances the reem 
ployment prospects of program-eligible workers, it will have no effect 
on total employment if each new job offered is at the expense of a job 
opportunity not available to ineligible workers. Davidson and Wood- 
bury (1993) explore the likely size of the displacement effect of a 
reemployment bonus program using a partial equilibrium matching 
model of the labor market. Workers potentially subject to displacement 
fall into two categories: (1) Ul-eligibles who fail to find a job in time to 
qualify for the bonus (including workers who have exhausted their UI 
benefits), and (2) Ul-ineligible workers.
The authors proceed by making use of data gathered in evaluating 
the Illinois experiment to infer values for unobservable parameters of 
their search model. The model is then solved to yield estimates of the 
displacement effect. Results reported indicate that overall unemploy 
ment falls in response to the bonus program; that is, the positive effect 
of bonus payments on the reemployment opportunities of program-eli 
gible workers more than outweighs possible displacement effects for 
ineligibles. Nevertheless, the unemployment of Ul-ineligible workers 
is found to rise in the one case (out of three the authors consider) in 
which assumed parameter values are characteristic of a recession. The 
magnitude of the displacement effect is small, since it never exceeds 
1.9 displaced workers per thousand. But even so, Davidson and Wood- 
bury (1993, p. 601) suggest that the effect is large enough that 30 to 60 
percent of the gross employment effect of the bonus is offset by dis 
placement of Ul-ineligibles. As they note, the finding that displace 
ment is greatest under conditions characteristic of a recession
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substantially weakens the attractiveness of the reemployment bonus as 
a policy alternative.
The Self-Employment Demonstrations
In the late 1980s, the USDOL initiated two demonstration projects 
to test the effectiveness of self-employment as an alternative reemploy 
ment strategy for UI claimants.9 The Washington State project began in 
September 1989 and supplied program services through March 1991. 
The Massachusetts project began in May 1990 as a three-year demon 
stration project. Both projects are early intervention programs designed 
to encourage new UI claimants to start up their own small businesses. 
Program services offered in both projects included twenty hours of 
training in basic business skills, counseling, and financial assistance. 
The financial assistance available in both projects included bi-weekly 
UI benefits. In addition, participants were exempt from the regular UI 
work search requirement while enrolled in the demonstrations.
Along with these similarities, the projects differed in two important 
respects. First, the Massachusetts project was targeted to unemployed 
workers judged likely to exhaust their UI benefits. The Washington 
project did not impose this targeting restriction. Second, the Washing 
ton project provided, in addition to regular UI payments, a lump-sum 
payment equal to remaining UI benefits to those who completed five 
project "milestones." 10 These were defined as completing a set of four 
business training modules, developing an acceptable business plan, 
opening a business bank account, satisfying all licensing requirements, 
and obtaining adequate funding.
Both of the self-employment demonstrations were formally evalu 
ated using a random-assignment methodology. But in addition to the 
net impact estimates, an important finding reported in the Abt Associ 
ates evaluation is that interest in the self-employment projects was not 
strong among UI claimants. Of those invited to participate in the pro 
grams, only 7.5 percent of Washington claimants and 3.8 percent of 
Massachusetts claimants were interested enough to attend an orienta 
tion session. And of those who attended the orientation sessions, less 
than two-thirds filed an application (which had to include a new busi 
ness idea). Thus, program take-up rates were very low at about 4 per 
cent for Washington and 2 percent for Massachusetts. In their report,
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Benus, Wood, and Grover (1994, p. ii) comment that "while many pro 
fess an interest in self-employment, relatively few choose to pursue 
self-employment when the opportunity arises." Acceptable applicants 
were assigned randomly to treatment and control groups. Total sample 
sizes are about 1,500 claimants for Washington and 521 claimants for 
Massachusetts.
Labor market outcome estimates were obtained over follow-up peri 
ods averaging 21.3 months in Washington and 18.9 months in Massa 
chusetts. The most favorable of the net impact estimates reported are 
that the programs in both states sharply increased the likelihood of 
self-employment and accelerated the start of self-employment. In 
Washington, for example, 52 percent of the treatment group had at 
least one self-employment experience during the observation period, as 
compared with 27 percent of the control group. This difference in self- 
employment experience is only somewhat smaller in Massachusetts at 
47 percent and 29 percent for the treatment and control groups, respec 
tively. Benus, Wood, and Grover (1994, p. 39) suggest that the larger 
impacts in Washington reflect the financial incentives provided by the 
state's lump-sum payment.
Other program net impact estimates tended to show smaller effects 
and less consistency across the two projects. With respect to self- 
employment earnings, a positive effect was obtained for Washington, 
but the program had no effect in Massachusetts. The authors of the 
evaluation report also suggest that program services might affect wage 
and salary earnings as well as self-employment earnings. 11 Taking both 
categories of earnings into account, the Washington program is found 
to have no effect on combined earnings (a positive effect, as noted, is 
obtained for self-employment earnings and a negative effect for wage 
and salary earnings); while the Massachusetts program increased com 
bined earnings (no effect on self-employment earnings coupled with a 
positive effect on wage and salary earnings). Excluding the lump-sum 
payment in Washington, both projects reduced the dollar amount of UI 
benefits received during the first benefit year. Including the lump-sum 
payment, however, the Washington demonstration increased total UI 
payments to participants. From the perspective of generating employ 
ment for others, finally, neither program is found to significantly affect 
the employment of nonparticipants.
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Selected Studies of Disadvantaged Worker Programs
The economically disadvantaged differ from displaced workers in 
the barriers they face in overcoming joblessness. One of the most 
important of these barriers for disadvantaged workers is lack of work 
experience. Nevertheless, useful evidence on some of the displaced 
worker issues raised thus far is available from recent evaluations of dis 
advantaged worker programs. Examined in this section is evidence on 
the effectiveness of classroom and on-the-job training in the National 
JTPA Study and of job search assistance in California's multicounty 
Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program. The highly suc 
cessful GAIN program in Riverside County is highlighted in the dis 
cussion.
Readers may also have noted the absence of information on basic 
education programs in this chapter. The reason is that basic education 
was not included in the mix of services provided in the five displaced 
worker projects discussed earlier. At the same time, national commis 
sions frequently suggest that strengthening basic skills is essential to 
allow American workers to cope with rapid technological change and 
increased international competitiveness (see, for example, U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor 1986, pp. 33-34); and the third program evaluation crite 
rion listed in chapter 1 argues that basic education should be part of a 
comprehensive displaced workers program. The four demonstration 
projects funded by the Rockefeller Foundation as part of the Minority 
Female Single Parent Demonstration provide important information on 
how to go about structuring basic education programs.
The National JTPA Study
In 1986 the USDOL commissioned a study to measure the impact of 
programs funded by Title II-A of JTPA, which is targeted to serve eco 
nomically disadvantaged Americans. Using data for over 17,000 JTPA 
applicants scattered across sixteen locally administered sites, the evalu 
ation report by Bloom et al. (1992) provides net impact estimates for 
four target groups—adult women and men (ages 22 and older) and 
female and male out-of-school youths (ages 16 to 21). Sample mem 
bers are assigned randomly to either a treatment group or a control 
group. 12 But before random assignment, individuals were classified
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into three service strategy subgroups based on the services recom 
mended by program intake staff. The CT subgroup consists of individ 
uals recommended for classroom training in occupational skills and 
basic education. 13 Next, members of the OJT/JSA subgroup were rec 
ommended for either on-the-job training or job search assistance or for 
both (treatment group members recommended for OJT typically were 
enrolled in ISA while searching for an OJT position or an unsubsidized 
job). Finally, members of the other services subgroup were recom 
mended for services including JSA, basic education, and work experi 
ence—but not classroom training in occupational skills or on-the-job 
training.
Bloom et al. (1992) point out that adult treatment group members in 
both the classroom training and OJT/JSA service subgroups were 
much more likely than control group members to have received the rec 
ommended service. 14 Over an 18-month period following random 
assignment, estimated earnings effects of JTPA services are shown for 
adults in table 3.7. For women, the classroom training results follow 
the expected pattern; that is, earnings losses occur in the first quarter or 
two, representing an initial investment of time in training, followed by 
earnings gains increasing in size over the remaining quarters. The pos 
itive effects measured for the last two quarters are statistically signifi 
cant. For men, on the other hand, none of the estimated effects is 
significantly different from zero. Note that these estimates are obtained 
for sample members assigned to the service subgroup, not for those 
who actually enrolled in a CT program.
The OJT/JSA treatment has a more immediate and sustained posi 
tive impact on the earnings of both adult women and men than does 
classroom training. This would be expected for a service strategy that 
emphasizes immediate placement in either an on-the-job training slot 
or an unsubsidized job. Women in the OJT/JSA subgroup enjoyed pos 
itive and statistically significant earnings impacts of from $109 to $144 
per quarter in five of the six quarters. Estimates for men are of similar 
magnitude in all but the first quarter, although estimated impacts are 
less often statistically significant.
Evidence recently made available for an additional 12 months of 
follow-up is important for understanding whether the classroom and 
on-the-job training effects shown in table 3.7 persist beyond the initial 
18 months. For adults engaged in OJT, Bloom et al. (1994) report esti-
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mates obtained for months 19-30 of the 30-month follow-up period 
that are larger for both men and women than the corresponding esti 
mates for months 7-18. In particular, OJT is found to increase annual 
earnings in months 19-30 by $1,021 (or 17 percent) for women and 
$1,125 (or 13 percent) for men. Both of these estimates are statistically 
significant.
Table 3.7 Estimated Impact of JTPA Title II-A Programs on Quarterly 
and 18-Month Earnings, by Gender and Service Strategy
















































SOURCE: Bloom et al. (1992, exhibit S6).
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respec 
tively.
The sustainability of the positive earnings effect of classroom train 
ing is not as clear. Bloom et al. (1994) find that for adult women the 
impact of CT drops from $434 to $365 per year moving from months
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7-18 to months 19-30 of the follow-up period. For men, on the other 
hand, an increase from $632 to $910 annually over the same two peri 
ods is reported. Although neither is statistically significant, the esti 
mates for months 19-30 represent substantial gains in annual earnings 
on the order of 7 percent and 11 percent, respectively, for women and 
men.
These results for disadvantaged adult workers provide evidence for 
randomly selected subgroups of the labor market effectiveness of on- 
the-job training and, to a lesser extent, of classroom training. As such, 
they support the results shown in table 3.3 for displaced workers in 
New Jersey who were self-selected in the sense that they opted to 
undertake the offered services. The JTPA and New Jersey findings 
indicating a strong positive effect of on-the-job training are especially 
important given the unexpectedly ambiguous OJT results in table 3.2 
for the Buffalo displaced workers program. Nevertheless, there are two 
important caveats to the JTPA findings. First, Bloom et al. (1992) sug 
gest that the earnings gains under JTPA are due primarily to increases 
in hours worked, rather than to higher hourly earnings while employed. 
Second, the authors (1992, p. 14) mention that program staff members 
tended to recommend the most job-ready applicants for the OJT/JSA 
service strategy.
As noted in the context of criterion 2 in chapter 1, a fundamental 
problem in implementing OJT programs is recruiting a sufficient num 
ber of employers willing to offer OJT slots. Evidence on this problem 
is provided by Bishop and Montgomery (1986), who examine 
employer familiarity with and participation in four targeted employ 
ment subsidy programs in operation in 1980. Using a USDOL survey 
of nearly 6,000 employers, the authors find that participation rates in 
these programs are very low, primarily because firms lacked knowl 
edge about the existence and rules of the programs. Bishop and Mont 
gomery also report, however, a strong effect of establishment size on 
the likelihood of both familiarity and participation, and that employer 
usage can be increased by vigorous promotion by local program 
administrators.
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The Riverside GAIN Program
Under the federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 
1981, states were given the authority to design their own programs to 
improve the labor market prospects of welfare recipients. One of the 
series of OBRA-related state programs is California's GAIN program, 
which was implemented between 1988 and 1990 in six counties. A key 
feature of GAIN that distinguishes it from most other welfare employ 
ment programs of the 1980s is its emphasis on up-front basic educa 
tion. Welfare recipients who do not possess a high school diploma (or 
its equivalent), who do poorly on a math and literacy test, or who are 
not proficient in English are deemed by GAIN to be "in need of basic 
education." These individuals can choose either a basic education class 
or a job search activity, but if they choose ISA and fail to obtain 
employment they must enter basic education. Recipients judged not in 
need of basic education begin by participating in job search. GAIN 
participants in either of these sequences who fail to obtain employment 
after completing their initial activities move on, after undergoing an 
employability assessment, to a next level of activities including skills 
training, vocationally oriented postsecondary education, on-the-job 
training, or unpaid work experience.
Using a random assignment experimental design, the GAIN evalua 
tion carried out by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corpora 
tion provides net impact estimates for both heads of single-parent 
families and heads of two-parent families. Estimated program effects 
for single parents (who represent about two-thirds of welfare recipients 
in the study) are found to vary substantially across counties. The cross- 
county range of these estimates is from -8 percent to 59 percent for 
earnings and from 2 percent to -12 percent for welfare benefits mea 
sured during the first year of the follow-up period. Similar variation in 
the outcome variables with a greater overall increase in earnings and 
decrease in welfare payments occurs in year 2. For both years, the larg 
est positive estimates for earnings and the largest negative estimates for 
welfare payments are found for the Riverside County program.
Friedlander, Riccio, and Freedman (1993, ch. IV) carefully discuss 
the factors that make Riverside different from the other five GAIN pro 
grams. The conclusion they reach is that Riverside's most distinctive 
feature is its "message" to all welfare registrants, even those in basic
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education classes, that employment is central, that it should be sought 
expeditiously, and that low-paying job opportunities should not be rou 
tinely turned down. The program's management underscored this mes 
sage to staff members by establishing job placement standards as one 
of several criteria for assessing performance. For program clients, the 
centrality of employment is reinforced by Riverside's rigorous use of 
sanctions to secure the participation of all mandatory registrants (those 
with children older than age 6) in recommended program services. 
Riverside also implemented a strong job development component to 
insure that jobs were indeed available to registrants. It is important to 
note, finally, that the Riverside program clearly benefited from a local 
economy that grew faster than any of the other county economies, even 
though Riverside's unemployment rate was not the lowest of the six 
counties.
The Minority Female Single Parent Demonstration
Between 1982 and 1988, the Rockefeller Foundation provided fund 
ing to community-based organizations located in Atlanta, Providence, 
San Jose, and Washington, D.C. to operate comprehensive welfare 
employment programs for low-income minority single mothers. The 
Minority Female Single Parent projects in Atlanta, Providence, and 
Washington followed either of two conventional approaches to provid 
ing services. In Atlanta and Providence, a "sequential" approach was 
used in which women with poor basic skills were enrolled initially in 
remedial education courses and only later placed in job skills classes 
after they attained academic prerequisites. The Washington project 
emphasized a "general employability" model that included instruction 
on motivation, basic reading and math, and job search skills. A course 
for better-prepared trainees augmented these general classes with 
instruction in the basic concepts of electricity, mechanics, and tools as 
preparation for further training or employment in nontraditional jobs.
The San Jose Center for Employment Training (GET) program dif 
fered from the other three Minority Female Single Parent projects and 
from most OBRA-based programs in seeking to integrate basic educa 
tion with job skills training. Three features of the GET program com 
bined to make it unique. First, low-income single mothers entering the 
program did not receive initial assessment and referral services but
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were instead placed immediately, regardless of their formal educa 
tional deficiencies, in an open-entry, self-paced, job training curricu 
lum. Curricula were developed or dropped in response to changes in 
local labor market demand as indicated by an industrial advisory board 
composed of employers and by the efforts of GET job developers. Sec 
ond, basic educational skills were taught concurrently with skill train 
ing as they pertained to the job skills being learned. This allowed 
program participants to acquire essential basic skills while still pro 
gressing toward the ultimate goal of a job. Finally, training was pro 
vided in-house using experienced instructors drawn from local firms. 
Since curricula were self-paced and competency-based, instructors had 
the time to provide participants with individual attention.
The evaluation report by Mathematica Policy Research provides 
dramatic support for the "integrated" program model used in the San 
Jose GET program. Measured over a 30-month follow-up period, the 
sequential and general employability approaches used in Atlanta, Prov 
idence, and Washington are found to have essentially no effect on earn 
ings and employment using a random-assignment evaluation design. In 
striking contrast, the GET program is estimated to increase employ 
ment and total earnings by about 14 percent and 22 percent, respec 
tively, above control group means (see Burghardt et al. 1992, table 
IV. 1). The larger estimated impact on earnings than employment 
implies that hourly wages as well as hours of work increased under 
GET, and the Mathematica researchers report a direct GET effect on 
average hourly earnings of nearly 11 percent. On the cost side, it is 
interesting to note that cost per GET treatment group member is about 
$3,600 per year, which is in the middle of the range for Minority 
Female Single Parent demonstrations of between $2,700 to $4,800.
Summary
The United States clearly leads the world in the quantity and sophis 
tication of its program evaluation research. This chapter reviewed the 
evidence available for government-supported evaluations of the reem- 
ployment services offered in five displaced workers projects carried out 
during the 1980s and into the 1990s. Two of these evaluations made
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use of a random-assignment evaluation design, while the other three 
used a treatment group/comparison group design. Considered in turn in 
this concluding section are the reemployment services provided in the 
displaced worker demonstrations, namely, job search assistance, class 
room training, and on-the-job training.
This evidence for displaced workers was supplemented by results 
obtained from studies of proposed UI system reforms in six job search 
experiments, four reemployment bonus experiments, and two self- 
employment demonstrations. (The New Jersey UI Reemployment 
Demonstration project is included among both the displaced worker 
and UI reform studies.) Also considered in this chapter were findings 
obtained from three studies examining for the economically disadvan- 
taged the labor market effectiveness of job search assistance, class 
room training, on-the-job training, and basic education services. Basic 
education is not included in the mix of services supplied in the dis 
placed worker demonstrations.
Beginning with job search assistance, evidence provided by the dis 
placed worker demonstration projects indicates quite clearly that JSA 
services speed up the reemployment of displaced workers. It appears 
that many displaced individuals possess sufficient marketable skills 
that they can find new jobs with limited, relatively low-cost assistance. 
JSA allows for quick intervention before workers disperse after layoffs 
and plant closings; and, given its modest cost per worker, the evidence 
suggests that JSA services are cost effective.
The job search experiments provide additional evidence to support 
the effectiveness of job search assistance, indicating, in particular, that 
more stringent monitoring of the job search activity of UI claimants 
can pay off in reduced UI expenditures. Estimated program effects in 
these experiments tend to cluster around one-half of a week less of UI 
benefits. After an initial flurry of interest stimulated by the Illinois 
reemployment bonus demonstration, findings from the three subse 
quent reemployment bonus experiments in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
and Washington State indicate only modest potential for speeding up 
the reemployment process above the effects of much cheaper JSA ser 
vices. Evaluation results from the self-employment demonstrations in 
Washington State and Massachusetts suggest a similarly cautious con 
clusion. While this evidence indicates that the self-employment pro 
grams did accelerate the reemployment of UI claimants as self-
90 An Overview of Existing Evaluation Evidence for the United States
employed entrepreneurs, the impact of these programs on earnings is 
ambiguous. It is also important to note that only very small fractions of 
eligible claimants turned out to be interested in participating in the pro 
grams.
Results from the displaced worker demonstrations are more mixed 
for classroom training in vocational skills. Only the follow-up study of 
the New Jersey UI Demonstration focusing specifically on individuals 
who actually received classroom training services (as distinct from the 
random sample of all eligible individuals offered CT) yields evidence 
of a positive incremental effect of CT above that of ISA-only. It is 
worth noting that the short-term, low-cost training provided in New 
Jersey was designed to upgrade workers' existing skills rather than to 
furnish training for a new occupation. In contrast, TAA participants 
received longer-term training intended to equip them to enter a new 
occupation or industry. Evaluation results for the TAA program are 
positive in the sense that the longer-term investments in classroom 
training allowed the earnings of TAA trainees—most of whom were 
obliged to change occupation or industry to obtain reemployment—to 
reach the level of earnings of a comparison group of displaced workers 
who were more likely to have been industry and occupation stayers. 
(Displaced workers reemployed in the same occupation and industry 
typically suffer smaller earnings losses than occupation and industry 
switchers.) Moderately favorable results for classroom training are also 
obtained for economically disadvantaged adult workers in the random- 
assignment JTPA Title II-A evaluation.
The authors of these evaluation reports take considerable care in 
interpreting their inconclusive and often negative results for classroom 
training. Caveats mentioned include the difficulty of drawing reliable 
inferences from small sample sizes and low take-up rates for classroom 
training programs; the problem that program participants in limited- 
duration experiments have relatively little time left to receive job 
placement assistance; the scarcity of training providers capable of put 
ting together high-quality, short-duration training courses on short 
notice; and the very real possibility that the classroom training pro 
vided is either not marketable in the local labor market or not of partic 
ular interest to the client population.
Although a substantial body of evaluation evidence on the effective 
ness of classroom training is now available, it is difficult to draw policy
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conclusions from this evidence on how to design permanent, nation 
wide retraining programs. At present, it seems prudent to conclude 
only that classroom training should be restricted to carefully selected 
workers who can be offered training curricula tailored to their back 
grounds and to the needs of local employers. Exactly how to anticipate 
the needs of employers in designing classroom training curricula is an 
open question, although considerable experience has been gained, 
most notably in the JTPA program, on the use of performance stan 
dards to increase the incentive of training providers to supply job-ready 
program graduates. JTPA performance standards are discussed in more 
detail in chapter 4. It should also be noted that the evaluation studies 
examined in this chapter do not provide evidence on the effectiveness 
of certification systems indicating mastery of particular occupational 
skills.
Even though the Buffalo displaced worker project provided surpris 
ingly mixed evidence for on-the-job training, results from the New Jer 
sey program for treatment group members who actually received on- 
the-job training are highly favorable, indicating incremental effects on 
earnings of as much as $3,000 per quarter relative to earnings of the 
JSA-only treatment group. A note of caution regarding this very posi 
tive result is that it is based on a small number of on-the-job training 
recipients who are undoubtedly highly self-selected. Nevertheless, the 
on-the-job training treatment is also found in the National JTPA Study 
to have an immediate and sustained positive impact on the earnings of 
both adult women and men. An issue that has yet to be successfully 
addressed in on-the-job training programs is how to successfully inter 
est American employers in providing a sufficient number of on-the-job 
training slots.
As noted earlier, basic education services were not offered partici 
pants in the displaced worker demonstrations. Yet evidence yielded by 
a welfare employment program located in Riverside county in Califor 
nia indicates that a basic education program closely linked to job 
placement assistance can sharply increase earnings while decreasing 
welfare payments. Also discussed in this chapter was a second highly 
successful welfare employment program in San Jose, California that 
teaches essential basic skills concurrently with skill training as the 
basic skills pertain to the job skills being learned.
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NOTES
1. The Buffalo program was one of six dislocated worker demonstration projects scattered 
across the nation that received USDOL funding. Due to cost considerations, it was decided that 
the impact analysis should be limited to one site. The Buffalo project was chosen as that site 
because of its size, a comprehensive mix of services, and the random selection of workers 
recruited for the program from six "target" plants.
2. In addition to assessing the effectiveness of alternative packages of reemployment services, 
the second major objective of the New Jersey project was to examine the possible use of the UI 
system to identify early in the claim period unemployed workers likely to face prolonged spells of 
unemployment and exhaust UI benefits. The approach used in New Jersey to distinguish the dis 
placed from other UI claimants was to apply five screens during the fourth week of claiming ben 
efits. The cumulative effect of these screens is the restrictions stated in the text.
Based on the New Jersey experience, 1993 federal legislation authorizing extended UI bene 
fits (the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993) requires the U.S. Secre 
tary of Labor to establish a program for encouraging the implementation of a system for 
"profiling" new claimants for regular UI payments (see Runner 1994). The profiling system is 
intended to identify those claimants who are likely UI exhaustees and who may require adjust 
ment assistance services to make a successful transition to new employment.
3. If longitudinal data are available for program participants and nonparticipants, a third "dif- 
ference-in-differences" econometric approach is available to control for the selection bias that 
would arise if unobserved person-specific factors affect both earnings and program selection. This 
approach is used in an evaluation of the Canadian Employability Improvement Program discussed 
in chapter 5.
4. Standard references are Heckman (1978 and 1979).
5. The reemployment bonus is directed at the problem that the reemployment of displaced 
workers may be delayed, not by inadequate job search skills, but by a lack of motivation to engage 
in search or by the natural reluctance to accept a new job offering considerably lower wages and 
benefits than the prelayoff job. Evidence for New Jersey and three other reemployment bonus 
demonstration projects is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
6. The discussion in this section borrows heavily from the comprehensive survey by Meyer 
(1992).
7. Using data from the New Jersey experiment, Anderson (1992) reports hazard function esti 
mates also indicating modest incremental effects of the reemployment bonus on the probability of 
reemployment.
8. Evaluation results for these two experiments are reported by Corson et al. (1992) for Penn 
sylvania and by Spiegelman, O'Leary, and Kline (1992) for Washington State.
9. The discussion in this section is based on the Abt Associates evaluation report authored by 
Benus, Wood, and Grover (1994).
10. The lump-sum design used in Washington is patterned after the French Unemployed 
Entrepreneurs Program which provides a lump-sum payment received after the registration of the 
new firm. In contrast, the Massachusetts design of a steady flow of UI payments over a fixed time 
period is based on the British Enterprise Allowance Scheme (now called the Business and Enter 
prise Services program). Both of these well-known self-employment programs are discussed in 
Bendick and Egan (1987) and Leigh (1989, ch. 5).
11. Benus, Wood, and Grover (1994, p. 44) outline the following reasons for expecting that a 
self-employment program might affect wage and salary earnings: (1) self selection causes less 
capable treatment group members to remain unemployed or to become employed in wage and sal-
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ary jobs, (2) participation in the demonstrations causes some treatment group members to delay 
their search for wage and salary employment, and (3) demonstration services (especially counsel 
ing) provide treatment group members with increased awareness of their marketable skills and an 
enhanced self-confidence in their employability. The first two of these factors would cause the 
demonstrations to have a negative effect on wage and salary earnings, while the third would be 
expected to have a positive effect.
12. In his critique of the National JTPA Study, Hotz (1992) argues that the study does not pro 
duce net impact estimates that are valid for the entire JTPA system because the 16 sites studied 
(out of over 600 sites nationally) are not representative of the system as a whole. The problem is 
that many sites made the decision not to participate in the study because of concern that assign 
ment of applicants to control groups would harm their ability to meet recruitment goals and per 
formance standards, and the ethics of denying services to members of the control groups during 
the follow-up period. Thus Hotz suggests that the estimates obtained are valid only for the sites 
that volunteered to participate in the study.
13. Basic education includes Adult Basic Education providing basic communications and 
mathematics training, high school or General Educational Development (GED) preparation, and 
English as a Second Language.
14. For the CT subgroup, 49 percent of the adult women treatment group received classroom 
training in occupational skills, as compared to 29 percent of the control group. These rates were 
40 percent versus 24 percent among adult men. For the treatment groups in the OJT/JSA sub 
group, 29 percent of both adult women and adult men received OJT, compared to less than 1 per 





This chapter addresses several of the policy issues raised in chapters 
2 and 3 regarding classroom and on-the-job training. In chapter 2, it 
was pointed out that during the latter half of the 1980s the Swedish 
government spent nearly twice as much per dollar of Gross Domestic 
Product on adult training than did the governments of any other of the 
nations considered. The first of the three main sections of this chapter 
explores the nature of the services Swedes receive for this extraordi 
nary commitment of resources to adult training. Of particular interest is 
the 1986 reorganization of the Swedish training system carried out to 
decentralize decision making and increase responsiveness to market 
forces.
Governments of other nations have recently sought to decentralize 
the provision of training services with the objective of better matching 
services provided to the needs of local employers and workers. But at 
the same time these governments step back from directly supplying 
training, they usually seek to make local program providers account 
able for meeting policy goals established at the national level. The sec 
ond section of this chapter examines the 1988 reform decentralizing 
Britain's training system and reviews available evidence on the role of 
performance standards in ensuring that efforts of local service provid 
ers are consistent with national policy goals.
In contrast to the government training system in place in Sweden 
and the employer-led/school-based system in the United Kingdom, still 
another training model is a system based largely on the firm. The third 
section, which is the longest section of the chapter, focuses on firm- 
based training systems. This section begins with discussions of fea 
tures of the highly regarded German and Japanese models that appear 
to contribute to their success. Of special interest is the issue of how to 
ensure that employers supply enough in-house training slots to satisfy 
the demand of workers who would benefit from on-the-job training. 
Considered next is the payroll training tax recently enacted in Austra 
lia—called the Training Guarantee—which is intended to increase the
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incentive of employers to meet their own training requirements. The 
discussion of the Training Guarantee is supplemented by evidence for 
the French payroll training tax first imposed in 1971. The final part of 
this section briefly describes the national skill certification system 
existing in the United Kingdom and presents evidence, using British 
data, on the role of skill certification in indicating to potential employ 
ers that apprenticeship program graduates possess nationally recog 
nized levels of occupational skills.
How It©s Done in Sweden
Characteristics of the Swedish System
It is useful to discuss the Swedish training system in terms of the 
first four criteria of the evaluation framework sketched in chapter 1. 
These criteria are the following:
• Program services should facilitate the transition of displaced 
workers to jobs in growing industries and growing sectors within 
existing industries.
• Program activities must meet the needs of displaced workers.
• Programs must serve the entire spectrum of displaced workers, not 
just those easiest to place.
• Training must supply marketable skills to program graduates.
The Swedish government has a long-term commitment to adjust 
ment assistance programs that satisfy the first criterion. As described in 
chapter 2, the Rehn-Meidner model implemented in Sweden in the 
mid-1950s explicitly emphasizes the role of active labor market pro 
grams in equipping laid-off workers to locate and qualify for new jobs 
in growing industries. In particular, adult training is intended to supply 
the enhanced skills required for displaced workers to move between 
occupations or industries. The nearly forty-year commitment of 
national resources made by Swedish society indicates a level of satis 
faction with their adult training system that warrants study.
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Prior to 1986, adult training in Sweden was administered jointly by 
the Ministries of Labor and Education. Operating under the Ministry of 
Labor, the National Labor Market Board established policy with 
respect to the quantity, quality, and location of training programs. The 
Ministry of Education was responsible for operating the system of 100 
skill centers scattered across Sweden and employing the staff of the 
skill centers.
The reorganization of 1986 created the National Employment Train 
ing Board (AMU), which took over responsibility for operating the 
skill centers. The AMU is composed of a national board and 25 county 
boards, each board consisting of employer, union, and government 
members. Decision-making authority resides in the county boards, 
with these boards responsible for the implementation, evaluation, and 
maintenance of financial records for the training activities in their own 
counties. Duties of the national AMU board in Stockholm are limited 
to developing central curricula and overseeing the financial records of 
county boards. The national AMU board has just 26 employees.
The AMU training system offers about 450 general curricula avail 
able in all 100 skill centers, and each of the 25 regions may further 
develop additional curricula of its own. Most training courses are voca 
tionally oriented and aimed at the upper secondary school level, with 
some programs reaching university levels. Courses are predominantly 
intended to provide skills in manufacturing, health care, office and 
computer occupations, and hotel and restaurant administration (Tre- 
horning 1993, p. 62). However, there are also basic education courses 
in Swedish, mathematics, and English. (Displaced workers in Sweden 
are frequently immigrants.) Courses may last up to a year or more.
The discussion of the second criterion in chapter 1 pointed out that 
adult training programs that meet the needs of displaced workers 
should be designed with the following goals in mind: (1) program 
entry should be flexible and length of courses variable, (2) programs 
should demonstrate to trainees a clear connection between skills 
learned and employment opportunities, and (3) trainees should be pro 
vided with a form of income maintenance during their training period. 
The Swedish training system is designed to meet each of these goals. 
With respect to the first, since layoffs can occur at any time it is impor 
tant that retraining programs permit immediate entry and are flexible 
enough to accommodate substantial variation in formal educational
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backgrounds. To this end, AMU programs are not organized around 
semesters beginning in the fall and winter and courses of fixed length. 
Rather, admission to skill centers is open, and trainees receive individ 
ual study plans and work with self-instructing materials to a large 
extent. After completing a training program, graduates are given a 
diploma, which conveys to potential employers precise information 
about the curriculum the worker has successfully completed and the 
skills he or she possesses.
A key aspect of AMU training is its modular system. For example, 
curricula in the mechanical engineering area are built around fifty-one 
different modules. Subsets of these modules taken sequentially com 
prise six different occupational specialties within mechanical engineer 
ing (i.e., lathe operator, milling operator, NC-operator, grinding 
operator, tool grinding, and grinding for tool work). The least intensive 
of these curricula (NC-operator) requires the completion of just one 
module, while the most intensive (milling operator) requires complet 
ing fourteen modules. 1 The modular system thus allows flexibility in 
individualizing study plans for trainees.
The modular system also extends to workers who are deficient in 
basic reading, communication, or computational skills. Basic educa 
tion modules are available to those requiring basic skills upgrading in 
one or more areas, but the curriculum is restricted as much as possible 
to those skills directly required for vocational training or for adequate 
job performance. Bendick (1983, p. 217) notes that the system resists 
the temptation to include materials that would fill significant gaps in a 
worker's education but which are not directly related to employment.
Concerning the connection between training and job opportunities, 
AMU skill centers are staffed by well-paid, experienced instructors 
who provide in-depth instruction utilizing modern equipment and 
state-of-the-art technology. But since the atmosphere in training cen 
ters is intended as much as possible to resemble a work environment 
rather than a school, instructors relate to trainees less like teachers to 
students than like supervisors to employees. Most instruction is one- 
on-one or in small groups rather than lectures in a classroom setting.
Participation in adult training is heavily subsidized by the state. 
Training programs are provided tuition-free. In addition, unemployed 
workers eligible for unemployment compensation who are undergoing 
training received a training grant in 1992 ranging up to SEK 564 per
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day, five days per week. To put this number in perspective, SEK 564 is 
about 86 percent of the daily earnings of an average industrial worker 
(Trehorning 1993, p. 63). Workers who are not eligible for unemploy 
ment compensation received from SEK 239 to SEK 338 per day in 
training grants.
Moving to the third evaluation criterion, an important feature of 
AMU training is the broad mix of clients passing through the system. 
The same training system serves not only displaced and economically 
disadvantaged workers, but also currently employed workers interested 
in enhancing their skills to qualify for a promotion or to make the tran 
sition to a job in a shortage occupation. Since AMU training is the 
most common way for Swedish workers to upgrade their vocational 
skills, employers are more willing to consider job applications from 
graduates of the public training system and to evaluate each applicant 
on his or her own merits rather than on a prejudged notion of what all 
graduates of a publicly sponsored program are prone to be like. Nar 
rowly targeted employment and training programs, such as those com 
mon in the United States, frequently run into the problem that 
graduates are difficult to place, despite adequate job qualifications, 
because association with the public program itself stigmatizes them.
The 1986 Reorganization
The fourth of the evaluation criteria listed at the beginning of this 
section raises the issue of how to guarantee that classroom training 
programs supply marketable skills. Berit Rollen (1988), Director Gen 
eral of the AMU, points out that prior to 1986, major decisions involv 
ing adult training had to be made by the Ministries of Labor and 
Education in Stockholm. This highly centralized decision-making pro 
cess was slow and cumbersome, and civil servants in neither ministry 
had a strong incentive to see that skill centers delivered high-quality 
training at a reasonable cost. The demands placed on training centers 
by the recession of the early 1980s made it clear that reorganization 
was necessary to increase flexibility and control costs in meeting the 
needs of the labor market. In response to these demands, the AMU was 
created in 1986 with the mandate to operate the system of skill centers 
in a more flexible and cost-conscious manner. Flexibility in the new 
agency was assured by decentralizing decision making to the county
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level. The tripartite organization of county AMU boards ensures close 
cooperation with employers in overseeing the quality of services and 
developing new curricula.
To make the AMU more cost effective, the radical decision was 
made to terminate direct funding by the central government. Instead, 
the AMU was designed to be financially self-supporting in the sense 
that the agency must set prices for training services that cover costs. 
Rollen (1988) comments on the dramatic adjustment faced by 5,700 
agency employees forced to shift from a bureaucratic culture to a free- 
enterprise way of thinking. To obtain funding, it was no longer neces 
sary to develop skills in convincing central government ministries of 
the needs of the skill centers. Instead, funding required an ability to lis 
ten to customers and respond accordingly. It is interesting to note that 
this change in cultures required the establishment of training programs 
in economics and marketing for AMU employees.
The AMU's biggest customers are the National Labor Market 
Board's regional boards, which operate the Employment Service. The 
National Labor Market Board receives funds from the central govern 
ment to buy training services, but these services need not be purchased 
from the AMU. Other suppliers of training services in Sweden are the 
municipal adult education authorities, upper secondary schools, uni 
versities, folk high schools, adult education associations, and private 
companies. Rollen (1988) states that during its first year of operation, 
the AMU obtained 95 percent of its revenues from the sale of training 
services to the National Labor Market Board. The other 5 percent 
resulted from sales to private-sector companies. Training programs 
sold to a particular company can be tailored to meet the specific needs 
of that company.
Before leaving this discussion of the Swedish system, the handful of 
quantitative evaluation studies surveyed by Bjorklund (1991) should at 
least be mentioned. Bjorklund provides an overview of eight evalua 
tions, which includes one study each of mobility grants and temporary 
relief work, two studies of intensified employment services, and four 
studies of skill training. The evaluations of skill training yield gener 
ally negative results. The one study that does show significantly posi 
tive effects of training on earnings indicates that foreigners benefit 
from training to a much greater extent than native-born Swedes—a 
result that leads Bjorklund to question the author's model specification,
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since many trainees of foreign citizenship had unusually low registered 
incomes in the initial year of the study.
Of the remaining four studies, the most favorable results were 
obtained for the two evaluations of intensified employment services. 
One of these studies showed that intensified services in the town of 
Eskilstuna increased employment, reduced weeks of unemployment, 
and improved monthly earnings for those who found jobs. The other 
JSA study found a positive effect of employment services on spells of 
unemployment for laid-off mining workers.
British TECs and Performance-Based Contracting
While Sweden operates an adult training system independent of the 
educational infrastructure, it is more common for national govern 
ments to subsidize existing educational institutions to supply training 
services to targeted groups of workers. A case in point is Britain. Con 
tinuing to focus on the issue of how to ensure that training programs 
supply marketable skills, this section begins with an overview of the 
1988 reform of Britain's training system. As with Sweden's 1986 reor 
ganization of its adult training system, the primary objective of Brit 
ain's 1988 reform was decentralization in the provision of training 
services.
An essential part of the 1988 reform in Britain is the requirement 
that payments to local service providers be linked to achieving speci 
fied national goals; that is, service providers are to be subjected to per 
formance standards. The fifth of the criteria included in the evaluation 
framework outlined in chapter 1 states that training programs should 
effectively utilize existing educational and training institutions. With 
this criterion in mind, the second part of this section examines avail 
able evidence on the labor market impact of performance standards. 
This evidence relates to the U.S. experience with JTPA Title II-A pro 
grams targeted to disadvantaged workers.
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Overhauling Britain©s Training System
In 1988, the British government presented to Parliament a White 
Paper, Employment for the 1990s, outlining what it termed a radical 
reform of the nation's training system (Department of Employment 
1988). As noted earlier, the training of redundant workers in a particu 
lar British industry had been the responsibility of employers in that 
industry through industry-specific Industrial Training Boards. The 
1988 reform makes training locally based rather than industry-based. 
The rationale for this policy decision is presented in the following pas 
sage from the White Paper (Department of Employment 1988, p. 29):
Several countries, notably Germany and the United States, also 
have more locally based training systems with the close and con 
tinuous involvement of employers and employer institutions. Such 
systems are much more likely to be attuned to the shifting pattern 
of employer needs, and to individuals' requirements, than the 
more inflexible arrangements at national and industry levels. It is 
at the local level that jobs and the need for particular skills arise. It 
is at the local level that people live and work and would wish to be 
trained for new or changing jobs.
The authors of the White Paper are also explicit in their assumption 
that small businesses will be the primary source of new jobs during the 
1990s.
The key element in the 1988 reform is the establishment of a 
national network of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) to plan 
and deliver training services and promote small business development 
at the local level. A TEC is created when a group of local employers 
enters into a contract with the nation, il Department of Employment. 
The Department of Employment provides funding, while each TEC is 
responsible for (1) assessing skill neec.s within the local labor market, 
(2) developing a plan to provide training tailored to satisfy these local 
needs, and (3) contracting for training services. Actual training pro 
grams are typically provided by local educational and training institu 
tions serving as TEC subcontractors.
TECs are given wide-ranging responsibility for operating the pleth 
ora of training initiatives developed at the national level during the 
1980s. Out-of-school youth who are jobless are currently guaranteed a 
training slot in the Youth Training program and an allowance for the
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duration of their training. Unemployed adults are eligible for three pro 
grams. The Employment Training program offers adults who have 
been unemployed for six months or longer a training allowance equal 
to their weekly unemployment compensation benefits plus £10 per 
week. In addition, temporary public service employment is available to 
adults unemployed for six months or longer through the Employment 
Action program. (These two programs have recently been combined 
into the Training for Work program.) Finally, unemployed workers 
desiring to start up and run their own small businesses are eligible for 
counseling on business planning, formal courses in business skills, and 
financial assistance as part of the Business and Enterprise Services pro 
gram. (This program replaces the earlier Enterprise Allowance 
Scheme.) To oversee all of these initiatives, the 1988 White Paper 
envisioned a national network of approximately 100 TECs covering the 
whole of Great Britain.
The contracts entered into by TECs and the Department of Employ 
ment obligate each TEC to meet the guarantees given by the govern 
ment to young people and the long-term unemployed. In addition, 
these contracts include performance management standards that spec 
ify quantitative outcome measures. Outcome measures mentioned by 
the Department of Employment (1988, p. 42) relate to target groups 
served, qualifications to be achieved, acceptable job placement rates, 
business support activities, and unit cost requirements. In turn, the con 
tracts between TECs and local institutional training providers link pro 
vider payment to the achievement of specified targets, presumably 
targets similar to the performance standards TECs themselves are sub 
ject to.
The TEC approach to delivering training services has at least two 
desirable features. The first is that the existing educational and training 
infrastructure is used to supply skills training tailored to meet local 
demand. Second, access to training of employees of small firms should 
increase because the fixed costs of training programs can be spread 
over the greater number of workers included in the geographic region 
covered by a TEC. As discussed later in this chapter in connection with 
firm-based training, a major policy issue involved with adult training is 
how to go about increasing the incentive of small and medium-sized 
firms to provide their employees with training opportunities.
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The primary question raised to date about the operation of the TEC 
network concerns funding. Dolton (1993, p. 1265) expresses the opin 
ion that there is little hope TECs will solve the chronic British problem 
of underinvestment in skills training. As amplified by Lynch (1993a, p. 
39), the limited government funding available must be used to meet 
income support guarantees of Youth Training and the multiple adult 
training programs. Additional funding to support actual training initia 
tives must come from private-sector employers, but they have little 
incentive to make substantial investments in their local TECs. As a 
consequence, at least some local business representatives on TECs are 
frustrated because they do not feel that they should be administering 
what is in effect an income-maintenance program. 4
A related problem noted by Lynch (1993a, p. 39) involves large, 
multisite firms that find themselves dealing with many different local 
TECs over training policies covering the communities in which they 
own facilities. In this situation, substantial variation may exist in the 
training of workers across local labor markets, leading some large 
firms to leave the TEC network. Unfortunately, these are often the very 
firms with sufficient resources to make a difference in the adequacy of 
TEC funding.
Effectiveness of Performance Standards
Barnow (1992) emphasizes that the application of performance stan 
dards to employment and training programs—often termed "perfor 
mance management"—needs to be carefully distinguished from the 
evaluation of such programs as described in chapter 3. Performance 
management is an ongoing process that provides continuous feedback 
to program managers and the agencies responsible for monitoring pro 
grams. Its objective is to make program managers accountable for 
achieving readily measurable program goals such as job placement 
rate, wage rates at placement, and per participant cost. In contrast, pro 
grams are typically evaluated only infrequently; and evaluators seek to 
measure the market value of the skills added by the program.
To solidify the distinction between performance management and 
program evaluation, suppose that a program goal is the achievement of 
a high postprogram job placement rate. In this case, program managers 
would receive the same performance management credit in either of
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two quite different situations: (1) the program is restricted to individu 
als judged to be nearly job-ready at admission, or (2) individuals with 
low initial qualifications are admitted into a program that successfully 
increases skills through retraining. Nevertheless, program evaluation 
should reveal that only in the second case does the program have a pos 
itive impact measured in terms of what it added to participants. The 
most common criticism levied against performance management is that 
it encourages "creaming" in the selection of program participants; that 
is, participants are enrolled who are likely to do well in the labor mar 
ket even without program services. To counter this incentive, a perfor 
mance management system must take appropriate account of 
participant characteristics.
The 1988 reform in Britain creating the nationwide system of TECs 
is based on the Private Industry Council (PIC) model established in the 
United States as part of the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982. As 
described in chapter 2, the poor public image of the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act program in the late 1970s and early 
1980s led to the design of a new training program emphasizing greater 
delegation of authority from Washington, D.C. to the state and local 
levels, more involvement by private-sector employers, and greater 
accountability throughout the system. The resulting JTPA divides up 
the nation into more than 600 local areas called Service Delivery Areas 
(SDAs). Funding is passed through from the federal government to the 
states and then on to the local level by formula. Each SDA is overseen 
by a PIC, which may either run the local JTPA program itself or act as 
a board of directors to the program. A majority of the PIC membership 
must be members of the local business community, and SDAs gener 
ally contract with local institutional training providers to deliver train 
ing services. JTPA also established a formal performance management 
system to focus the attention of local programs on labor market out 
comes and to monitor success.
The performance standards system is more highly developed for 
JTPA Title II-A programs directed at disadvantaged youth and adults 
than for the other JTPA titles. 5 For adults, the statute specifies goals to 
be achieved in terms of placement and retention in unsubsidized 
employment, increases in wage rates and earnings, and reductions in 
the number of families receiving welfare and in the payments received. 
For youth, performance goals include attainment of "employment
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competencies" established by the PIC; completion of elementary, sec 
ondary, or postsecondary education; and enrollment in other training 
programs, apprenticeships, or the armed forces. In addition, standards 
relating to costs are to be considered.
It is the task of the U.S. Department of Labor to establish perfor 
mance measures capturing the basic goals of the statute and to issue 
national standards that governors may adopt. Because of the difficulty 
and expense of collecting preenrollment information on applicants, it 
was natural for the USDOL to specify performance standards based on 
absolute levels rather than gains in wages and employment and reduc 
tions in welfare receipt. But since PICs are penalized for not meeting 
performance standards and rewarded for keeping their cost per trainee 
low and their job placement rate high, there is a strong incentive for 
them to cream in the selection of trainees and to provide low-cost, 
quick-fix services such as job search assistance. 6 As a possible offset to 
this incentive, the JTPA statute authorizes the USDOL to issue 
"optional adjustment models" that governors may use to adjust the 
expected performance of SDAs for variation in participant characteris 
tics and local labor market conditions. Barnow (1992, p. 299) observes 
that in recent years, the USDOL has made a strong effort to reduce 
creaming and the provision of quick-fix services through policy direc 
tives and speeches, elimination of cost criteria from national perfor 
mance standards, and addition to optional adjustment models of 
explanatory variables that better reflect improvements in earning 
capacity.
There are presently only a handful of empirical studies examining 
the significance of creaming in JTPA Title II-A programs. Barnow 
(1992, pp. 297-99) reviews a study by Dickinson et al. (1988) in which 
the authors conclude that SDAs vary significantly in the degree to 
which they balance the requirement of meeting performance standards 
with other objectives. SDAs that place primary emphasis on achieving 
high scores in the performance standards system are likely to engage in 
creaming. On the other hand, SDAs that emphasize other objectives 
(i.e., commitments to serving certain types of clients and responding to 
local employer needs and interests) found the performance manage 
ment system to be of little hindrance in achieving their goals because 
most SDAs have little trouble meeting the standards.
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Two additional studies have become available. In the first, Ander- 
son, Burkhauser, and Raymond (1993) use data collected for disadvan- 
taged adults in Tennessee who were first enrolled in a Title II-A 
program in 1987. A unique feature of this state-sponsored data set is 
that it includes detailed information on the personal characteristics of 
JTPA trainees that can be linked to program information. To determine 
whether the difficult-to-train are underrepresented in the trainee popu 
lation, the March 1986, 1987, and 1988 Current Population Surveys 
are used to obtain a random sample of the entire economically disad- 
vantaged population of Tennessee.
The authors test the importance of creaming by jointly estimating a 
two-equation model of JTPA trainee selection and the probability of 
their job placement. The JTPA statute defines the economically disad- 
vantaged to include individuals who are receiving welfare or food 
stamps, members of families with income below the poverty line, fos 
ter children receiving government assistance, and the handicapped. 
PICs are also permitted to assist those facing significant barriers to 
employment, including high school dropouts and drug addicts. Explan 
atory variables specified for the right-hand sides of the two equations 
include most of the JTPA-specified characteristics, including receipt of 
welfare (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and unemploy 
ment insurance benefits. The dependent variable measuring job place 
ment is whether the trainee was placed in a job within three months of 
successfully completing training. Anderson, Burkhauser, and Ray 
mond note that this standard is used by Tennessee to evaluate the per 
formance of PICs.
Table 4.1 summarizes results obtained when the two equations are 
estimated jointly, thus controlling for both measured and unmeasured 
influences on the dependent variables. Beginning with the job place 
ment column, the estimate -15.53 is read as saying that SSI receipt 
reduces the probability of a successful job placement by over 15 per 
centage points. 7 Other negative predictors of job placement are receipt 
of AFDC, urban residence, high school dropout, female, and age. (Age, 
education, and unemployment rate are all measured as continuous vari 
ables.) Better-educated individuals are more likely to be placed in jobs, 
as are UI recipients; 8 and a black skin color has no effect.
The selection equation shows a quite different pattern of results. 
Among the negative predictors of job placement, only SSI receipt and
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urban residence are found to negatively affect selection; and SSI has a 
much smaller estimated effect on selection than it does on placement. 
The AFDC, high school dropout, and female variables—all of which 
lower placement success—are found to have no statistically significant 
effect on selection. On the other hand, increased schooling, which 
increases placement success, also has a positive impact on the chance 
of selection into a JTPA program. The authors conclude (1993, p. 621) 
that if one's concept of creaming is underrepresentation of subgroups 
within the eligible population with lower expected job placement rates, 
then creaming does not seem to be as much of a problem as critics 
would suggest. Only people with physical handicaps (SSI recipients) 
and those handicapped by poor education are significantly less likely 
than others in the eligible population to be both placed in a job and 
served by JTPA.
Table 4.1 Marginal Impacts of Individual Characteristics on JTPA 
Program Selection and Subsequent Job Placement 


































SOURCE: Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond (1993, table 3).
**and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.
A second study (Craig 1993) proceeds by linking a 1986 survey car 
ried out by the National Commission on Employment Policy (NCEP) 
to a random sample of young adults taken from the National Longitu-
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dinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). NLSY data include detailed informa 
tion on participation in government training programs, and the 
longitudinal character of the data permits measurement of earnings 
changes.
From the NCEP survey, Craig specifies the following four policy 
variables:
AWARDS IZE = fraction of the maximum 6 percent of the state bud 
get dedicated to incentive awards.
CARROT = number of performance standards that must be passed 
to qualify for an award.
STICK = number of standards that may be failed before sanctioning 
is required.
ADJ = whether a state has a procedure to allow a SDA to apply for 
an adjustment in USDOL performance standards for unexpected diffi 
culties associated with clients served, services offered, or economic 
conditions.
Controlling for variation in local labor market conditions and differ 
ences in personal characteristics, effects of the policy variables are ana 
lyzed using two models. The first model assesses whether higher 
incentives lead to more creaming in the enrollment process, while the 
second investigates whether change in average earnings measured 
before and after training is larger in states where there are greater 
incentives.
Beginning with the enrollment model, the test of the creaming 
hypothesis involves coefficient estimates on the interaction terms 
between work experience (defined as fraction of time spent working 
since the respondent left school) and the four policy variables. This test 
produces a number of estimates to be assessed and reconciled with 
each other, but the results seem to suggest that only specifications 
involving CARROT and ADJ are statistically significant. In particular, 
the interaction between CARROT and work experience is positive, 
indicating that in states with greater risk of not meeting performance 
standards there is a tendency to select more job-ready individuals. The 
interaction between ADJ and work experience is negative, suggesting
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that in states with an adjustment policy less-experienced individuals 
are selected. Both of these results are consistent with creaming.
Nevertheless, Craig comments that these results for enrollment 
might be interpreted as suggesting that higher incentives induce SDAs 
to provide services to those for whom value-added is higher and who 
might in fact be more-experienced individuals. The earnings change 
model is intended to test whether JTPA incentives increase value- 
added performance and not just creaming. Again, the number of coeffi 
cients estimated and the imprecision of the estimates make the results 
difficult to assess. Craig consequently provides simulation results for a 
variety of scenarios. Two patterns that emerge from the simulations are 
that (1) higher incentives lead to a rise in the value-added from training 
programs, even though the incentives are based on post-training out 
come measures, and (2) states with adjustment policies have a higher 
value-added than those without. Consistent with the results of Ander- 
son, Burkhauser, and Raymond (1993), Craig's findings appear to sug 
gest that performance standards need not lead to creaming by program 
managers.
Firm-Based Training
Numerous studies estimating earnings functions for American work 
ers have shown that firm-based training has a higher return than other 
forms of postschool training. Presumably this is because the training is 
linked more directly to skills needed in the workplace. An important 
issue in the provision of firm-based training is that a firm investing in 
training risks having skilled employees hired away by other firms that 
have not shared in the cost of training. This problem is commonly 
known as "pirating" or "poaching"; the consequence is that private- 
sector employers will underinvest in worker training. Underinvesting 
in training is especially likely to be the case for small and medium- 
sized firms. 9 Lynch (1992) presents evidence for young noncollege 
graduates that employer-provided training in the United States is lim 
ited to quite firm-specific skills, since such training from a previous 
employer never significantly affects current wages.
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This section begins by examining two countries—Germany and 
Japan—in which firm-based training is much more prevalent than it is 
in the United States. The discussion in chapter 1 of the final criterion in 
the evaluation framework sketched the argument that it is increasingly 
important for American workers to be able to think creatively and solve 
problems, work effectively in teams, adapt flexibly to rapid shifts in 
product demand, and engage in lifetime learning. Germany and Japan 
are often presented as being far ahead of the United States in develop 
ing these productive characteristics in their workers. This section also 
discusses the training tax recently enacted in Australia to stimulate 
firm-based training. Using British data, the final part of the section pre 
sents some empirical evidence on the importance of formal skill certifi 
cation in firm-based training programs.
German Apprenticeship Training
Chapter 2 provided a brief overview of the German dual system of 
apprenticeship training. As described there, the dual system is based on 
a partnership between schools, trade unions, employers, and the gov 
ernment. At the federal level, the government establishes guidelines for 
standard-setting, training regulations, and curricula for off-the-job 
training. These guidelines are translated by individual states (or Lands) 
into specific regulations and course curricula, which in turn are imple 
mented in light of regional needs by self-governing Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce. German Chambers are organizations of 
employers. Unlike the voluntary promotional organizations we are 
familiar with in this country, however, German Chambers are quasi- 
public agencies that firms must join and to which they must pay dues. 
Chambers play the critical roles of accrediting firms to provide training 
and of assessing the qualifications of program graduates to receive 
vocational certification. There is no national system for assessing 
apprentice qualifications, but Harhoff and Kane (1993, p. 11) point out 
that examinations developed by Chambers focus on general skills, and 
that firms with consistently low pass rates may have their accreditation 
removed.
In 1988, about 72 percent of all school leavers entered the dual sys 
tem to acquire training in 378 classified occupations (Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate 1991, p. 9). Length of apprenticeship training varies from
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two to three and one-half years, and apprentices complement their 
training in employers' workplaces with one or two days a week of off- 
the-job training at state-funded vocational schools or Berufsschules. 
Up to 40 percent of vocational school classwork is intended to develop 
a broad range of skills including mathematics, politics, languages, and 
communications. A good grounding in basic education curricula is 
viewed as important in helping apprentices develop skills that go 
beyond those required for a specific job or task. The remaining 60 per 
cent or more of classwork provides theoretical education to comple 
ment the practical training provided by training firms.
The 378 classified occupations include many that Americans con 
sider unskilled. Using retail shoe sales as an example, Hamilton (1990, 
pp. 143-44) argues that the German shoe salesperson who is "over 
trained" from a U.S. perspective is not only quite competent in selling 
shoes, but he or she also has the basic qualifications to operate a shoe 
store and is prepared to take this step if the opportunity should arise. In 
contrast, he suggests, the American propensity to undertrain sales and 
clerical workers devalues work done by people without college degrees 
and leaves most of them with few options for upward occupational 
mobility. On this theme, Marshall and Tucker (1992, p. xviii) write that
[Americans] who do not have and are not on their way to getting a 
baccalaureate degree—more than 70 percent of the population— 
are held in low regard, have little claim on the nation's goods and 
services, and are in no position to make the contribution at work 
of which they are capable. ... In comparing our human-resources 
system for our front-line workers point for point with that of our 
competitors, we find a staggering cumulative deficit.
Although the Vocational Training Act of 1969 guarantees training to 
young Germans accepted into an apprenticeship program, it does not 
ensure permanent employment with the training employer at the end of 
the apprenticeship. About 59 percent of apprentices leave the employer 
with whom they trained and seek employment elsewhere. Since 
employer participation in the system is voluntary and trained appren 
tices are not bound to training firms, an important question concerns 
the incentive for firms to provide training. After all, there are no direct 
financial incentives for firms to offer training, and apprenticeship train 
ing is costly since employers pay trainees an allowance and bear the
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direct costs of training. Hamilton (1990: 35) reports that in the early 
1970s, the net expense of an apprentice after subtracting his or her pro 
ductive work is as much as $3,000 annually for large industrial and 
commercial firms, somewhat less for smaller firms, and half as much 
or less for craft firms. Prewo (1993) calculates that in 1991 German 
firms spent $10,500 per apprentice after netting out the trainees' contri 
bution to output. Detailed calculations provided by Harhoff and Kane 
(1993, p. 8) indicate that as of 1980 the net cost of training an appren 
tice was about $5,991 and $9,381, respectively, in the craft and indus 
trial sectors (in 1990 U.S. dollars). Soskice (1994, p. 36) reports net 
annual apprenticeship costs (in 1980 Deutschmarks) of DM 14,310 and 
DM 10,963, respectively, for industrial/commercial-sector firms of 
more than 1,000 and less than 1,000 employees and of DM 7,248 for 
smaller craft firms.
The report of Her Majesty's Inspectorate (1991, p. 13) indicates, in 
fact, that most German firms choose not to be training firms. Soskice 
(1994, pp. 35-37) adds the information that the probability a firm offers 
apprenticeship training is directly related to its size measured in terms 
of number of employees. In particular, a large majority of firms with 
less than 10 employees do not provide apprenticeships, while fewer 
than 1 percent of firms with more than 500 employees fail to train 
apprentices.
Among those firms that do provide training, small Handwerk estab 
lishments located largely in the crafts sector can be distinguished from 
large Industrie firms in the industrial and commercial sectors by the 
share of training costs borne by employers. Steedman (1993, pp. 1287- 
88) points out that in Handwerk establishments, trainees bear a large 
share of training costs by accepting a wage well below the full value of 
their marginal product. 10 These establishments provide about a third of 
all apprenticeship slots. In larger capital-intensive Industrie compa 
nies, on the other hand, she suggests that it can safely be assumed that 
there is a substantial net cost to the firm.
So why do Industrie firms pay for what appears to be transferable 
training? Her Majesty's Inspectorate (1991, p. 3) points out several rea 
sons for companies to become accredited to offer training, and several 
other authors have also recently attempted to come to grips with this 
question (see Bishop 1994, pp. 19-26; Harhoff and Kane 1993; Lynch 
1994; Soskice 1994; and Steedman 1993, pp. 1287-88). The reasons
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discussed in the literature appear to boil down to essentially four fac 
tors.
The first concerns turnover. Employers will not invest in training 
unless they believe that trained workers will remain with the firm long 
enough for them to recoup their investment. Bishop (1994, pp. 20-21) 
reports that from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, only 38 to 41 per 
cent of American workers had been on their current job for more than 
five years. The percentages for German workers for about the same 
time period are substantially higher at between 59 and 63 percent. (The 
percentages for Japanese workers are higher still at from 63 to 67 per 
cent.) Clearly contributing to the longer job tenure of German workers 
relative to Americans are the greater legal and contractual obstacles to 
layoffs and dismissals in Germany. Also potentially important is the 
role of the German apprenticeship system in generating information 
that reduces the importance of job shopping and try out hiring in the 
youth labor market.
A second factor involves screening. Only accredited training firms 
can accept apprentices, and firms with an established reputation for 
training receive many more applications for apprenticeship positions 
than they can accommodate. This puts training firms in a position to 
select those applicants who appear to be the most trainable and moti 
vated. In addition, many firms train more young people than they plan 
to hire, allowing them to engage in a second round of screening by 
choosing the most qualified of program graduates for permanent 
employment. Deciding not to hire an apprentice is much cheaper than 
dismissing a regular employee, which allows apprentices to serve as a 
buffer for adjusting employment levels to short-term fluctuations in 
demand (Harhoff and Kane 1993, pp. 16-17). Since the national system 
of wage determination keeps wage differentials small, the chance that a 
trained worker will be bid away by a competing firm is minimal. 
Indeed, Soskice (1994, pp. 35-37) argues that an employer seeking to 
expand its workforce by hiring away skilled workers trained by other 
firms runs the considerable risk that the pool of available workers will 
be largely limited to "lemons," that is, workers the training company 
did not wish to retain.
A third reason firms seek accreditation as training employers stems 
from the value German society attaches to having a highly skilled 
workforce. As described by Hamilton (1990, p. 34), Germany's pros-
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perity depends heavily upon the ability to export; and Germany com 
petes successfully with the United States and Japan for world 
leadership in the export of industrial products with a third of the U.S. 
and half the Japanese population. Since apprenticeship training is 
widely regarded as the source of Germany's international competitive 
ness, a company's public image is enhanced by being accredited as a 
training firm. In effect, a company that trains apprentices is certified as 
producing a high-quality product because the public is aware of the 
machinery for controlling the quality of apprenticeship training. 
Hamilton (1990, p. 36) makes this point in the following description of 
a full-page ad for Lufthansa Airlines in the popular magazine Der Spie- 
gel:
[The ad] shows four apprentices clustered around a jet engine 
attending raptly to an adult worker's instructions. Lest there is any 
doubt about what is happening, the words "Lufthansa Training" 
are visible on the fuselage in the background. The caption reads, 
"Whoever wishes to go high needs a solid foundation." The dou 
ble meaning is obvious to any German reader: (1) These young 
men, who wish to make something of themselves as airplane 
mechanics, need the solid foundation of apprenticeship training; 
(2) You, the airline passenger, who wish to fly, need the solid 
foundation provided by Lufthansa's high-quality aircraft mainte 
nance, which is assured by first-rate training.
Finally, important institutions that make up Germany's industrial 
relations system may also play a role in accounting for employers' 
willingness to pay for general training. Lynch (1994, pp. 66, 79) sug 
gests that local Chambers use moral suasion within the business com 
munity to protect firms that train a large number of workers from 
excessive poaching. In addition, Harhoff and Kane (1993), Rogers and 
Streeck (1994, pp. 111-12), and Soskice (1994, pp. 42-43) point out 
that, among other functions, works councils monitor employer compli 
ance with Germany's system of apprenticeship training. This responsi 
bility includes checking employers to make sure that nationally 
standardized curricula have been implemented in the workplace, that 
apprentices are not used unduly for production, that the skills taught to 
apprentices are portable and not primarily workplace-specific, and that 
competing firms are prevented from poaching workers trained else 
where.
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Before turning to the Japanese model of firm-based training, two 
additional issues regarding the German apprenticeship system remain 
to be considered. The first concerns a principal criticism of the sys 
tem—its rigidity. Rigidity in the German system is manifest in the 
large number of finely divided occupational specialties and the resis 
tance to change inherent in the complex system regulating apprentice 
ship training. Hamilton (1990, pp. 148-49) illustrates both of these 
points using the example of metalworkers' training. He reports that 
some forty-two different metal-working occupations were recently 
consolidated into just six broadly defined training fields. This consoli 
dation had the desirable impact of increasing both the universality of 
training and the flexibility of trained workers. Nevertheless, the consol 
idation took place only after eight long years of negotiations among 
employers, unions, and the government.
Considered at greater length is a second issue involving the transfer- 
ability of the German apprenticeship system to the United States. Har- 
hoff and Kane (1993) are not optimistic on this issue, taking the 
position that deeply rooted labor market institutions rule out the possi 
bility that U.S. employers would be willing to accept part of the cost of 
general training. In particular, they suggest that relative to German 
firms, the incentive for American employers to invest in worker train 
ing is low because (1) unions cannot be counted on to restrict poaching 
by competing firms, (2) American wages are more flexible and firing 
costs are low, and (3) mobility costs are lower in the United States.
On the other hand, Hamilton (1990, p. 152) comments that the 
replacement of the traditional German model of full-time workplace 
training at age 15 or 16 with the modern dual training system makes 
some form of apprenticeship training a much more viable option for 
American workers. The reason is the strong commitment of American 
society to universal schooling; and Lynch (1993b, p. 1301) notes that 
community colleges, in particular, are increasingly linking up with 
local employers to develop technical courses designed to equip stu 
dents with appropriate vocational skills.
Indeed, available anecdotal evidence suggests that German firms are 
successfully establishing transplant facilities in the United States and 
employing American workers. What appears to have happened is that 
ten years of sustained growth, continuing through the 1991-92 global 
recession, left Germans in the enviable position of enjoying shorter
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workweeks and more holidays and vacation days per year than workers 
in any other industrialized country in the world (see Benjamin 1993). 
At the same time, Germany has the less enviable status of being among 
the world leaders in average labor costs per hour. Rapidly rising labor 
costs have provided German employers with a strong incentive to over 
come their traditional reluctance to transfer production abroad. Exam 
ples include the highly publicized expansions of BMW and Mercedes- 
Benz in South Carolina and Alabama, respectively.
Writing in The Wall Street Journal, McCarthy (1993) reports that 
more than 200 German companies have established facilities in North 
and South Carolina. These two states are the leading magnets for Ger 
man industrial firms. As he notes, the Carolinas are not an international 
transportation hub, and they lack the concentration of research univer 
sities that exist in New England and California. Nevertheless, German 
firms apparently find that high-quality vocational/technical schools and 
community colleges and malleable southern workers more than com 
pensate for higher transportation costs and the absence of close prox 
imity to research universities. Osterman and Batt (1993) provide a 
useful description of the extensive and accessible community college 
systems in both North and South Carolina and the long-term commit 
ment of the systems in both states to vocational training programs tai 
lored to specific employers.
An interesting example of the transferability of the German dual 
system to this country is the apprenticeship program first developed in 
1980 by the German-owned Stihl Incorporated, a manufacturer of 
chain saws and lawn trimmers and blowers (see Salwen 1993). Located 
in Virginia Beach, Virginia, Stihl established a dual system apprentice 
ship program after it was unable to hire skilled craftsmen to build the 
precision machines needed to make finely tuned parts for its motors. 
Over time, the Stihl program has evolved into an 8,000-hour appren 
ticeship combining shop-floor training with a twenty-eight-credit cur 
riculum at the local Tidewater Community College that ranges from 
blueprint reading to industrial mathematics. As is common in German 
apprenticeship programs transplanted to the United States, Stihl man 
agers worked with community college teachers to design course con 
tent to meet Stihl's requirements. Admission to the program requires 
that trainees pass a basic mathematics test, followed by interviews with 
company officials and a manual skills examination.
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Lifetime Learning in Japan
While a German-style apprenticeship training system fosters the 
identification of workers with a particular occupation, the organization 
of work in Japan depends on the attachment and loyalty of workers to 
employers. The description in chapter 2 emphasized five main features 
of the Japanese firm-based training model:
• Close coordination with the education system facilitates a continu 
ous flow of workers who possess solid basic skills and a willing 
ness to work together and learn on the job.
• Life-long training achieved primarily by rotating workers through 
various jobs within the firm. This training produces skills that are 
intrafirm-general but interfirm-specific.
• Senior workers play a major role in training younger, less-experi 
enced workers.
• Workers share information and responsibility within work teams.
• Broadly trained workers are retained on payrolls in times of 
declines in demand, especially by large firms. Breadth of training 
makes it possible for employers to shift redundant workers to jobs 
in another department, a subsidiary, or even another firm.
In a recent study, Hashimoto (1994) offers a useful theory that 
serves as an organizing framework for understanding Japanese firm- 
based training. The theory focuses on the practices of Japanese firms 
that lower the costs of investment in technical skills and, of equal 
importance, in employment relations. It is training in employment rela 
tions that allows Japanese workers to communicate effectively with co- 
workers and to share information rather than to hoard it to their own 
individual benefit (a problem known as "opportunism"). Hashimoto 
(1994, p. 125) contrasts the attitudes of Japanese and American work 
ers toward sharing information and responsibilities in the following 
passage:
Imagine a situation, for example, in which a supervisor asks a sub 
ordinate worker to fix a glitch in the production process. A Japa 
nese worker would see such a request as an opportunity to prove 
his value to the firm. He would take it upon himself to ask all con 
ceivable parties for advice and information, and those asked, in
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turn, would be trained to provide help willingly on the spot. 
Should he fail to come up with a solution, he would not be penal 
ized. Instead, if he solves, say, eight of ten problems, he will gain 
respect and his prospects of promotion are improved. In turn, oth 
ers depend on him, when called on, to provide help. In contrast, an 
American worker is said to be reluctant to seek advice unless his 
superior specifically requests such action, and many of those con 
tacted would be equally reluctant to cooperate by providing help 
and advice.
Key to this theory is the linkage between schools and firms. The pro 
duction of graduates who are homogeneous in terms of mastery of 
basic academic subjects allows the firm to concentrate on providing 
firm-specific technical training in the workplace. Indeed, solid basic 
education permits self-study to play an important role in imparting 
technical training; that is, workers can be expected to study manuals or 
books on their own. In the hiring process, schools further reduce 
employer costs by performing much of the screening function through 
"semiformal" relationships between firms and specific high schools.
Likewise, training in employment relations received in school pro 
vides the basis for workers' ability to function in a team-production 
setting and to teach technical skills to younger, more junior employees. 
Hashimoto notes that the Japanese tradition of hierarchical teaching 
has carried over to modern industrial training. Employers can count on 
the cooperation of senior employees in training subordinates because 
of this tradition, which is reinforced by making a worker's ability to 
instruct more junior co-workers a key criterion for promotion. An envi 
ronment of "lifetime" employment guarantees the senior worker that 
the newly trained worker will not be a threat to the trainer's job secu 
rity. In turn, a lifetime employment commitment is rational for employ 
ers because broadly trained workers do not defect to other firms, and 
the training provider is allowed to capture the returns on even general 
forms of training. Brown et al. (1993, p. 433) add that the linking of 
pay to tenure, skills, and performance rather than job categories, cou 
pled with a well-developed promotion ladder within nonmanagement 
ranks, gives rise to a steeper age-earnings profile for frontline Japanese 
workers than exists in most other industrialized countries.
To summarize, the essence of Japanese firm-based training is that 
homogeneity in basic skills, willingness to learn and to teach others,
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and the ability to function as part of a team all have the effect of lower 
ing training costs. How transferable is this model to an American 
workforce, whose basic academic and technical skills are much more 
diverse and generally lower than those of the Japanese? Hashimoto 
(1994) examines this question in the context of Japanese automobile 
transplants in the United States. Transplant firms studied are Diamond- 
Star Motors (a joint venture between Mitsubishi Motors and Chrysler), 
Honda, Mazda, Subaru-Isuzu, and Toyota. Nissan refused to be inter 
viewed.
Hashimoto found that the first problem transplant firms faced was 
assembling their workforces. Because the American educational sys 
tem could not be relied upon to perform much of the screening func 
tion, firms had to develop their own screening procedures. These 
procedures usually were based on a high school diploma or its equiva 
lent and made use of a battery of tests intended to measure mechanical 
aptitude, facility in assembling and disassembling simple mechanisms, 
and ability to work cooperatively with others. Young persons with no 
previous experience in the auto industry were preferred for assembly- 
line jobs because of transplants' desire to train, rather than to retrain, 
workers in their own ways of operating.
Once hired, employees of transplant companies received on-the-job 
training supplemented by formal courses which, in the case of Honda 
and Toyota, were taught at training centers located adjacent to the 
plants. Formal training included courses in employment relations as 
well as technical skills. One difference from the firm-based training 
model developed for Japanese workers is that greater heterogeneity in 
basic skills means that self-study is not as practical for Americans. 
Instead, Hashimoto notes that training at transplants made extensive 
use of videos and pictures, as opposed to written materials, combined 
with a great deal of hands-on training.
Japanese automobile transplants are still young in the United States. 
To date, however, Japanese firms appear to have successfully overcome 
the different constraints involved in hiring and training American 
workers. For example, Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow (1989, p. 20) con 
clude that Japanese transplants in the United States have come close to 
the quality and productivity of the best plants in Japan. In a recent arti 
cle, titled "For Japan's Economy, a Call to Arms," Ohmae (1994) sug-
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gests that Japanese transplant operations in the United States produce 
goods of the same quality as in Japan but 30 percent cheaper.
The Australian Training Guarantee
In 1990, Australia adopted for the first time a training tax imposed 
on employers called the Training Guarantee. All Australian firms with 
payrolls greater than $200,000 (Australian) were required to spend 1.0 
percent of their payroll on structured training programs in 1991, with 
the tax rate rising to 1.5 percent beginning in 1992. A program quali 
fies as a "structured" training program if (1) its objectives are clearly 
defined before the program begins, and (2) the skills to be acquired are 
clearly identified, as are the means of imparting these skills. The focus 
of the Training Guarantee is on formal training. For on-the-job training 
to qualify, there must be a period of instruction followed by a period of 
closely supervised work.
Firms that fail to spend the required percentage of their payroll on 
structured training must forfeit the difference between 1.5 percent and 
what they spent to the government, which, in turn, uses the tax reve 
nues to finance additional training activities. The basic rationale for the 
training tax is the perception that employers needed to take greater 
responsibility for meeting their own training requirements. As noted by 
Osterman and Batt, (1993, p. 469), increased training provided by 
firms for whom the training tax constraint is binding has the desirable 
impact of enlarging the overall level of training received by the 
nation's workers without the problems inherent in designing and deliv 
ering government programs.
Lynch (1993a, pp. 33-37) summarizes the major arguments leading 
to the passage of the Training Guarantee. The first is the reluctance of 
Australian employers to invest in training because of binding minimum 
wages and other rigidities established in centralized collective bargain 
ing contracts. These rigidities make it difficult for firms to share the 
costs of general and specific training with their employees. In addition, 
Australian employers had the usual concern about competing firms 
poaching skilled workers in whom they had invested. At the same time, 
relatively flat wage profiles imposed by collective bargaining reduce 
the returns to training from the worker's perspective, thus weakening 
his or her incentive to invest in training off-the-job.
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Two important policy questions associated with a training tax are (1) 
how to specify in practice the training expenditures that meet the fixed 
percentage requirement and monitor this requirement, and (2) whether 
the tax increases training provided by small firms and the access to 
training of unskilled workers. Concerning the first issue, Lynch (1993a, 
pp. 36-37) describes how Australia has implemented a 50 percent rule 
in deciding whether a particular expenditure should be allowed to 
count toward the 1.5 percent requirement. That is, eligible training pro 
grams must have at least 50 percent of program expenditures devoted 
to training, as opposed to pure productive work or social or recre 
ational activities. For example, firms may hire eligible trainers or train 
their own trainers. In either case, the entire salary of a trainer can be 
counted as a training expenditure if he or she spends 50 percent of his 
or her time doing training. Important outstanding questions include 
how to define the qualifications of trainers whose salaries count toward 
the fixed percentage requirement, and how to restrain firms from over 
stating the training component of a particular program or activity. 
Lynch (1993a, p. 37) mentions that the government is currently in the 
process of establishing nationally recognized standards and certificates 
to eliminate the use of trainers approved through disreputable mail 
order firms. Clearly, there is the potential for the government to feel 
obliged to create a sizable bureaucracy to monitor employer compli 
ance. The alternative is to stimulate creative tax avoidance on the part 
of employers.
Evidence on the bureaucracy issue as well as on the incidence of 
training by firm size and skill level is available for the French training 
tax imposed on all firms with more than 10 employees." Enacted in 
1971, the training tax obligated every French employer to spend 0.8 
percent of its payroll on continuing education and training of its 
employees or to pay a tax equal to the difference between its mandated 
and actual training expenditures. The tax rate was raised to 1.0 percent 
in 1974, to 1.1 percent in 1977, and to 1.2 percent in 1987. Since Janu 
ary 1993, the mandated spending rate has been 1.4 percent. This tax 
rate is applied to expenditures on formal training programs provided 
either directly by the firm or by a postsecondary educational institu 
tion. Bishop (1993b, p. 286) notes that the bureaucracy needed to mon 
itor compliance has been kept to a minimum, adding that the auditing
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of company reports of training expenditures requires a staff of only 120 
controllers for the entire nation.
The French experience relating to the distribution of training is less 
encouraging. Bishop (1993b, table 1) reports that regardless of occupa 
tion, the incidence of training increases with firm size. In 1990, train 
ing incidence ranged from 8 percent of all employees of small firms of 
10-19 employees up to 53 percent of all employees in the largest firm 
size category (2000+ employees). Within each firm size category, in 
addition, unskilled operatives received the least training. Among firms 
in the 500-1999 size category, for example, the incidence of training 
ranged from 15 percent for unskilled operatives to 55 percent for 
supervisors and technicians and 62 percent for managers and profes 
sionals. Bishop (1993b, p. 290) explains that the training tax creates a 
strong incentive for companies to substitute formal training for infor 
mal training such as that acquired through the Japanese kaizen process. 
The kind of informal training that small employers excel at provid 
ing—close supervision and informal training by the owner—is not eli 
gible for the subsidy. Thus small firms must join together in 
cooperative efforts to achieve the economies of scale necessary to 
make formal training feasible.
There appears to be a social consensus in France favoring the train 
ing tax. This includes a lack of vocal employer opposition. In Austra 
lia, on the other hand, the Training Guarantee has turned out to be 
generally unpopular. Employers dislike the paper work and threat of 
government interference. There is also resentment that the levy must be 
met even by unprofitable firms. Unions have become disillusioned 
because the training mandate has failed to provide the hoped for 
enhancement of the skills of production workers. And there is the con 
tinuing concern that too many employers are meeting their Training 
Guarantee requirements with expenditures on executive training pro 
grams that often have a large recreational component. Although there 
appears to be considerable sentiment to abolish the levy, major provi 
sions of the 1994 amendment to the 1990 Training Guarantee Act are 
limited to (1) extending the ability of a group of firms to be treated as a 
single entity for the purpose of defining a training employer, (2) 
expanding the per apprentice allowance that may be treated as an 
allowable training expenditure, and (3) allowing an excess in Training
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Guarantee expenditures in one year to offset a shortfall in expenditures 
the next year.
Evidence on Skill Certification in Britain
Earlier discussion in this chapter of the Swedish adult training sys 
tem and German apprenticeship training mentioned the role of skill 
certification in conveying information to potential employers on the 
skills possessed by program graduates. Nationally recognized creden 
tials should have the advantage of enhancing the transferability and 
hence the value to the individual of vocational training. In addition, 
Baily, Burtless, and Litan (1993, pp. 126-28) note that a national sys 
tem of skill certification might also allow the government to insist that 
before any training provider—whether private-sector employers or 
nonprofit and for-profit training institutions—is compensated, their 
graduates be required to meet certification standards. As described by 
Heckman, Roselius, and Smith (1993), however, a disadvantage of a 
formal testing system is that teaching in training programs might rap 
idly become directed toward performing well on a general standardized 
test rather than toward specific job-related skills needed in the local 
labor market or by the firm providing the training.
Blanchflower and Lynch (1994) furnish empirical evidence for 
American and British youth on the labor market impact of apprentice 
ship training and, for British youth, of nationally recognized skill certi 
fication. But before delving into their results, some additional 
background information on British youth training programs and the 
vocational qualification system is helpful. Chapter 2 noted that during 
the 1970s, the principal institutional sources of training for British 
youth were apprenticeships and company-sponsored training organized 
under the Industrial Training Board structure. Although apprenticeship 
training was not as widespread in Britain then as it is in Germany 
today, it was distinctly more common than in the United States. Most 
apprenticeships in Britain provided a mix of training in the workplace 
and day release programs operated at local colleges. On average, 
apprenticeships lasted 43 months for males and 34 months for females. 
Company-sponsored training programs were typically split between 
colleges and employer training centers and usually involved the full- 
time participation of trainees. These courses were much shorter in
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duration than apprenticeships, and well over half were completed in 
under six months.
A strong link existed between British apprenticeship training and 
further qualifications attained by passing an examination. Blanch- 
flower and Lynch (1994) report that approximately nine out of ten 
workers who completed an apprenticeship also obtained some kind of 
skill certification during or at the end of their program. Two types of 
certification—Cities and Guilds-Craft and Cities and Guilds- 
Advanced—account for nearly 60 percent of all those obtained by 
apprentices. These are qualifications typically obtained by craft work 
ers. Females were less likely than males to obtain apprenticeship train 
ing and, among apprenticeship program graduates, females were less 
likely to obtain skill certification. Apprenticeship training for females 
tended to be concentrated in hairdressing.
The National Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ) was 
established in 1986 with the objective of rationalizing the existing 
diverse set of vocational qualifications. Within each major industry, the 
NCVQ encouraged representatives of employers, unions, and profes 
sional groups to establish standards of workplace competence. NCVQ 
accreditation is based on these competency standards, subject to the 
requirement that training be of sufficient breadth to be the basis of fur 
ther skill development (Department of Employment 1988, pp. 32-33). 
The National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) standard established for 
each occupation is structured as a hierarchy of five levels of perfor 
mance. At the low end, Level 1 measures competence in the perfor 
mance of a range of work activities, most of which are routine and 
predictable. At the high end, Level 5 requires competence in applying a 
range of fundamental principles and complex techniques in a broad 
and unpredictable set of workplace contexts. Substantial personal 
autonomy is often a feature of Level 5 skills, along with significant 
responsibility for the allocation of resources and personal responsibil 
ity for the design, planning, execution, and evaluation of workplace 
tasks. One application of the NVQ structure is that employer-led TECs 
may use NVQs to contract out training programs to institutional train 
ing providers and to measure the performance of these subcontractors. 
As described in chapter 2, the apprenticeship training system in 
place under the Industrial Training Board structure was dismantled by 
the Thatcher government during the 1980s and replaced by the govern-
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ment-sponsored Youth Training Scheme. YTS, in turn, was later 
replaced by the current Youth Training program. Blanchflower and 
Lynch (1994) argue, nevertheless, that YTS was introduced with lim 
ited empirical information for British youths on the impact of tradi 
tional apprenticeship and employer-provided training programs that 
were replaced. They also suggest that the recent surge in interest in 
apprenticeships among U.S. policy makers can be informed by the 
British apprenticeship experience, even though it is less well known 
than the German system, because of the greater similarity of the insti 
tutional structures of the two countries. 12
In their empirical analysis, Blanchflower and Lynch (1994) make 
use of two large microeconomic data sets gathered for American and 
British youth. The data sets are the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth and the British National Child Development Survey (NCDS).
Table 4.2 Estimated Impact on Hourly Earnings of Apprenticeship 
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SOURCE: Blanchflower and Lynch (1994, table 8.6).
a. Includes those with all other qualifications escept City & Guild Craft and City & Guild
Advanced.
U.S. data show that apprenticeship training has a large impact on earn 
ings, especially for males. Using the NCDS sample, table 4.2 presents 
estimates of the impact of training on 1981 wages controlling for a
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number of factors that might also affect earnings, including ability test 
scores. The negative sign of the estimates in the first row suggests that 
British apprentices share in the cost of their training with employers. 
Completion of an apprenticeship is seen in the next row to raise earn 
ings by about 2 percent for both males and females. (The "no qualifica 
tions" category includes all other qualifications apart from the City & 
Guild categories.) At least for males, however, the wage gain to suc 
cessful apprentices is even higher when the gains associated with skill 
certification are added. Among males, a City and Guild Craft certificate 
conveyed a further gain of 4 percent, while a City and Guild Advanced 
certificate added a 7 percent gain. In contrast to the apprenticeship 
results, the impact of firm-sponsored training shown in the last row is 
larger for females than males.
Blanchflower and Lynch conclude from their results that if the cur 
rent Youth Training program is to serve as an adequate replacement for 
apprenticeship training in terms of meeting the skill needs of employ 
ers, then a nationally recognized system of certifying skills should be 
implemented as part of it. Similarly, they recommend that nationally 
recognized qualifications should be part of any program intended to 
expand apprenticeship training in the United States.
A related study by Dolton, Makepeace, and Treble (1994) examines 
the effect of government-subsidized training provided through the 
Youth Training Scheme. Using data for about 10,000 16-to-19-year 
olds between 1985-86 and 1988-89, the authors estimate an earnings 
equation in which YTS participation is interacted with apprenticeship 
training, off-the-job training, and no training. Keeping in mind that the 
data allow only the short-run effects of training to be measured, their 
results are not particularly supportive of the YTS program. On-the-job 
training is found to increase the earnings of both males and females 
relative to youth who received no training at all, but only for those 
respondents who did not participate in YTS. In contrast to the findings 
of Blanchflower and Lynch, apprenticeship training appears to lower 
earnings, particularly for respondents who received apprenticeship 
training under the YTS program. The authors (1994, p. 269) remark, 
however, that this result is not unexpected, because many apprentices 
had not completed their training by the time earnings were measured. 
Finally, YTS training not accompanied by apprenticeship or off-the-job 
training decreases the earnings of women and has no statistically sig-
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nificant effect for men. It is also interesting to note that receipt of a 
vocational qualification certificate is found to have no statistically sig 
nificant effect on the earnings of either young men or young women.
Summary
This chapter discussed three models of the provision of adult train 
ing services in terms of the criteria sketched in chapter 1, with special 
attention given the criterion that training must provide marketable 
skills. Considered first was the government training model in place in 
Sweden. The Swedish adult training system is well known for the 
breadth of its curricula, its open entry, the flexibility of its modular sys 
tem in individualizing study plans, the quality of its instructors and its 
modern equipment, and the large fraction of the adult population it 
serves. Participation of Swedish employers and union officials in over 
seeing program quality and developing new curricula has traditionally 
focused the attention of program managers on providing job-ready 
graduates. Even so, the 1986 reorganization of the training system cre 
ated a new agency—the National Employment Training Board—with 
the mandate to operate Sweden's nationwide system of skill training 
centers on a financially self-sustaining basis.
The second training model discussed in the chapter is characterized 
by local employer leadership in utilizing community educational insti 
tutions to provide training within a decentralized decision-making sys 
tem. This employer-led/school-based model was implemented in 
Britain in a fundamental reform of that nation's training system in 
1988. At the heart of the 1988 reform is the mandate given to groups of 
local employers organized into Training and Enterprise Councils to 
plan and deliver training services. To ensure accountability in meeting 
national policy goals, TECs are subject to performance standards; and 
available evidence on the effectiveness of performance standards 
obtained for the JTPA Title II-A program in the United States is 
reviewed. Despite the common criticism that performance standards 
lead to creaming in the selection of program clients, the JTPA evidence 
suggests that the incentive of program operators to cream can be con 
trolled by careful specification of the clients to be served.
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Finally, the firm-based training model was described as it has 
evolved in the German dual system of apprenticeship training and the 
Japanese lifetime employment system. In both nations, a tradition 
emphasizing the importance of a highly skilled workforce reinforced 
by the requirements of export-led economies has resulted in systems 
that provide workplace training opportunities to substantial fractions of 
the working populations. Youth are the primary beneficiaries of in- 
house training in Germany, while on-the-job training is more likely to 
continue over the working lifetime in Japan. Careful attention was paid 
to the incentive structures existing in each country to induce employers 
to provide workplace training.
A tradition of firm-based training does not exist in this country. Nev 
ertheless, anecdotal evidence on the experience to date of German and 
Japanese transplant firms in the United States suggests that the basic 
approaches to training of both countries are applicable to American 
workers. To increase the incentive for U.S. employers to supply train 
ing to their employees, a possible policy intervention is the imposition 
of a mandatory training tax on company payrolls. The training levy 
idea was discussed in this chapter in the context of the Australian 
Training Guarantee enacted in 1990, supplemented by experience 
gained over a longer time period for the French training tax. Another 
policy intervention considered in the context of firm-based training is a 
national system of certifying worker skills, such as the British National 
Vocational Qualification system. Recent empirical evidence relating to 
British apprenticeship training during the 1970s indicates that nation 
ally recognized credentials signaling mastery of occupational skills 
substantially enhanced the 1981 earnings opportunities of young work 
ers.
NOTES
1. This example is provided in Rollen (1988).
2. A well-known paper by Burtless (1985) provides evidence of a stigma effect in the context 
of a targeted wage-subsidy program carried out in Ohio during 1980-81. His results suggest that 
rather than indicating that targeted workers could be employed at attractive government-subsi 
dized wage rates, program vouchers were used by employers as a labor market signal of poten 
tially poor job performance.
3. Bendick and Egan (1987) provide a useful qualitative evaluation of the British Enterprise 
Allowance Scheme (EAS) along with the French Unemployed Entrepreneurs program. The 
French program provides a lump-sum payment to the unemployed entrepreneur, which is received
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about two months after the new firm has been registered, while the HAS supplies the entrepreneur 
a weekly allowance for a maximum of 52 weeks. An important conclusion of the authors' analysis 
is that the initial capitalization and proprietors' credentials needed to ensure that a newly created 
small business will survive and possibly create jobs for other individuals means that unemployed 
entrepreneur programs should be at most a minor component of the package of services intended 
to promote employment opportunities for the displaced. See also Leigh (1989, ch. 5).
4. The Economist (1994a) recently characterized as "fundamental flaws" in the present opera 
tion of the TEC network the problems that (1) TECs are being asked to concentrate on the delivery 
of welfare rather than training services, (2) central government mandates prevent them from 
adopting to local conditions, and (3) TECs are caught up in the competition between separate cen 
tral government agencies responsible for administering a fragmented group of programs.
5. The JTPA Title III program for displaced workers includes one performance standard 
(entered employment rate) and an optional goal (average wage at placement) for use in judging 
performance, but the USDOL has not implemented a rewards/sanctions system for Title III pro 
grams.
6. The reward for exceeding performance standards is additional funding, while failure to 
meet standards results in a reorganization of the SDA and restrictions on which training providers 
may be retained in the future.
7. Since members of the eligible population and the JTPA sample are required to be under age 
60, all SSI recipients are significantly limited in their ability to work and have work histories that 
are insufficient for eligibility for regular Social Security disability benefits.
8. This result is understandable since eligibility for UI benefits requires recent work experi 
ence and hence a closer tie to the labor market than those whose benefits have run out or whose 
work history does not qualify them for benefits.
9. There are several reasons why smaller firms are less likely to be able to internalize the ben 
efits from training than larger firms. One is that smaller firms tend to pay lower wages, and thus 
they are more likely to be constrained by minimum wage restrictions from passing on part of 
training costs to trainees. In addition, as noted earlier in the text, smaller firms often find that the 
average costs of training workers are much higher than those incurred by larger firms, because 
small firms have fewer workers over whom to spread fixed costs. Finally, small firms are more 
vulnerable to production losses associated with workers learning rather than producing, and they 
are less able to offer an internal career ladder to retain workers within their organizations.
10. Lynch (1994, pp. 76-77) links nationally recognized skill certification to the willingness of 
German apprentices in general to work for lower wages during their period of training. Contrast 
ing German apprentices who earn about one-third of the adult unskilled wage with British appren 
tices who typically earn 60 percent or more of the adult rate, she suggests that the Youth Training 
Scheme introduced in Britain during the 1980s implemented a skill certification system in which 
standards are low, certificates are too industry-specific, and exams fail to reliably measure an indi 
vidual's actual skills. According to Lynch, the consequence is that British trainees are not willing 
to accept the same wage reductions as German apprentices, who can be confident that their greater 
skills will be rewarded in the post-training period. British employers, in turn, provide both less 
training and training that is more firm-specific than that supplied by German firms.
11. This discussion of the French training levy is largely drawn from Bishop (1993b and 1994, 
pp. 57-61).
12. Compared to those in the United States, Blanchflower and Lynch (1994) suggest German 
institutional structures differ in terms of the long-term relationships between banks and firms, a 
greater link between schools and postschool training, and a strong influence of local Chambers of 
Commerce on the number of apprenticeship positions offered.
Assisting the Unemployed 
in Job Search
The first criterion of the evaluation framework outlined in chapter 1 
specified that the services provided in active labor market programs 
should facilitate the transition of displaced workers to jobs in expand 
ing industries and growing sectors within existing industries. Of the 
categories of active labor market programs indicated in table 2.1, the 
two designed to assist displaced workers in making the transition from 
distressed to expanding industries and industry sectors are adult train 
ing programs and employment services. Adult training programs were 
examined in the previous chapter. This chapter, which is divided into 
four main sections, focuses on the efficient provision of employment 
services to displaced workers. The first section relates employment ser 
vices traditionally provided by most OECD countries to the more pro 
active job search assistance (ISA) services introduced in chapter 3 in 
the context of the U.S. displaced worker demonstration projects.
The second section of the chapter examines the limited empirical 
evidence available on the effectiveness of existing employment ser 
vices in Canada and the United States. Agencies responsible for pro 
viding employment services in the two countries are the Canadian 
Employment Centre (CEC) system and the U.S. Employment Service 
(ES). Both agencies were created during the 1930s to function as feder 
ally funded but state- or province-operated labor exchanges. The dis 
cussion of limitations of the CEC and ES systems in this section lays 
some groundwork for a consideration in the third section of the highly 
regarded Swedish Employment Service and the Canadian Industrial 
Adjustment Service.
Most industrialized nations make eligibility for unemployment 
insurance benefits at least nominally conditional on some form of 
active job search. 1 At the same time, an issue of concern in many 
nations is the increasing incidence of long-term unemployment among 
the unemployed. The final section of the chapter examines policies 
recently implemented in Britain, Canada, and Australia to maintain the 
work incentives of the unemployed by more closely linking receipt of
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unemployment compensation benefits to active job search coupled 
with enhanced employment services.
Components of JSA Programs
Employment services are usually divided into core and support ser 
vices. The core labor exchange service is intended to lower transaction 
costs involved in matching job seekers to job vacancies in the local 
labor market. This function typically includes applicant screening and 
job placement. Beyond this core service, public employment agencies 
often play the supportive roles of (1) acting as a "gateway" for access 
to retraining services and transitional employment opportunities, and 
(2) validating the job search requirements of unemployment insurance 
programs.
Neither of these core or support services may be directly relevant to 
a displaced worker whose job search skills are rusty from disuse or 
whose primary employment opportunities are either not listed by 
employers with the public employment service or lie beyond the geo 
graphic boundaries of the local labor market. As described in chapter 3, 
the U.S. displaced worker demonstration projects were designed, 
among other reasons, to test the labor market effectiveness of an 
expanded menu of employment services. Termed "job search assis 
tance," these services go beyond the traditional labor exchange func 
tion of public employment agencies in terms of reaching out to the 
unemployed, improving their job search skills, and assisting them to 
locate jobs that are not listed or advertised by employers. To provide an 
overview of the range of possible JSA services, this section briefly out 
lines the services supplied across the Downriver, Buffalo, Texas WAD, 
and New Jersey UI Reemployment demonstration projects. JSA ser 
vices are discussed in roughly the sequential order in which they might 
be offered.
1. Outreach. The first problem is to make known to displaced work 
ers the services offered by a JSA program. With respect to workers 
affected by a plant closing or mass layoff, the surest means of making 
contact is to offer assistance at the plant site before layoffs begin and
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workers disperse. Clearly, advance notification of layoffs and plant clo 
sures would increase the chance of effective outreach to workers about 
to be laid off. For other unemployed workers, outreach depends more 
on media campaigns, word-of-mouth, and referrals by staff members in 
unemployment insurance offices.
2. Orientation. Orientation plays the key role of informing prospec 
tive participants about the range of services offered by the program, 
what these services can and cannot be expected to deliver, and what is 
expected of participants themselves. The objective is to help unem 
ployed workers arrive at a sensible decision regarding program partici 
pation. In particular, unemployed workers anticipating recall and those 
who can reasonably be expected to find satisfactory jobs without assis 
tance should be discouraged from continuing further. On the other 
hand, other jobless individuals may be unrealistically clinging to the 
hope of being recalled. Orientation services for these workers should 
include assistance in correctly assessing their recall prospects.
In approaching workers who appear to be good candidates for ISA 
services, it is important for program staff members to clearly acknowl 
edge that there is no guarantee that jobs available to program graduates 
will offer prelayoff levels of pay and benefits. Potential participants 
should especially be cautioned that not everyone benefits from rela 
tively costly and time-consuming retraining programs.
3. Assessment and testing. The next service offered in many ISA 
programs is an assessment session intended to determine whether a 
participant already possesses locally marketable skills or whether 
retraining is a necessary precondition for reemployment. Formal test 
ing is often used to determine the participant's vocational interests and 
his or her aptitude for undertaking particular retraining programs. In 
some cases, testing may reveal that remedial education is a prerequisite 
for retraining. A frequent outcome of an assessment and testing session 
is a written agreement between the client and a program staff member 
outlining a viable back-to-work strategy. The written agreement is 
often called an "employability plan."
4. Job search workshops, resource centers, and job clubs. Based on 
the assessment results, participants are typically placed in either a 
classroom training or on-the-job training program or enrolled in a job
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search workshop. Job search workshops in the displaced worker dem 
onstrations generally lasted about twenty hours spread over several 
days. Workshop content usually consisted of two primary elements. 
First, specific job search skills were taught, including resume prepara 
tion, techniques for locating job leads, and effective application and 
interviewing practices. Second, motivational activities and exercises 
were provided to raise the low self-esteem that many displaced work 
ers suffer after being laid off.
Following the job search workshop, most programs channeled par 
ticipants into either a resource center or a job club. Resource centers 
provide participants a base of operation for their self-directed job 
search in a central facility typically outfitted with a telephone bank, 
telephone and business directories, newspaper help-wanted ads, and 
listings of job openings from the public employment service. An 
important objective of resource centers is to create an atmosphere of 
mutual encouragement and support by encouraging job seekers to 
operate out of a common location.
Batt (1983) comments that few experiences in life are as isolating as 
looking for a job. Job clubs are designed to deal with this feeling of 
isolation. Meeting on a regular basis to follow up on job leads, job 
clubs allow for the supervised application of recently acquired job 
search skills while offering the opportunity for developing a group sup 
port system during the search period. Corson, Maynard, and Wichita 
(1984, pp. 132-34) describe a successful implementation of the job 
club concept in the Lehigh Valley program of the Dislocated Worker 
Demonstration projects. A key feature of this program is a fixed mem 
bership per club of about fifteen participants that was unchanged until 
all club members were able to find employment. The reduction in the 
number of club members as placements occurred had a positive rather 
than negative effect on remaining members and project staff, since job 
club moderators took pride in watching the club "close out." The 
authors caution, nevertheless, that because of the highly personal inter 
action likely to be generated in job clubs, they may not be appropriate 
for all clients in all areas.
5. Follow-up counseling. Most JSA programs provide some form of 
follow-up counseling ranging from informal, occasional counseling, 
which consists largely of job interview advice, to sophisticated case-
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management systems, which assign clients to particular counselors 
who have full responsibility for their progress through the program. 
Whatever form counseling takes, its primary goal is to ensure that par 
ticipants are making satisfactory progress in their job search. Particular 
services a counselor can provide include serving as a "sounding board" 
for participants, supplying job information and arranging for support 
services, urging clients to make use of resource center facilities, and 
encouraging participants to persevere in their search.
6. Job matching and job development. As noted, public employment 
agencies have traditionally offered the service of matching job vacan 
cies listed with the agency by local employers to individual job appli 
cants, making use of a core of resume information provided by the job 
seeker. Resume information typically includes the applicant's voca 
tional interests, formal education, and work history, supplemented, if 
available, by vocational test scores.
Beyond the job vacancy information furnished by employers, some 
ISA programs also offer the service—called job development—of uti 
lizing the informal contacts of staff members to turn up job openings 
that are not advertised or listed with the public employment service. In 
other words, the function of a job developer is to uncover job vacancies 
that would be unlikely to come to the attention of a displaced worker 
searching on his or her own. Job development is successful when job 
developers establish a reputation with local employers by carefully 
screening workers to ensure that referrals satisfy the employer's hiring 
requirements.
Evidence for the Canadian and U.S. Employment Services
Table 2.1 indicated that Canada ranks along with Sweden and Ger 
many in having the highest public expenditure ratios on employment 
service programs of the seven countries considered. At the other 
extreme, the United States and Japan rank lowest on employment ser 
vice spending. This section begins with a consideration of available 
evidence on the labor market impacts of employment services provided 
in Canada. Examined in detail is a recent study by Osberg (1993) of the
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role of Canadian Employment Centres in assisting jobless Canadians 
to find employment during the 1981-86 period. The second part of this 
section surveys available evidence for the United States. A well-known 
article by Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985) evaluates whether 
workers who received Employment Service job referrals obtained bet 
ter jobs sooner than those who did not. In addition, Bishop (1993a) 
examines the impact of ES referrals and other job finding methods on 
employers' assessments of the productivity of new hires. Finally, 
Jacobson (1994) reviews other recent studies evaluating the effective 
ness of ES services.
Canadian Evidence
In Canada, as in the United States, there are a variety of job search 
methods available to jobless individuals; and public employment agen 
cies are just one of these methods. While high-paying jobs are usually 
found through informal information networks involving personal con 
tacts, public employment agencies typically list jobs paying below- 
average wages. Osberg (1993) notes that the average wage of jobs 
listed at CECs was $6.24 in 1986-87, whereas the average wage of all 
workers in similar industries was $11.24 and the average wage of new 
hires was $7.91. 2 Consequently, the choice of a job search strategy by 
jobless workers is simultaneously a choice of the wage offer distribu 
tion, implying that users of public employment agencies are not a ran 
dom sample of all jobless individuals.
Osberg's empirical analysis is based on 1981, 1983, and 1986 data 
drawn from the Canadian Labour Force Survey of inhabitants of a 
large random sample of dwelling units. A two-stage procedure is uti 
lized to control for sample selection. The first stage of this procedure 
involves estimating a probit model of CEC use by jobless workers. Sta 
tistically significant determinants of CEC use are found to vary over 
the business cycle. In all three years studied, however, the probability 
of using the CEC system rose as duration of unemployment spells 
increased, suggesting that the jobless turn first to other job search 
methods. In addition, CEC use is found to be higher for those who lost 
their last job (as opposed to those who left their last job for other rea 
sons) and for those eligible for unemployment insurance.
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Controlling for sample selection, the second stage of Osberg's anal 
ysis estimates the impact of CEC use on job-finding success. His 
results are mixed. Stratifying the data by year, gender, and duration of 
unemployment (spells less than or greater than three months), in none 
of the six regressions reported for the short-duration unemployed does 
CEC use have a statistically significant effect on the probability of 
finding a job. The CEC appears to be of little assistance in placing 
workers who turn out to have relatively short spells of joblessness. This 
finding is consistent with Osberg's (1993, p. 360) remark that the CEC 
is criticized in Canada for inadequate screening of referrals, slow ser 
vice, and irrelevance to most recruitment decisions. 3
Among the six regressions estimated for the long-duration unem 
ployed, a significantly positive effect of CEC use on job-finding suc 
cess is found in only two equations—the equation for females in 1986 
and the equation for males in 1983. Indeed, CEC use has a significantly 
negative estimated effect in 1981 for long-duration unemployed males. 
In interpreting these results, it should be noted that 1981 was a period 
of relatively low unemployment (8.3 percent), 1983 was a high unem 
ployment (13.7 percent) year, and 1986 was somewhere near the mid 
point of the cycle. Osberg (1993, p. 366) concludes from his results 
that the CEC is not of much help at the peak of the business cycle, even 
for the long-duration unemployed, since jobs are relatively plentiful 
and job seekers tend to find them on their own. Nevertheless, he sug 
gests that the CEC provides a valuable safety net function for the long- 
duration male jobless who have exhausted their usual job search meth 
ods during the trough of a recession. The CEC also seems to provide 
significant assistance to long-duration jobless women at the midpoint 
of the business cycle.
Osberg's analysis is one of ten studies commissioned in 1986 by the 
Canadian government as part of an effort to rigorously evaluate and 
revitalize the national employment service. Of particular concern to 
government officials was the apparent decline during the 1970s and 
early 1980s in the CEC's labor exchange role indicated by a downward 
trend in the volume of its job placement activity measured relative to 
labor force growth. Trebilcock (1986, p. 46) comments on the poor job 
placement record of the CEC, pointing out that most employers do not 
list job openings with the system because they view job applicants 
referred to them by CECs as generally people with poor work histories.
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The commissioned studies are particularly useful in gaining an under 
standing of three ISA-related issues: (1) the effectiveness of a universal 
screening interview followed by employment counseling targeted to 
the non-job-ready, (2) the labor market impact of computer-assisted 
job search, and (3) the potential of privatization in revitalizing Can 
ada's employment service.
A key element in the revitalization strategy for the national employ 
ment service is the introduction of Service Needs Determination inter 
views. The purpose of these short (typically about 11 minutes) 
interviews is to allow CEC staff members to distinguish clients who 
are already job-ready from those who appear to have severe barriers to 
overcome before they can be said to be job-ready. Job-ready clients are 
routed to self-service facilities such as Job Information Centre display 
boards and group information sessions. Six out of every ten Service 
Needs Determination interviews conclude with clients being referred 
to a self-service facility. Clients determined not to be job-ready are 
scheduled for employment counseling sessions at their local CEC 
office. Through the counseling process, these clients are assisted in 
establishing employment goals, resolving employment-related prob 
lems, and implementing their plans to enter or stay in the labor force. A 
survey of CEC staff members funded by Employment and Immigration 
Canada (EIC) finds that over two-thirds of respondents indicated that 
Revitalization affected positively the quality of counseling services 
(see EIC 1989b, p. 70). Major factors correlated with the improvement 
in counseling services are improved identification of target groups, 
more effective management of counselor time, more manageable case 
loads, and greater focus on clients' needs.
Turning to computer-assisted job search, those CECs that offered 
jobless workers the National Employment Services System (NESS) 
were subjected to evaluation. NESS is a computerized on-line system 
of processing job orders and maintaining data on worker clients. EIC 
(1989b) summarizes a survey of CEC staff members in which they 
were asked to assess the impact of NESS on the quality of job match 
ing services provided. Some 83 percent of respondents cited improve 
ments in the quality of services to worker clients. These improvements 
included (1) faster and wider exposure of job orders, (2) easier access 
to information, (3) more effective identification of target group clients, 
(4) ability to spend more time with clients, and (5) ability to refer cli-
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ents to more vacancies (EIC 1989b, pp. 55-56). Some 76 percent of 
CEC respondents also felt that NESS helped to improve quality of ser 
vices to employers, primarily because of greater speed in making refer 
rals, availability of more up-to-date information, and more efficient 
monitoring of job orders (EIC 1989b, p. 46). Consistent with this qual 
itative evidence are the results of multivariate regression analyses indi 
cating that NESS speeds up the time it takes for CECs to make their 
first referral to a job order and reduces the number of days required to 
fill a vacancy (EIC 1989b, pp. 34-36).
Concerning the potential for privatizing employment services, 
finally, an important constraint in Canada is that private-sector employ 
ment agencies cannot charge job seekers for placement services; that 
is, only employers may be billed for successful job placements. A 
study of private-sector labor market intermediaries (private employ 
ment agencies and temporary help services) suggests that private-sec 
tor firms, subject to this constraint, will concentrate, quite 
understandably, on labor markets in which profit potential exists. These 
labor markets tend to be limited to highly skilled positions, standard 
ized occupations such as word processing, and large urban areas. 
Employment and Immigration Canada (1989b, pp. 99, 129) concludes 
that private-sector firms are not a practical substitute for the CEC, 
except possibly in large urban areas and for some occupational catego 
ries.
U.S. Evidence
Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor, the Employment Ser 
vice evaluation by Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985) is based on 
data collected for approximately 8,000 new applicants for ES services 
in thirty Job Service offices in twenty-seven states between July 1980 
and May 1981. The net impact of ES services on earnings and other 
labor market outcomes is measured by comparing the labor market 
experiences following application to the ES of individuals who 
received job referrals with the experiences of those who did not. Thus, 
the CEC study by Osberg and the ES evaluation examine the impact of 
public employment agencies at two different stages in the job search 
process. Osberg investigates job seekers' use of the CEC (which may 
or may not lead to a job referral), while the ES evaluation by Johnson,
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Dickinson, and West focuses on the impact of actual job referrals for 
workers who chose to apply to their local Job Service office.
Clearly, Employment Service applicants receiving a referral need 
not be a random sample from the pool of new applicants, because ES 
staff members may either cream in making referral decisions or 
emphasize assistance to hard-to-place clients. In either case, it is criti 
cal to consider whether individuals selected for job referrals differ sys 
tematically from those not selected. Results of a careful comparison 
carried out by Johnson, Dickinson, and West indicate that the referred 
and not-referred groups are generally comparable on measured charac 
teristics, and that the not-referred group may be somewhat more 
advantaged on unmeasured characteristics. If anything, therefore, net 
impact estimates could slightly underestimate the impact of ES job 
referrals.
Table 5.1 presents the main evaluation results reported by the 
authors broken down by gender. Shown in the table are means for the 
referred and not-referred groups adjusted using ordinary least squares 
regression to control for differences in demographic characteristics, 
work histories, characteristics related to the provision of ES services 
(dummy variables for job attachment, union membership, and veteran 
status), measures of applicants' motivation to find work, and site and 
other environmental characteristics. Differences in the adjusted means 
represent the net impact of an ES referral.
For men, the table shows the surprising result that receipt of an ES 
referral does not result in a significant impact on any of the measures 
of labor market performance. In particular, during the six-month period 
following application to the ES, men who did not receive a referral and 
located a job on their own found their job six-tenths of a week sooner 
and earned $98 more than those who did receive a referral. Neither of 
these small negative estimates is significantly different from zero.
In contrast, an ES referral has positive and statistically significant 
effects on a number of the labor market outcome variables for women. 
Women who received a referral earned on average $325 more (a 23 
percent increase in earnings) than women in the comparison group dur 
ing the six-month observation period. The major factor in accounting 
for this earnings gain is the reduction of almost three weeks in the 
length of time necessary to find the first job. Wage rates earned by the 
referred group are no different from those earned by the not-referred
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group. Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985, p. 136) conclude that at 
least part of the reason ES assistance is more effective for women than 
men is that women have less labor market experience and less access to 
the traditional network of job-finding methods. The authors also note 
that the cost per individual referred is minimal, ranging from just $30 
to $80.
Table 5.1 Estimated Impact of ES Referrals on Labor Market 
Outcomes for Men and Women
Labor market outcome
Earnings in 6 months
Weeks to first job
Percent of 6-month period:
Unemployed
Out of labor force
Employed
Hours worked in 6 months
Wage rate
Earnings in 6 months
Weeks to first job
Percent of 6-month period:
Unemployed
Out of labor force
Employed



















































SOURCE: Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985, table 3). 
NOTE: Group means are regression adjusted, 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Bishop (1993a) uses data collected from employers in a recent sur 
vey carried out by the National Federation of Independent Business on 
the experience of about 1,600 firms with new hires. Among his results 
is the finding that new hires referred to employers by public employ 
ment agencies generally perform poorly. Holding constant worker and 
job characteristics, referrals from public agencies (the ES, vocational 
rehabilitation agencies, JTPA, and community-based organizations) 
are found to be significantly less likely to be perceived by employers as 
willing to work late and to contribute to the firm's profitability, both 
initially and after six months on the job. When separate dummy vari 
ables for ES referrals and for referrals by other government agencies 
replace the single public employment agency dummy, both types of 
government referrals had similar negative coefficients.
To summarize, the empirical results reported in this section for the 
United States, as well as for Canada, are clearly mixed. The conclusion 
that emerges from this evidence is that if public employment agencies 
have any potential at all, this potential is largely unrealized. It follows 
to many observers that the ES should either be radically restructured or 
abolished.
Among the many critics of the U.S. Employment Service, Baily, 
Burtless, and Litan (1993, pp. 136-39) argue that there are two main 
problems facing the agency. First, the ES does not know where job 
vacancies are, since employers are under no obligation to list their 
vacancies. As a consequence of not having good information on the 
occupational demand for labor, the agency is in a weak position to 
direct the unemployed to appropriate vocational training programs 
such as those funded by JTPA.
Second, the ES has been weighed down over the years by the obliga 
tion to help the most disadvantaged class of job seekers—UI recipi 
ents, persons subsisting on welfare, and poor teenagers seeking access 
to targeted employment and tax-subsidy programs. A bit of historical 
background would be helpful on this point. During the 1950s and early 
1960s, the ES sought to serve all job seekers by establishing one-on- 
one relationships between ES staff members and employer personnel 
representatives. As noted earlier, these relationships are a key aspect of 
what is known as job development. Bishop (1993a, p. 380) notes that 
ES referrals during this period accounted for nearly 20 percent of the 
nation's new hires. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, political pri-
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orities shifted and the ES was made responsible for the placement of 
targeted populations, including welfare recipients and other disadvan- 
taged workers. At the same time, individual ES staff member control of 
job orders began to decline, weakening the working relationships that 
had been established between agency staff and employers. ES referrals 
fell to about 8 percent of all new hires in 1971 and remained low 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
Baily, Burtless, and Litan argue that this obligation to the disadvan- 
taged gives rise to a problem of adverse selection. As the clientele of 
the Employment Service became younger, poorer, and less skilled as 
the result of new government regulations, employers searching for 
good workers began to look elsewhere. And as more attractive employ 
ers shied away from Job Service offices, average workers had less rea 
son to apply for agency services, further reducing the average quality 
of ES clients. Marshall and Tucker (1992, p. 223) add that the dynam 
ics of adverse selection led to a social underinvestment in employment 
services with the result that, because it is starved of resources, the ES 
has not computerized many of its offices and does not do a serious job 
of counseling. In fact, Bishop (1993a, p. 381) observes that without 
support from its traditional constituencies (i.e., employers, voters, and 
nondisadvantaged workers), the ES was unable to fend off substantial 
budget cuts during the 1990-91 recession, and it began to lose even its 
ability to serve the disadvantaged.4
Given this generally quite pessimistic assessment of the Employ 
ment Service, it is interesting to note the much more positive view 
appearing in Jacobson's (1994) recent literature review prepared for 
the U.S. Advisory Commission on Unemployment Compensation. 
Beginning with a critique of the Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985) 
analysis, Jacobson suggests, particularly for males, that the relevant 
follow-up period for measuring labor market outcomes is not the first 
six months following application to the ES, as shown in table 5.1, but 
rather the first six months following referral. His argument is that 
unemployed males are more likely than unemployed females to be UI 
claimants, and that the incentive for UI claimants to return to work 
increases substantially after the six months of UI benefits are over. 
From this perspective, the Johnson, Dickinson, and West study is likely 
to understate ES effects on labor market outcomes for males, since it
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ignores the potential effectiveness of ES services in aiding UI claim 
ants after their benefits have been exhausted.
Jacobson also reviews an as yet unpublished series of analyses of 
Pennsylvania administrative data for UI claimants carried out by 
Arnold Katz and himself. Recognizing that the ES is often turned to 
only after other job search methods have failed or are unavailable to 
searchers, Jacobson and Katz find that the ES is effective in reducing 
the joblessness of UI claimants, particularly for UI exhaustees and 
women. Direct placements, as would be expected, have by far the larg 
est positive effects on reemployment, but referrals that do not lead to 
placements also appear to provide useful information about available 
jobs that shortens the period of joblessness. Jacobson (1994, p. 30) 
concludes from this evidence that the direct placement services pro 
vided by the Employment Service reduce the duration of joblessness 
and have a small positive effect on earnings. Because the cost of its ser 
vices is low, the ES is cost effective.
The second half of Jacobson's survey examines studies of the ability 
of the Employment Service to make job placements. These studies 
include a series of GAO reports based on data from individual ES 
offices and an unpublished study by Jacobson of administrative data 
collected for individuals registered with the Pennsylvania ES between 
1978 and 1987. Using detailed data on management procedures in ES 
offices, the GAO reached a number of provocative conclusions includ 
ing the following:
• Offices in states subjected to measurable performance standards 
reinforced by awards for obtaining favorable outcomes had place 
ment rates double those of offices in other states.
• Offices with a self-service system placed 20 percent more appli 
cants in permanent jobs compared with offices where job seekers 
could only see job lists with the help of ES staff.
• Offices serving relatively small populations and those facing low 
applicant-to-labor-force ratios were far more effective than offices 
serving large populations and facing high applicant-to-labor-force 
ratios. This provides strong support for the view that the ES is more 
effective when it has the flexibility to provide personalized services 
to voluntary applicants.
Assisting the Unemployed in Job Search 145
• Local offices that spent time communicating with employers had a 
12 percent higher permanent placement ratio compared with 
offices that did not communicate with employers. It is clear that ES 
offices able to devote resources to job development are much more 
effective in obtaining permanent job placements.
• Offices that held individual intake interviews had placement rates 
24 percent higher than offices that used group intake.
• More ES involvement with other placement or job training pro 
grams (such as JTPA) was associated with better performance.
Jacobson (1994, p. 39) summarizes the GAO's studies as indicating 
that (1) reductions in resources have played a major role in reducing 
the effectiveness of the ES, and (2) the ES is charged with many activi 
ties that detract from the performance of its labor exchange function. 
Despite these disadvantages, the GAO evidence suggests that marginal 
changes in management procedures and funding could dramatically 
improve performance. Jacobson's own study also concludes that most, 
if not all, of the observed decline in the ES placement rate in Pennsyl 
vania can be accounted for by shifts in the proportion of hard-to-place 
registrants and structural changes in the industrial mix of available 
jobs.
"Best Practice" Employment Service Programs
Following up on this discussion of criticisms and proposed changes 
in public employment agencies in Canada and the United States, it is 
useful to look in some detail at examples of "best practice" employ 
ment service systems. Two long-standing and highly regarded employ 
ment service programs currently in operation on a nationwide basis are 
the Swedish Employment Service and the Canadian Industrial Adjust 
ment Service.
The Swedish Employment Service
It was noted in chapter 2 that the focal point of Swedish labor mar 
ket policy is its nationwide system of 360 employment exchange
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offices. In addition to the 360 regular offices, the Employment Service 
has 60 specialized placement offices staffed by personnel specially 
qualified to assist job seekers to find jobs in specific fields such as tech 
nology and accounting and finance. In some major urban areas, the 
Employment Service also operates a drop-in placement service called 
Expo that provides quick information about job vacancies (Trehorning 
1993, p. 61). No registration of job seekers takes place at Expo centers. 
Finally, since August 1991, the Employment Service has operated a 
special office in central Stockholm for international job placement. It 
provides referrals for jobs outside the Nordic countries and helps 
Swedes living abroad who will be moving home and are seeking 
employment.
For the late 1980s, the OECD (1990, pp. 31-32) reports that Sweden 
ranked highest (at 1.0) among nineteen countries in employment office 
staff members per thousand persons aged 15 to 64. These countries 
include Britain, Germany, Australia, and Canada. Similarly, Sweden 
ranked lowest (at 14) in average number of unemployed persons per 
employment office staff member in 1988.
It is clear that the Swedish Employment Service is much more than 
a labor exchange. Key aspects of the Swedish system include the fol 
lowing:
• Immediate provision of services
• A permanent case manager assigned to each client
• Near-universal listing of job vacancies by employers
• A computerized system for matching job vacancies and job seek 
ers
• Attention to the needs of individuals who are not immediately job- 
ready
Beginning with the first aspect, the Employment Service takes the 
position that immediate involvement of laid-off workers in the service 
delivery system is important to prevent a period of idleness that is 
destructive to workers' motivation and effectiveness in seeking reem- 
ployment. Indeed, mandatory advance notice of mass layoffs and plant 
closures allows services to begin in many cases before workers' cur 
rent jobs actually end.
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Clients of the Swedish Employment Service are assigned a case 
manager who remains responsible for the case until the worker 
becomes reemployed. Even though the case manager may refer the cli 
ent to specialists within the system for assessment and testing or for 
training, the case manager is the continuing point of contact between 
the client and the system. A primary task of the case manager is to 
select the appropriate set of services to be provided each client. Three 
groups of clients may be distinguished: the job-ready, those with an 
appropriate vocational objective but lacking the required training, and 
those who need assistance in selecting a vocational objective.
A job-ready client may proceed directly to job search, relying on the 
Employment Service's listings of job vacancies. Swedish law requires 
employers to list with the public employment service all jobs lasting 
more than ten days, while forbidding the operation of private employ 
ment agencies. 5 Insistence that employers list their job openings at the 
public employment service tends to eliminate the adverse selection 
problem noted in connection with the public employment services in 
the United States and Canada. That is, possession of information on the 
full range of available employment opportunities and on the qualifica 
tions needed to fill them makes it attractive for Swedish job seekers to 
visit the Employment Service to get good job leads. At the same time, 
employers can be confident that workers referred to them are not lim 
ited to the lower end of the skill distribution. Bendick (1983, p. 221) 
reports that as of the early 1980s, job vacancies were listed on weekly 
newspaper-like sheets, which were available at all Employment Ser 
vice offices. By the late 1980s, a fully computerized job placement sys 
tem provided each employment office with on-line access to 
information about job seekers and job vacancies. Baily, Burtless, and 
Litan (1993, pp. 138-39) make the common-sense argument that job 
less workers in areas with high unemployment in the United States 
often find that access to better employment opportunities requires a 
geographic move. But long-distance job seekers are forced to invest in 
costly and often fruitless in-person searches. These costs would be sub 
stantially reduced if local employment service offices, as in Sweden, 
could provide information on job vacancies in labor markets around 
the country.6
Beyond supplying information on job vacancies, the Swedish 
Employment Service provides assistance in locating jobs not listed or
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advertised by employers. A first source of information on these jobs 
results from the job development activity of placement staff and train 
ing staff members. In addition, rising unemployment during and imme 
diately after the 1990-91 recession caused the Employment Service to 
expand its job search training activities to include the formation of job 
clubs. In Sweden, job clubs are groups of unemployed job seekers who 
meet every day at their local employment exchange office to obtain 
information on the overall state of the labor market and to be trained in 
how to engage in job search, reply to help-wanted advertisements, fill 
out job application forms, and interview effectively. Trehorning (1993, 
p. 62) refers to a recent Employment Service follow-up survey indicat 
ing that nearly half the positions filled by job club participants had not 
been advertised or listed in the Service's own vacancy lists.
A second group of Employment Service clients are those who have 
already selected an appropriate vocational objective but who lack the 
required qualifications. These clients are referred to a training program 
offered by a skill center. The system of skill centers operated by the 
National Employment Training Board was discussed in some detail in 
chapter 4.
Finally, clients who need assistance in selecting a vocational objec 
tive can be referred to specialists who provide vocational testing and 
assessment. Vocational testing and counseling may last several weeks. 
In his evaluation of Sweden's employment and training system, Ben- 
dick (1983, pp. 215-16) comments that
... in no part of its services is this lavishness [in the level of 
resources invested] more striking than when a client is attempting 
to select an occupation (for example, prior to entering training). 
The availability of specialized counseling and testing services has 
been mentioned earlier. Additionally, the case manager can 
arrange short visits to training classes or to typical job sites or 
even short-term trial placements in typical jobs and will himself 
participate in what strikes an American observer as an amazingly 
patient process of thought and discussion.
Job seekers who, in addition, require rehabilitation can obtain testing 
and assessment services at an employability institute.
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The Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service
Undoubtedly the best-known public employment service agency 
specializing in job development is Canada's Industrial Adjustment Ser 
vice (IAS). Established in 1963, the IAS is a federally funded agency 
intended to serve as a catalyst in bringing together local labor and man 
agement officials to locate job opportunities for workers displaced by 
economic and technological change. IAS assistance is also available to 
companies or communities facing labor shortages. This additional 
responsibility of the agency helps it avoid the possible stigma of only 
being associated with layoffs and plant closings.
The I AS is very small in terms of number of employees and size of 
budget. During the middle 1980s, its staff consisted of just sixty expe 
rienced professionals, with only three persons located in its headquar 
ters office in Ottawa and the rest assigned to regional field offices. Its 
annual budget was between $6 and $8 million (in Canadian dollars).
As described in the Secretary of Labor's Task Force report (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1986, p. 21), the IAS program operates on five 
premises.
1. Reemployment services should be offered in advance of, rather 
than after, a plant closing or mass layoff.
2. Advance warning is essential to allow time for planning and 
implementing appropriate reemployment services.
3. Worker adjustment to displacement is best accomplished by the 
joint action of the parties directly involved.
4. The role of government is to encourage and support, not to sup 
plant, the efforts of management and labor.
5. Program participation should be voluntary.
After learning that a plant closing is imminent, the IAS acts immedi 
ately to meet with labor and management representatives at the highest 
possible level and to offer its assistance in finding new jobs for laid-off 
workers. Early warning of a layoff is quite likely because six of the ten 
Canadian provinces have plant closing laws that require 8 to 16 weeks' 
advance notice of layoffs affecting fifty or more workers. In addition, a
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national advance notice law applies to government-regulated enter 
prises such as airlines and railroads.
If the lAS's offer of assistance is accepted, which is nearly always 
the case, the agency negotiates a brief formal agreement, which estab 
lishes an ad hoc labor-management adjustment committee consisting 
of an equal number of labor and management representatives. Labor 
representatives include prospective job losers wherever possible. The 
purpose of the agreement is to obtain from both the employer and the 
union (if a union is present) a commitment of time and financial 
resources to the adjustment process. The IAS provides a chairman, 
whom the adjustment committee may select from a roster of experi 
enced people. In addition, it pays half of the committee's costs, with 
the company usually picking up the other half. Committees typically 
finish their work and disband in about one year. According to the Sec 
retary of Labor's Task Force, the IAS arranges from 400 to 600 labor- 
management agreements per year. 7
The basic thrust of the IAS is to place unemployed workers in jobs 
that are never publicly announced, but instead are filled by word-of- 
mouth. From this strategy follow several of the important features of 
the program. One of these is an emphasis on prompt placement rather 
than retraining, relocation, or counseling. Adjustment committees not 
only undertake to uncover job openings, but they also attempt to make 
it easier for prospective employers to consider client workers by assist 
ing in the screening process. Workers who cannot be placed are 
referred to the CEC system for relocation or retraining assistance. 
When the committee has done all that it can in terms of placing dis 
placed workers, it disbands and the chairman writes a final report doc 
umenting the work of the committee. Batt (1983, p. 5) comments that 
the final report includes a description of what happened to every laid- 
off worker, adding that
[S]uch detailed reporting offers a refreshing contrast to what hap 
pens in the United States. As a general rule here, no one knows 
what has happened to the displaced people—not the company, not 
the union, not the employment service, not anyone. Nor does any 
one appear to care enough to find out.
A second element of the IAS strategy is recognition that it is people 
with extensive experience in the industry and community—that is, the
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labor and management representatives on an adjustment committee— 
who are in the best position to use their informal contacts to engage in 
job development. Thus the IAS advisor to an adjustment committee 
keeps a low profile, and the committee itself is flexible enough to look 
at the individual needs of each worker. Worth emphasizing is the basic 
philosophy of the IAS that displaced workers are to be assisted individ 
ually by persons who know them personally.
The Secretary of Labor's Task Force (U.S. Department of Labor 
1986, appendix A) comments favorably on the operation of the IAS. 
Noted in particular are the program's modest cost (about $171 per year 
for every worker served), reasonably good placement rates (about two- 
thirds of workers affected by plant closings are placed within a year), 
absence of bureaucratic red tape, contribution to improved labor-man 
agement relations, and favorable effect on reducing workers' resistance 
to technological change and relaxation of trade restrictions. The Task 
Force report also mentions that, according to a survey of displaced 
workers served during the 1982-83 fiscal year, IAS assistance reduced 
the length of unemployment spells by an average of two weeks. Thus 
the Task Force comments that the program virtually pays for itself by 
lowering UI outlays and accelerating the return of workers to tax-pay 
ing status.
As noted in chapter 2, the Task Force's favorable evaluation of the 
IAS formed the basis for its recommendation that federal funding 
should be provided states to develop rapid response units capable of 
reacting to major layoffs and plant closures with on-site offers of job 
search assistance and retraining. This recommendation was subse 
quently incorporated as a major element of the Economic Dislocation 
and Worker Adjustment Assistance act of 1988, which amended Title 
III of the Job Training Partnership Act.
A recent evaluation of the IAS by Employment and Immigration 
Canada (1993) concludes with what appears to be a less positive 
assessment of the program. The EIC evaluation is based on a survey of 
a random sample of almost 1,900 displaced workers, about 800 of 
whom were IAS participants. It should be noted that IAS participants 
enjoyed significantly higher earnings prior to being laid off than did the 
members of the comparison group. Comparing postprogram labor mar 
ket outcomes for the two groups, the EIC concludes that laid-off work 
ers who received IAS services took significantly longer to begin active
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job search and spent more time in job search. The longer period of job 
search means that IAS participants received four and one-half more 
weeks of UI benefits and nearly $1,700 more in UI payments.
A closer look at the evaluation results reveals, however, that the neg 
ative net impact estimates obtained for the program as a whole are 
mainly the consequence of particularly adverse outcomes for IAS par 
ticipants who received two or more services. Take-up rates for program 
services are much higher for IAS participants than for nonparticipants, 
and it is this aspect of the IAS program that leads to the unfavorable net 
impact estimates. That is, there is no evidence that the negative impact 
of multiple services per se is greater for IAS participants than for the 
comparison group. Rather, the negative outcomes for the IAS program 
appear to be related to the fact that more IAS recipients participated in 
multiple services than is true for the comparison group.
Looking at the specific services offered by the I AS, it is clear that 
individual services differ substantially in their effect on reemployment 
opportunities. In particular, job placement assistance is found to be 
associated with less time looking for work, fewer weeks unemployed, a 
greater likelihood of finding a full-time job, and higher postprogram 
earnings. The evaluation report also notes that circulating resumes is 
the only other single service associated with positive labor market out 
comes. On the other hand, participation in a retraining program is asso 
ciated with a lower likelihood of finding a full-time job and with more 
weeks of unemployment. Similarly, career counseling appeared to do 
little except increase the total number of weeks unemployed, while 
what the report terms "job search counseling" delayed the initiation of 
the job search process but had no real impact on employment out 
comes. These results seem to indicate that the IAS can provide a key 
labor market function by concentrating on its primary role as a job 
development agency. But its effectiveness appears to be seriously 
diluted when program participants are channeled into related services 
including retraining.
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Maintaining the Work Incentive of the Unemployed
Unemployment insurance benefits provide a first line of defense for 
workers faced with involuntary job loss and increase the political sus- 
tainability of public policies that permit freer international trade and 
the introduction of new technology. At the same time, UI benefits have 
the effect of reducing the cost of job search, thereby lengthening the 
expected duration of search. Longer duration of job search is not a seri 
ous problem with respect to laid-off workers who can reasonably be 
expected to be recalled to their old jobs when the economy recovers 
(i.e., cyclical unemployment). It is clearly more of a problem in the 
context of the longer-term structural unemployment associated with 
industrial restructuring if, as might be expected, availability of UI 
slows the transition of displaced workers to jobs in growing industries 
by reducing incentives to widen the industrial scope of their job search 
and to engage in retraining.
An issue of increasing concern among policy makers in many indus 
trialized nations is the rising incidence of long-term unemployment 
among the jobless. This section examines policies implemented during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s in Britain, Canada, and Australia 
intended to more closely link receipt of unemployment insurance bene 
fits to active job search, coupled with improved ISA services. As 
described in chapter 2, all three of these countries provide unemploy 
ment compensation benefits for up to one year or longer (50 weeks in 
Canada); and it was noted in connection with table 2.2 that the United 
Kingdom and Australia face a relatively high level of long-term unem 
ployment.
Britain©s Scheduling and Programming Strategy
The basic employment service in the United Kingdom has tradition 
ally been job matching provided by the Employment Service through a 
dense network of Jobcentres located on high (or main) streets through 
out the nation. Job vacancies are displayed on cards, and a job seeker 
can drop by his or her local Jobcentre and select those that are of inter 
est. A receptionist is available to furnish more information about each 
job and to set up interviews with employers. Despite the generally high
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marks given the Jobcentre system for the share of job vacancies it lists 
(OECD 1992, p. 141), concern increased during the 1980s regarding 
the ability of the system to keep the long-term unemployed in some 
form of contact with the labor market. The Department of Employment 
(1988, p. 55) comments that despite a decline in unemployment during 
the second half of the 1980s,
. . . there is evidence that a significant minority of benefit claim 
ants are not actively looking for work. Some are claiming bene- 
fit[s] fraudulently while working at least part-time in the black 
economy. Others seem to have grown accustomed to living on 
benefits] and have largely given up looking for work, . . . [Still] 
others believe, mistakenly, that they might be financially worse off 
taking a job or are reluctant to travel daily more than a short dis 
tance to where jobs are available.
Chapter 2 noted that British workers who are unemployed for longer 
than one year are eligible for income-maintenance benefits for an 
indefinite time period under the Income Support program. While 
Income Support originally played only a minor role in assisting the 
unemployed, the OECD (1992, p. 141) notes that currently about three- 
quarters of the unemployed rely exclusively on this means-tested bene 
fit. During the 1980s, consequently, Britain's Employment Service was 
confronted with the problem of facilitating the reemployment of large 
numbers of unemployed workers with little recent contact with the 
labor market. The policy response to this problem, implemented during 
the latter half of the 1980s, is known as the "scheduling and program 
ming strategy." Along with offers of information and assistance, this 
strategy emphasizes periodic interviews with unemployment compen 
sation recipients designed to keep them in contact with the labor mar 
ket.
Table 5.2 outlines the schedule of Employment Service interven 
tions in the scheduling and programming strategy. Newly unemployed 
workers are expected to check in with their local Unemployment Bene 
fit Office or Jobcentre to receive information on their rights to unem 
ployment insurance benefits and their obligations to engage in job 
search. A New Client Adviser helps the client prepare a back-to-work 
plan. Financial assistance through the Travel to Interview Scheme is 
available to clients who must travel to job interviews beyond normal 
daily traveling distances.
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After three months, workers who are still jobless are invited to meet 
with a claimant adviser who reviews their back-to-work plan and may 
refer them to either a Job Search Seminar or a Job Review Workshop. 
Job Search Seminars offer two days of assistance on how to search out 
and apply for jobs and on how to behave in job interviews, while Job 
Review Workshops are two-day workshops designed to help clients 
with professional and executive backgrounds who are exploring new 
career options.
Table 5.2 Schedule of British Employment Service Contacts in the 
Scheduling and Programming Strategy, by Duration of 
Unemployment Spell
Duration of 
unemployment Employment Service action
Day 1 Basic check of entitlement; benefit forms issued.
First week Explanation of "benefit contract" (i.e., claimant's legal
rights and obligations); agreement on a back-to-work plan.
Week 13 Review back-to-work plan; claimants may attend a 2-day 
course on job search techniques or a 2-day workshop on 
alternative careers.
Week 26 First Restart interview: review benefit contract; develop 
new back-to-work plan; access given to Jobclubs, Training 
for Work program, and the Job Interview Guarantee 
program.
Week 52 Second Restart interview: same actions as week 26 but
required attendance at a Jobplan workshop if other options 
were not followed up on.
Week 78 Third Restart interview: same actions as week 26 plus 
warning that attendance at a Restart course could be 
mandatory.
Week 104 Mandatory attendance at a 1-week Restart course. Involves 
overcoming perceived barriers to employment, assessment 
of skills and experience, enhancement of job search skills, 
and designing a plan of action leading back to work.
SOURCES: OECD (1992, tables 3.8 and 3.9) and Employment Department Group (1991).
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During the first six months of unemployment, most job seekers are 
viewed as being basically job-ready but in need of assistance in locat 
ing suitable employment opportunities. This attitude changes after six 
months, when the jobless become eligible for the Restart program. 
Restart is intended for the long-term unemployed who may have 
become convinced that they will never again be employed and have 
adjusted to a low standard of living. The program begins with an inter 
view with a claimant advisor. These interviews are repeated every six 
months with the same claimant adviser, so that a good working rela 
tionship can be achieved between adviser and client. Depending on the 
needs of the client, the adviser can recommend a variety of services, 
including a slot in an adult skill training program, a place in a Jobclub, 
participation in a Jobplan workshop, access to the Job Interview Guar 
antee program, a temporary public-sector job under the Training for 
Work program, financial assistance to set up a small business, and a 
slot in a Restart course. Jobclubs, Jobplan workshops, and Restart 
courses are three of the most important of these programs.
Jobclubs in Britain feature many of the services described earlier for 
job search workshops in the U.S. displaced worker demonstration 
projects. More specifically, Jobclubs typically offer workers unem 
ployed for at least six months two weeks of four half-day sessions per 
week of structured training on how to look for jobs, write more effec 
tive job applications, and come across well in interviews. Following 
these two weeks, clients are given access to "resource areas" (or 
resource centers) containing telephones and sources of labor market 
information. At this stage, which is limited to four to six months, there 
is more support from other club members and less from the Jobclub 
leader. Workers unemployed for a year who have not followed up on 
other options offered them at their Restart interview are required to 
participate in an one-week Jobplan workshop. Jobplan workshops offer 
participants an opportunity to take a fresh look at their situation with 
the objectives of clearly identifying their strengths and skills, setting 
new employment goals, and drawing up an action plan for getting back 
to work.
Attendance at a Restart course is mandatory after two years of 
receiving unemployment benefits for those claimants who have refused 
to participate in other programs. In addition to providing information 
on the range of available JSA options, Restart courses involve small
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groups of the long-term unemployed in exercises intended to overcome 
barriers to labor force participation, sort out career options, motivate 
the resumption of active job search, and produce an individualized plan 
of action for reemployment. Courses are typically five days in length.
The OECD (1992, annex 3.D) reports that as of 1989, more than 10 
percent of claimants who were sent a letter inviting them to attend a 
Restart interview stopped claiming benefits rather than attend. More 
recently, about 9 percent of claimants scheduled to attend a Restart 
course stopped claiming benefits. Although these drop-out rates could 
be reflecting reemployment, the OECD suggests that it is more likely 
that many who dropped their claim for benefits have access to other 
income, in which case their Income Support claim (which is means- 
tested) could well be fraudulent. Tending to support this conclusion is 
U.S. evidence for the Charleston and Washington State job search 
experiments described in chapter 3. Evidence produced for these two 
experiments shows that strengthened reporting requirements and man 
datory attendance at a job search workshop reduced UI payments by 
raising the costs of remaining on UI rather than by enhancing the job 
search abilities of claimants. Anderson (1992) also reports for the New 
Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration that the positive effect of ISA 
activities on reemployment probability is due more to their effect on 
scaling down recall expectations than their effectiveness in enhancing 
job search skills.
Similar results are reported for a French program introduced in 
1992, which was designed to combat long-term unemployment by 
evaluating, through individual interviews, the job prospects of workers 
unemployed for more than a year (see OECD 1993, pp. 108-10). As a 
consequence of the interviews, about 16 percent of the long-term 
unemployed were immediately dropped from UI rolls. Some of these 
individuals were dropped due to retirement and other special factors, 
but many others failed to fulfill mandated job search requirements. The 
program also appears to have produced a decline in long-term unem 
ployment of about 5 percent. However, the desirable effect on unem 
ployment due to increased hiring of the long-term unemployed was 
substantially offset by a reduction in the hiring of short-term unem 
ployed workers, leaving total unemployment essentially unchanged. 
This evidence raises an important red flag that targeted programs 
intended to benefit a particular category of workers may operate as
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intended for the targeted group, but only at the expense of the job 
opportunities of nontargeted workers. This "displacement effect" was 
considered in chapter 3 in the context of the U.S. reemployment bonus 
experiments.
Canada©s VIInitiatives
The discussion in chapter 2 commented on the generosity of Can 
ada's unemployment insurance system. Indeed, among the seven coun 
tries included in table 2.1, only the United Kingdom reports a higher 
public expenditure ratio on passive labor market programs than Can 
ada.
The relative generosity of the Canadian UI system during the 1980s 
stemmed from basically three factors. First, unemployed Canadians 
could qualify for UI on the basis of as little as 10 to 14 weeks of 
employment, depending on the unemployment rate in the region in 
which they lived. In contrast, Japan requires 26 weeks of work during 
the past year to qualify for UI, while Germany requires 30 weeks of 
employment during the previous year plus 52 weeks of work during the 
last three years. Second, Canadian workers who voluntarily quit their 
jobs may collect UI benefits following a disqualification period that 
averaged just two weeks. Most countries, including the United States, 
restrict UI benefits to the involuntary unemployed. Finally, unem 
ployed Canadian job seekers were eligible for up to 50 weeks of UI 
benefits.
The Labour Force Development Strategy announced by the Cana 
dian government in 1989 had the purposes of tightening up on UI eligi 
bility while, at the same time, allowing a reallocation of UI resources 
from income maintenance to active labor market policies. A policy 
statement released by Employment and Immigration Canada (1989a, 
pp. 11-12) spells out the following changes in eligibility for UI bene 
fits.
1. While retaining the UI program's sensitivity to differences in 
regional unemployment rates, a new UI benefit schedule increases the 
minimum weeks of employment required to become eligible for UI 
benefits in most areas of the country. For example, the minimum weeks 
worked requirement for workers in Saskatoon, Montreal, and St.
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John's would increase from 10 weeks to 13 to 16 weeks under the new 
regulations.
2. The maximum period of UI entitlement is reduced except in those 
regions suffering very high unemployment rates. For example, claim 
ants in regions with an unemployment rate of 11 percent who had 
worked for at least 30 weeks were entitled to 50 weeks of UI benefits. 
Under the new regulations, these claimants qualify for just 42 weeks of 
UI.
3. Workers who quit their jobs without just cause are still eligible to 
receive UI, but they face a 7- to 12-week delay before benefits com 
mence, and the duration of their benefits is reduced. In addition, the 
replacement rate for insurable earnings is cut to 50 percent from 60 
percent.
4. Penalties are significantly strengthened for fraudulent use of the 
UI program by claimants and employers.
The Labour Force Development Strategy also permits UI funds to be 
spent on active labor market programs. Prior to 1989, payment for the 
costs of training and other reemployment services came out of the bud 
get of the Canadian Jobs Strategy (CJS), while income support for UI 
recipients was paid for from the UI account. (The comprehensive CJS 
program created in 1985 was outlined in chapter 2.) In 1989, Employ 
ment and Immigration Canada was permitted for the first time to use 
the UI account to fund training program costs, supplementary allow 
ances, and associated income support payments. Employment and 
Immigration Canada's policy statement (1989a) projects for the early 
1990s that reforms of the UI system will save $1.3 billion (Canadian) 
in UI expenditures per year. This represents about 10 percent of the UI 
program's total annual expenditures beginning in 1990. Of the $1.3 bil 
lion, approximately $500 million is projected to be spent on improved 
UI benefits for maternity, sickness, and parental leave, as well as for 
workers over the age of 65. The remaining $800 million is dedicated to 
raising the skills of Canadian workers and enhancing job placement 
and job development services. In particular, the IAS is to receive a 
more than doubling of its budget to $15 million, allowing program ser 
vices to be made available to about 1,000 firms and their workers annu-
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ally (in comparison to the 400 to 600 firms noted earlier). Legislation 
passed in 1990 authorized a greater percentage of UI funds to be ear 
marked for training.
In 1991 a restructuring of Canadian employment and training pro 
grams was carried out in which the Job Development, Job Entry, and 
Skill Shortages programs of the Canadian Jobs Strategy were incorpo 
rated into the new Employability Improvement Program. Added to this 
program, moreover, was the Feepayer option, which was previously 
outside the CJS. The Feepayer option permits Ul-eligible workers to 
receive income support and an exemption from having to engage in job 
search while undergoing training. However, Feepayer option partici 
pants themselves, or a third party, are required to pay for training costs. 
Following 1989, as noted, the Labour Force Development Strategy 
made UI funds available to pay these costs. The overall objective of the 
Employability Improvement Program of 1991 was to decentralize deci 
sion making, allowing CEC counselors to work with UI clients to 
develop reemployment plans more closely attuned to the needs of the 
individual. This policy change resulted in increased use of the Fee- 
payer option. Prior to 1991, the preferred approach was the Direct Pur 
chase option under which workers eligible for CJS programs were 
assigned to program slots purchased from training institutions by the 
government.
An evaluation study commissioned by Employment and Immigra 
tion Canada recently examined the effect of Ul-sponsored training on 
labor market outcomes for participants in the Feepayer, DIR, Job 
Entry, Job Development, and Skill Shortages programs (see Park, Rid- 
dell, and Power 1993). A brief description of each of these programs 
follows.
Feepayer clients must qualify for UI and must have been out of 
school for more than two years. Feepayers are eligible to enroll in any 
training program recommended by their CEC counselor, including, 
since 1991, basic skills training.
DIR clients either took training (often in the evening) that did not 
interfere with their job search or did not inform their local CEC office 
that they were enrolled in training while on UI.
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Job Entry clients include women reentering the workforce after an 
absence of at least three years and out-of-school youths with little labor 
market experience.
Job Development clients must have suffered long-term unemploy 
ment defined as being unemployed for at least 24 weeks in the previous 
30 weeks.
Skill Shortages clients are workers recommended by their CEC 
counselors for training in skills designated at the national level as being 
in short supply.
The Park, Riddell, and Power study is based on longitudinal data 
collected for UI trainees and nontrainees whose UI receipt began in 
1988, 1989, 1990, or 1991. Training provided to workers participating 
in all five programs is classroom training. However, the average length 
of training courses differed significantly by program, with Feepayer 
program participants enrolled in the longest courses (33.5 weeks on 
average) and Skill Shortages participants enrolled in the shortest 
courses (19.2 weeks).
Availability of longitudinal data collected for trainees and nontrain 
ees makes it possible to use a "difference-in-differences" econometric 
approach to controlling for the selection bias likely to be present 
because both observed and unobserved factors influence earnings as 
well as program selection. The key assumption underlying this 
approach is that there is an unobserved permanent component of earn 
ings that varies across individuals but is fixed over time, and that this 
permanent earnings component also influences the program selection 
decision. Park, Riddell, and Power also estimate a two-stage model for 
controlling for sample selection, using a multinomial logistic model to 
form selection bias correction terms for each of the five training pro 
grams. However, the authors (1993, p. 124) argue that the difference- 
in-differences approach is more credible because it nets out the large 
differences observed between programs in preprogram earnings.
Table 5.3 presents net impact estimates for the five components of 
the Employability Improvement Program obtained using the differ- 
ences-in-differences econometric methodology. Shown are estimated 
net impacts measured in terms of 1991 earnings for the 1988 and 1989 
cohorts of UI claimants. For each cohort, estimates are calculated for
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base year earnings measured both two years and one year prior to ini 
tial receipt of UI benefits. The table indicates that the impact of UI- 
sponsored training depends strongly on the particular program studied. 
Across both cohorts, only the Job Entry program resulted in consis 
tently positive and statistically significant impacts on earnings. In addi 
tion, the Skill Shortages program records very large and statistically 
significant estimated impacts for the earlier cohort and distinctly posi 
tive but not significant estimates for the later cohort. It is interesting to 
note that both the Job Entry and Skill Shortages programs provided 
trainees a much greater opportunity to combine OJT with classroom 
training than was possible in the other three programs (see Park, Rid- 
dell, and Power 1993, p. 29).
Table 5.3 Impact of Canadian Ul-Sponsored Training Programs, 1991 


































SOURCE: Park, Riddell, and Power (1993, table 5.12). 
NOTE: Estimates are based on comparisons of average earnings.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respec 
tively.
In contrast to these two Employability Improvement Program com 
ponents, net impact estimates obtained for the Feepayer, DIR, and Job 
Development programs are only rarely positive and statistically signifi 
cant and are occasionally even negative. All of the estimates shown in 
table 5.3 are based on a simple comparison of average earnings. Con 
trolling for residence and a limited number of personal characteristics 
in a regression framework, program net impact estimates display the
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same general patterns seen in table 5.3, although the individual esti 
mates tend to be smaller in magnitude. 8
Australia©s Newstart Program
While income support was commonly received by displaced Austra 
lians enrolled in a retraining activity, the government implemented in 
July 1991 a fundamental reform of its unemployment benefit program 
intended to make income maintenance more directly related to claim 
ant self-help. Termed Newstart, the program was a response to a grow 
ing number of long-term unemployed Australian workers. Instead of 
providing unemployed workers with income support and leaving it up 
to them to conduct their own job search, Newstart is designed to diag 
nose the difficulty the unemployed are having in finding employment, 
and then to deal actively with their needs through retraining and other 
forms of active labor market assistance.
Like the British scheduling and programming strategy, Newstart 
treats the long-term jobless (defined as being out of work for more than 
12 months) differently from those experiencing shorter periods of job- 
lessness. In particular, the Newstart program creates two new payment 
schemes—the Job Search Allowance for the shorter-term unemployed 
(and those under age 18) and the Newstart Allowance for the long-term 
unemployed. The objective of the Job Search Allowance is to prevent 
long-term unemployment by early identification of clients likely to 
have difficulty obtaining reemployment. With this objective in mind, 
the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) interviews all clients 
after three months of unemployment, and again if they remain unem 
ployed after six months. If the CES determines that vocational training 
is needed to improve labor market prospects, Job Search Allowance 
participants receive a training allowance along with their Job Search 
Allowance. To ensure an adequate number of training slots, the govern 
ment pledged to provide funding for additional active labor market ser 
vices through the end of 1993-94.
A key feature of the Newstart program is the tailoring of assistance 
and program requirements to the individual needs and capacities of the 
unemployed. For workers unemployed longer than 12 months, contin 
ued receipt of income-maintenance benefits requires that an applica 
tion be submitted for participation in the Newstart Allowance payment
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system. In turn, receipt of the Newstart Allowance is conditional on the 
working out of an Activity Agreement by the client and a CES staff 
member. This agreement outlines the steps that the individual will have 
to take to improve his or her employment prospects. Clients who fail to 
meet their obligations by refusing offers of assistance or by exerting 
insufficient effort themselves may have their payments suspended for a 
period or canceled entirely.
Summary
The core employment service provided in most industrialized 
nations, including the United States, is the traditional labor exchange 
function involving matching unemployed workers to job vacancies 
listed by employers in the local labor market. Beyond this core service, 
public employment services typically play the supportive roles of gate 
keeper in allocating retraining and transitional employment opportuni 
ties and of enforcer of job search requirements imposed by 
unemployment insurance programs.
Following a brief overview of more proactive job search assistance 
services, this chapter began with a review of the limited empirical evi 
dence available on the effectiveness of the U.S. and Canadian public 
employment services in matching the unemployed with vacant jobs. A 
favorable interpretation of this evidence is that the public employment 
agencies of both nations appear to have potential, but that this potential 
is largely unrealized. Particularly for the United States, the absence of 
consistently positive net impact estimates for public employment ser 
vices is not surprising, given regulations targeting services to the disad- 
vantaged, a sharp decline in federal funding, and the absence of 
universal listing of job vacancies by employers. The outcome of a pro 
cess of adverse selection is that the U.S. Employment Service is basi 
cally limited to the referral of unskilled workers to low-paying and 
often temporary jobs. ES job matching services are consequently of lit 
tle interest to many displaced workers. Nevertheless, ES job matching 
services are very low cost, and the argument can be made that the ES 
serves a valuable "backstop" function in aiding job seekers who lack 
good information about the pay and location of vacant jobs or have
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failed to locate jobs using other job search methods. There also appears 
to be considerable variation in efficiency across local ES offices, with 
offices subject to state performance standards and those engaging in 
job development with employers generally demonstrating higher 
placement rates.
Considered next was the operation of the highly regarded Swedish 
Employment Service. The Swedish government provides a highly effi 
cient job matching service as well as a broad mix of more proactive job 
search assistance services. Key aspects of the Swedish system include 
(1) immediate provision of services to laid-off workers, (2) a perma 
nent case manager assigned to each client, (3) near universal listing of 
job vacancies by employers, (4) a computerized system for matching 
vacancies with job seekers, and (5) attention to the needs of those not 
immediately job-ready through extensive vocational testing and assess 
ment. A near universal listing of job vacancies and the highly comput 
erized labor exchange system make it attractive for Swedish job 
seekers of all levels of job readiness, including the highly skilled, to 
visit their local employment exchange office to get leads on jobs avail 
able across Sweden. At the same time, employers are assured that 
workers referred to them are not limited to the lower end of the skill 
distribution.
Beyond its labor exchange function, the Swedish Employment Ser 
vice provides a number of ISA services. One of these is the involve 
ment of staff members in job development to help in locating jobs not 
listed or advertised by employers. The job development function of 
public employment services was considered in more detail in the con 
text of the Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service. The IAS is a low- 
cost federal agency that serves as a catalyst in inducing local labor and 
management officials to work together to locate job opportunities for 
workers displaced by economic and technological change. A recent 
evaluation of the IAS concludes that job development, when not con 
taminated by the receipt of additional services, is associated with less 
time looking for work, a greater likelihood of finding a full-time job, 
and higher postprogram earnings.
Employment services are usually linked to unemployment benefits 
by requirements that UI benefit recipients engage in some form of 
active job search. The United States offers unemployed workers a UI 
program that is stringent, relative to the programs of most other OECD
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countries, in terms of eligibility requirements, wage replacement rates, 
and period of benefit eligibility. Other industrialized nations that offer 
more generous UI programs are typically faced with a more severe 
problem of long-term unemployment.
The final section of the chapter examined recent initiatives in Brit 
ain, Canada, and Australia to deal with the issue of long-term depen 
dency on income-maintenance benefits. Canada's new approach is to 
limit eligibility and length of benefits and to shift a majority of the UI 
funds saved to active labor market policies. Canadian Employment 
Centre staff members are instructed to work closely with claimants in 
developing individualized reemployment plans. Britain and Australia 
are pursuing active labor market policies designed with two objectives 
in mind. The first is to decrease the likelihood that a recently laid-off 
worker will become a member of the long-term unemployed through 
increased access to training and job search assistance programs. (The 
long-term unemployed are defined as being unemployed for more than 
6 months in Britain and more than 12 months in Australia.) Programs 
in both nations seek to identify early in the unemployment spell those 
claimants likely to have difficulty finding reemployment without assis 
tance. The second objective is to increase the labor market contact of 
the long-term unemployed by making continued receipt of income- 
maintenance benefits more directly related to claimant self-help.
NOTES
1. In the United States, for example, the unemployment insurance system promotes the reem 
ployment of claimants by imposing a set of work search requirements and referring claimants who 
are not job-attached and do not expect to be recalled to the Employment Service.
2. Osberg also comments that the wage of $6.24 overstates the wages actually available to 
CEC users because organizations such as the federal government and universities (who want to be 
seen as making jobs available to a broad range of Canadian applicants) may list jobs with the CEC 
without any real expectation that such listings will produce serious candidates.
3. Osberg's remark about the CEC is in the context of similar complaints he reports about pub 
lic employment agencies in Australia, Britain, and the United States.
4. At current staffing levels, Bishop (1993a, p. 384) suggests that the ES appears to see its 
market niche as a highly automated, high-volume referral system. As part of its labor exchange 
function, Bishop also notes that the new referral system of the ES bases referrals on the General 
Aptitude Test Battery, which evaluates applicants' potential performance in a wide range of jobs.
5. Trehb'rning (1993, p. 59) notes that in December 1992 a government commission of inquiry 
presented draft legislation that would permit the establishment of private employment agencies as 
a supplement to the public employment service. As in Canada, it would be illegal to charge job 
seekers a fee, but employers who hire workers through the agency may be billed.
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6. The authors add that these costs could be further reduced if innovations in telecommunica 
tions equipment could be exploited to permit face-to-face interviews with geographically distant 
prospective employers through teleconferencing.
7. A more recent estimate obtained from personal correspondence with Ging Wong, Director 
of the Insurance Programs Division of the EIC, is that the number of IAS agreements was 860 per 
year during the early 1990s.
8. Sample sizes for these regressions are 571 and 407, respectively, for the 1988 and 1989 
cohorts. Park, Riddell, and Power (1993, p. 121) note that these sample sizes are somewhat lower 





Chapter 1 described displaced workers as unemployed individuals 
with considerable work experience who lost their previous jobs 
because of a layoff or plant closing associated with widespread indus 
trial restructuring. Industrial restructuring, in turn, is the consequence 
of substantial excess capacity in key industries resulting from funda 
mental technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces that 
are radically changing the global competitive environment. Michael 
Jensen (1994) of the Harvard Business School recently argued in The 
Wall Street Journal that today these forces are generating a "Third 
Industrial Revolution" comparable in scope to the previous two.'
Since their job losses follow from industrial restructuring, displaced 
workers face a low probability of being recalled to their old jobs or 
even to similar jobs in their old industries. And because of their consid 
erable work experience, many displaced workers have not been obliged 
for perhaps many years to test the labor market by engaging in job 
search. Thus the job search skills of the displaced are likely to be rusty, 
and they are quite unlikely to possess up-to-date information about 
alternative job opportunities, particularly those in other industries.
Following immediately from this simple characterization of dis 
placed workers are the following policy prescriptions:
• Training is likely to be necessary for at least some displaced work 
ers to qualify for jobs in expanding industries. In this context, 
training should be defined broadly to include not only vocational 
skill retraining but also training in basic math and communica 
tions skills necessary for reemployment or as a prerequisite for 
skill training.
• Job search assistance (ISA) services are essential to enhance the 
job search skills of many of the displaced.
• Displaced workers will typically benefit from an efficient public 
employment service that furnishes job vacancy information not 
necessarily restricted to the local labor market.
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The OECD includes both ISA and job matching services under the 
general heading of employment services. Employment services and 
adult training are major components of what are known as active labor 
market programs.2
A large literature exists indicating that displaced workers suffer siz 
able earnings losses associated with lengthy periods of postlayoff job- 
lessness and lower wages upon reemployment. These earnings losses 
have been found to be especially large for displaced workers possess 
ing lengthy job tenure with their prelayoff employers, those forced to 
change industry or occupation to find a new job, and residents of high- 
unemployment areas.
Using longitudinal data covering the 1980-86 period for high-tenure 
workers in Pennsylvania, a recent study by Jacobson, LaLonde, and 
Sullivan (1993a, 1993b) provides a comprehensive picture of earnings 
losses suffered by the displaced. The authors find that earnings losses 
of displaced workers average about $9,000 or 40 percent of prelayoff 
earnings in the year following displacement. The size of these losses 
declines somewhat over time, as almost all displaced workers find sta 
ble employment after six quarters of unemployment. But even during 
the fifth year after job separation, lower-wage reemployment jobs led 
to earnings losses that average approximately $6,500, or 25 percent of 
former earnings. Moreover, earnings losses associated with temporary 
layoffs and wage reductions began even before workers were perma 
nently separated from their firms. Taking into account the prelayoff 
earnings dip, the period of postdisplacement joblessness, and lower 
reemployment wages, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan calculate that 
the present value of earnings losses for a typical displaced worker is on 
the order of $80,000. This is clearly a major financial setback for expe 
rienced workers. There is little wonder that labor unions and sympa 
thetic policy makers object with such stridency to policies including 
trade liberalization and environmental protection that may lead to 
increased displacement. Farber (1993) presents evidence indicating 
that older and more educated workers were more vulnerable to job loss 
during the 1990-91 recession than during earlier recessions. Moreover, 
he suggests that the wage loss associated with displacement for the 
full-time reemployed was substantially larger for workers displaced in 
1990-91 than it was for workers displaced earlier.
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From a social perspective, the fundamental problem is that while all 
consumers benefit from the lower prices made possible by freer inter 
national trade and improved technology, the substantial labor market 
costs associated with industrial restructuring are concentrated on dis 
placed workers. Recognizing this problem, the governments of all 
industrialized nations offer an array of labor market services intended, 
at least in part, to reduce the costs of displacement. These services are 
typically divided into active and passive programs. The primary pas 
sive program provided by all industrialized nations is an unemploy 
ment compensation system intended to help maintain the consumption 
of unemployed workers and their families during a temporary period of 
joblessness. But since the joblessness faced by displaced workers is not 
fundamentally cyclical, it is widely argued that more aggressive active 
labor market policies are required to assist the displaced in making the 
transition to new jobs in growing industries. The OECD has been 
instrumental in causing policy makers in many countries to redirect 
their focus from passive to active labor market policies. 3
In comparison to most other industrialized nations, the United States 
devotes a small fraction of national resources to both active and passive 
labor market programs. Our active labor market programs, in particu 
lar, can accurately be described as fragmented and subject to dramatic 
fluctuations in funding and focus. The two areas in which the United 
States does lead the world are in its willingness to fund limited-dura 
tion demonstration projects and the technical sophistication with which 
the labor market effects of these projects are evaluated. Chapter 3 
described the empirical evidence available for the Downriver, Buffalo, 
Texas WAD, and New Jersey UI displaced worker demonstrations. 
Also examined in chapter 3 was evidence on the impact of retraining 
services provided under the Trade Adjustment Assistance program. 
Despite this wealth of empirical evidence, the net impact estimates 
summarized in chapter 3 are subject to enough qualifications, particu 
larly with respect to skill training provided in a classroom setting, that 
it is not easy to draw strong policy recommendations for the design of 
permanent, nationwide programs.
The thesis advanced in this monograph is that experience gained by 
other highly developed nations in the design and implementation of 
active labor market programs is worth considering by American policy 
makers as they contemplate new labor market policy initiatives. The
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six nations studied fall into two groups. The first group consisting of 
Sweden, Germany, and Japan provides their workers with a stable, 
nationwide employment and training system. Within this group, Swe 
den is well known for its comprehensive government training system 
operated in conjunction with an extensive network of employment 
exchange offices. Germany and Japan are best known for their firm- 
based training models, with the major difference between the two 
nations being that Germany's dual system of apprenticeship training 
focuses training opportunities on youth while workplace training in 
Japan continues throughout a worker's career with his or her employer.
The countries in the second group—Britain, Canada, and Austra 
lia—have in common recent major restructurings of their employment 
and training programs involving the shift of resources from passive to 
active labor market policies. Canada's strategy is to limit eligibility and 
duration of unemployment insurance benefits and to shift a majority of 
the UI funds saved to active labor market policies. Britain and Austra 
lia are attempting to deal with the issue of dependency on income- 
maintenance benefits with active labor market policies designed to pre 
vent recently laid-off workers from joining the ranks of the long-term 
unemployed and to increase the labor market contact of workers 
already included among the long-term unemployed.
Because the labor market programs in all six of these countries have 
not typically been subjected to formal evaluation in which program 
costs and benefits are estimated and compared, chapter 1 outlined an 
informal evaluation framework against which the operation of active 
labor market programs in different nations may be consistently 
assessed. Viewed from the perspective of U.S. policy makers, the eval 
uation framework consists of the following six criteria:
1. Program services should facilitate the transition of displaced 
workers to jobs in expanding industries and growing sectors within 
existing industries.
2. Program activities must meet the needs of displaced workers— 
that is, programs should be flexible, job-oriented, and low cost to par 
ticipants.
3. Programs must serve the entire spectrum of displaced workers, 
not just those easiest to place.
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4. Training programs must supply marketable skills to program 
graduates.
5. Programs should effectively utilize existing education and train 
ing institutions.
6. A broadening of the concept of job skills should be encouraged— 
that is, restructured employers require workers who are retrainable and 
adaptable to new technologies and work organizations.
In line with criterion 1, the discussion in this concluding chapter 
focuses on what can be learned from the experience of these six 
nations with adult training and employment services, since these are 
the categories of programs intended to facilitate mobility between 
industries and sectors within industries. Adult training is considered 
first, followed by a discussion of employment services in the second 
section. The final section of the chapter outlines an agenda for assisting 
displaced American workers.
Adult Training
Chapter 4 examined the following three training models found in the 
countries considered: the government training model, the firm-based 
training model, and the employer-led/school-based training model. Of 
the six countries studied, the nations that offer stable, nationwide 
employment and training systems—Sweden, Germany, and Japan—are 
leading examples of the operation of the government training and firm- 
based training models. Building on the discussion in chapter 4, this 
section begins with a consideration of lessons that can be learned from 
the Swedish government training system. This is followed by an exam 
ination of firm-based training systems in Germany and Japan. Consid 
ered finally is the employer-led/school-based system recently 
implemented in Britain.
The Government Training Model
Sweden's government training model is implemented through the 
National Employment Training Board, which is a major component of 
a comprehensive national employment and training system. It was
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pointed out in chapter 2 that the Swedish government spends a far 
higher percentage of Gross Domestic Product on adult training than 
does any other of the nations considered. Functioning independently of 
the regular educational infrastructure, the National Employment Train 
ing Board operates a nationwide system of 100 skill training centers. 
Each skill center offers basic education courses as well as several hun 
dred vocational training curricula lasting up to a year or more.
Creation of a government training system like that found in Sweden 
is not practical in the United States because of our extensive postsec- 
ondary school system (see criterion 5). Nevertheless, there are at least 
three important lessons to be learned from the Swedish experience. 
First, training should be provided to the extent possible in an environ 
ment resembling a workplace rather than a classroom in a school. In 
connection with the second criterion, it was emphasized earlier in 
chapter 1 that displaced workers are interested in jobs, not training. In 
Sweden, a modular system allows training programs to be individual 
ized and self-paced, and instructors relate to trainees less like teachers 
lecturing students than like supervisors interacting with employees.
A second lesson is that program curricula should be directly respon 
sive to market demand so that program graduates possess job skills that 
are salable (criterion 4). Sweden has traditionally approached this 
problem by appointing business and labor members to the national and 
local boards that supervise the training system. The 1986 reorganiza 
tion of the system was designed to increase its flexibility and respon- 
siveness by decentralizing decision making within the National 
Employment Training Board and making it financially self-supporting.
Finally, the Swedish adult training system operates successfully as 
the most common way for Swedish workers to enhance their voca 
tional skills. This is true whether they are jobless and classified as dis 
placed or economically disadvantaged workers or they are currently 
employed individuals interested in upgrading their skills to qualify for 
a promotion or to move between employers. The broad usage of the 
system has two substantial advantages in comparison to the narrowly 
targeted approach used in the United States. One advantage is that the 
Swedish system avoids the stigma often attached by employers to grad 
uates of programs specifically targeted to the low skilled or to welfare 
recipients. The other is the equity issue involved in allowing some job 
less individuals access to a government-funded program, but denying
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access to others who appear to be equally in need (for example, access 
to the Trade Adjustment Assistance program in the United States is 
restricted to trade-displaced workers).
Although adult training in Sweden is generally highly praised, the 
system has been subjected to several criticisms. One is that it "ware 
houses" substantial numbers of workers for whom training is unlikely 
to improve their long-term earnings prospects (see, for example, Ben- 
dick 1983, p. 216). More recently, Ramaswamy (1994) argues that 
Sweden's government training system imparts mainly general skills, 
whereas modern technology requires a greater emphasis on workplace- 
specific skills. But employers' willingness to offer in-house training 
depends, at least in part, on the freedom they have to devise their own 
internal wage structures and promotion schemes to retain the services 
of newly trained workers. In Ramaswamy's view, rigidities imposed by 
centralized bargaining and a national policy of wage equalization 
remove the flexibility Swedish employers need to offer wage-tenure 
profiles that are steeply enough sloped to retain the services of trained 
workers. The consequence is an underinvestment in firm-specific train 
ing. This argument may help to explain the absence of evidence noted 
in chapter 4 of a positive earnings effect of Swedish adult training pro 
grams. Finally, Forslund and Krueger (1994) emphasize that Sweden's 
heavy investment in adult training and active labor market programs in 
general failed to fend off the extraordinarily large rise in the Swedish 
unemployment rate beginning in 1991.
Firm-Based Training
From the criterion 4 perspective that training programs must supply 
marketable skills, the firm-based model is most likely to be successful 
since workplace training has the benefit of providing demand-related 
training. Baily, Burtless, and Litan (1993, p. 126) note that while grad 
uates of public training programs often end up with skills they do not 
use on their next jobs,
[P]rivate employers, who at least understand their own training 
needs, enjoy significant advantages in assigning workers to 
courses of instruction. Chances are good that if an employer is 
paying for part of the training investment, the training will be used 
in the worker's next job.
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Since the training is strongly linked to jobs (as opposed to simply more 
schooling), firm-based training also satisfies an important need 
expressed in criterion 2. Considered in detail in chapter 4 were the 
firm-based training systems in place in Germany and Japan.
The German dual system of apprenticeship training has recently 
received considerable attention in this country because of the Clinton 
administration's advocacy of a nationwide system of youth apprentice 
ship programs designed after the German model (see Heckman, Rose- 
lius, and Smith 1993). As described earlier, apprenticeship training in 
Germany lasts from two to three and one-half years; and apprentices 
complement their on-the-job training with one or two days a week of 
off-the-job training in a state vocational school. The workers produced 
by this system are generally thought to be highly skilled—as opposed 
to highly specialized—as called for by the "high-performance work 
places" described in chapter 1 in the context of criterion 6. Although 
the German dual system is currently of interest to policy makers seek 
ing to smooth the school-to-work transition of American youth, the 
earlier discussion also pointed out that adult workers in Germany have 
the opportunity to continue their occupation-specific training in a 
Meister or a Technician program. In the case of the displaced, ad hoc 
agreements worked out between employers, local government officials, 
and worker-elected works councils frequently allow redundant workers 
to receive government-subsidized retraining. The objective of the gov 
ernment subsidy is to allow workers to remain on the employer's pay 
roll or, in the case of a permanent plant closure, to entice new 
management to take over the closed facility and its workers.
The transferability of the German dual system of apprenticeship 
training to American workers is considerably enhanced by the commit 
ment within the United States to provide ready access to community 
college and vocational/technical school training. Indeed, the commu 
nity college system is currently undergoing a fundamental transforma 
tion. Historically a springboard to four-year colleges and a source of 
vocational training for youth, community colleges are emerging as the 
nation's largest provider of adult worker retraining. Along with stan 
dard classes in basic literacy and math skills, community colleges are 
increasingly linking up with local employers to develop technical 
courses tailored to meet their individual demands for skilled workers 
(see Lynch 1993b, p. 1301; and Osterman and Batt 1993, pp. 460-61).
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This trend toward greater utilization of existing education and training 
institutions to meet firm-specific training needs is very much consistent 
with criterion 5.
Hashimoto (1994) reports that while the use of formal training by 
Japanese employers is increasing, informal training in the workplace 
still characterizes Japan's firm-based training system. 4 The Japanese 
model is built on a school system that produces students competent in 
basic skills and possessing the abilities to learn and to function as team 
members. Once hired, large Japanese firms offer an internal labor mar 
ket structure within which workers can expect to receive life-long 
training opportunities through a process of job rotation supplemented 
by self-study. The combination of high-quality schooling and intensive 
informal training produces workers widely viewed as capable of meet 
ing the many challenges imposed in high-performance workplaces. 
That is, Japanese workers covered by lifetime employment guarantees 
tend to be highly skilled, able to work in teams, flexible in their ability 
to adjust quickly to changes in product demand, and capable of solving 
problems on their own.
Although Germany and Japan are still widely regarded as producing 
world-class skilled workers, some criticisms of their firm-based sys 
tems are beginning to surface (see, for example, Heckman, Roselius, 
and Smith 1993; and The Economist 1994b). The German apprentice 
ship system has been criticized as being inflexible in responding to 
shifts in the occupational demand for labor. Moreover, questions have 
recently been raised about whether occupation-specific training is suf 
ficient to allow workers to be competitive in labor markets that appear 
to be placing increasing value on workers' abilities to perform multiple 
tasks and to retrain themselves in new skills. Apparently young Ger 
mans recognize that apprenticeship training may no longer guarantee a 
secure job. The Economist (1994c) recently reported that the number 
seeking places in the dual system of apprenticeship training is falling 
and that, for the first time, more Germans are choosing to enroll in uni 
versities than to enter the dual system.
The viability of the Japanese model is also being questioned as, due 
to the lingering effects of the worldwide recession of the early 1990s, 
fewer young workers are being extended lifetime employment con 
tracts by their employers. Japanese employers are instead making 
increasing use of temporary or contract workers for whom continued
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employment and salaries are renegotiated annually and pay is tied 
strictly to performance. At the same time, chapter 4 presented anec 
dotal evidence for Japanese as well as German transplant firms located 
in the United States, which indicates that the firm-based training sys 
tems of both nations are economically feasible with American workers.
In the absence of the high value placed on skilled workforces in 
Germany and Japan, an approach to increasing firm-based training in 
the United States is the imposition of a payroll training tax along the 
lines of the Australian Training Guarantee discussed in chapter 4. Aus 
tralian employers are required to document that they spend 1.5 percent 
(as of 1992) of their payroll on formal training; otherwise, they have to 
make up the difference between what they spend and 1.5 percent of 
payroll in a tax payment. These tax payments are presumably used to 
fund government-sponsored training programs. The training tax offers 
the advantages of increasing the priority employers place on training 
and of reducing the incentive to poach already-trained workers, since 
all firms that benefit from training share in the costs. Nevertheless, the 
earlier discussion of the Australian Training Guarantee centered on two 
difficulties in implementing a training tax. The first of these was the 
problem of verifying reported expenditures on programs and trainers 
since companies have an incentive to overstate their training expendi 
tures. The second was the difficulty of making sure that access to train 
ing actually increases for less-skilled workers and for employees of 
small firms.
In advocating a 2 percent training tax levied on payrolls, Baily, Burt- 
less, and Litan (1993, pp. 128-31) are optimistic that these two prob 
lems can be overcome. 5 To ensure that training opportunities are 
directed to the less skilled, they recommend that employers be required 
to devote at least a specified percentage of their payrolls to training 
workers whose formal education ended with high school or who have 
no more than a year of college. On the problem of verifying employer 
training expenditures, the authors suggest that for the first several years 
after the training obligation has been imposed, approved training 
expenses should be defined loosely to reduce the shock of the new 
mandate and to minimize potential adverse effects on employment. 
Gradually, the definition of allowable training would become more 
strict in the sense that employers would be expected to demonstrate
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that the training they provide leads to a mastery of occupational skills 
as certified by nationally recognized credentials.
Lynch (1993a) and Osterman and Batt (1993) take a less optimistic 
view of the feasibility of the training tax. They argue, based on experi 
ence gained in Australia as well as in France, that no matter how the 
tax is structured, there will always be some firms that manipulate 
expenditures to beat the system, and that a tax rate high enough to 
increase the level of training will be a heavy burden on small firms that 
are already struggling. Bishop's (1993) description of the French expe 
rience with a training tax includes the finding that the incidence of 
training increases with firm size and, within each firm size category, 
with skill level. In particular, he points out that small firms have a com 
parative advantage at providing informal training, but that the training 
tax furnishes a strong incentive to substitute formal for informal train 
ing. Because formal training is subject to substantial economies of 
scale, small firms are at a disadvantage in responding to this incentive 
unless they can join forces in a cooperative effort to achieve the scale 
necessary to make formal training economically feasible.
Employer-Led/School-Based Training
Following on the heels of this discussion of apprenticeships and 
firm-based training, it is interesting to note that, as described in chapter 
4, Britain overhauled its training system in 1988, moving away from an 
apprenticeship system and to a decentralized employer-led/school- 
based system. As discussed by Dolton (1993, p. 1266), the primary 
problem with the union-controlled apprenticeship system administered 
under the Industrial Training Board (ITB) structure was that some 
unions feared the consequences of new technology and clung to obso 
lete demarcation lines between skills. Union apprenticeship programs 
were thus viewed as an anachronism by a Thatcher government seek 
ing policies intended to restrict the power of institutions like the ITBs 
and to stimulate market competition and entrepreneurship.
The key element of the 1988 reform was the creation of a national 
network of consortiums called Training and Enterprise Councils 
(TECs). Each of the 100 TECs is composed of local employers given 
the mandate to plan and deliver training services and promote small 
business development in their geographic regions. The national gov-
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ernment provides funding, while each TEC contracts out to local train 
ing institutions for provision of the actual training programs. 
Advantages of the TEC approach are twofold. First, decentralization 
increases the responsiveness of the training system to the needs of local 
employers. Second, access to training of employees of small firms is 
enhanced by spreading fixed costs of training programs over the 
greater number of workers covered by the consortium. As discussed in 
chapter 4, performance standards are imposed on individual TECs to 
make sure that their efforts are consistent with national policy goals. 
The earlier discussion suggested that performance standards can be 
specified to minimize the problem of creaming in the selection of pro 
gram participants.
To date, the main difficulty with the TEC system involves inade 
quate revenue. The old ITB system received government funding, but 
each ITB was also permitted to impose levies on participating firms 
within its industry. In contrast, TECs face the obligation to deliver ser 
vices required by existing programs with limited government funding 
and little incentive for participating employers to commit themselves 
financially to training programs. It appears that at present TECs can do 
little more than provide training allowances to youth and members of 
the long-term unemployed, respectively, who are eligible for the Youth 
Training and Employment Training programs. 6
Employment Services
The discussion in chapter 5 centered on two important categories of 
government-funded employment services—job matching (or labor 
exchange) services and job search assistance. Job matching is the core 
employment service provided by public employment agencies in most 
industrialized nations, including the United States. In addition to this 
core service, public employment services typically play the supportive 
roles of gatekeeper in allocating retraining and transitional employ 
ment opportunities and of enforcer of job search requirements imposed 
in unemployment insurance programs. Job search assistance (JSA) ser 
vices typically go beyond the traditional labor exchange function of 
public employment services in terms of reaching out to the unem-
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ployed, providing them with counseling, improving their job search 
skills, and assisting them to locate jobs that are not listed or advertised 
by employers. ISA services are key components of the packages of ser 
vices offered in the U.S. displaced worker demonstration projects car 
ried out during the 1980s and early 1990s. Yet these services are not 
commonly available on a permanent and nationwide basis to displaced 
American workers.
The limited empirical evidence available on the effectiveness of job 
matching services provided by the U.S. and Canadian public employ 
ment services is not especially encouraging. For American men, in par 
ticular, a well-known study by Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985) 
finds that an Employment Service (ES) referral had no significant 
effect on earnings and weeks to first job during the six-month period 
following application to the ES. In other words, unemployed men who 
did not receive a referral located jobs on their own as quickly as men 
who received an ES referral. Moreover, the jobs found by the not- 
referred paid as much.
It is not difficult to explain these discouraging results. As described 
in chapter 5, the U.S. Employment Service has been obliged to shift its 
priorities over time from serving all job seekers to focusing on the 
placement of disadvantaged workers. At the same time, U.S. employers 
are under no obligation to list their job vacancies with the ES. The con 
sequence of these two factors is a dynamic process of adverse selec 
tion, the outcome of which is that the ES is limited to referring low- 
skilled workers to low-paying and often temporary jobs listed by local 
employers.
A recent survey by Jacobson (1994) of largely unpublished papers 
and government reports offers a less pessimistic evaluation of the 
Employment Service. Two of his points are particularly worth consid 
ering. First, he argues that the ES has an important role to play as a 
"backstop" aiding job seekers who lack good information about alter 
native job opportunities or those who have tried, but failed, to find jobs 
using other job search methods. That is, the ES does a reasonably good 
job of helping unskilled workers find relatively low-paying jobs. Sec 
ond, despite reductions in resources and increased responsibilities that 
detract from its effectiveness in providing labor exchange services, 
Jacobson concludes that the ES offers enough potential that marginal
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changes in management procedures and funding could dramatically 
improve its performance.
Sweden offers an example of a well-funded national employment 
service that provides labor exchange services to a broad cross section 
of workers. As described in chapters 2 and 5, the nationwide system of 
employment exchange offices operated by the National Labor Market 
Board is the focal point of Swedish labor market policy. An unem 
ployed job seeker who registers with his or her local employment 
exchange office becomes the responsibility of a case manager who is 
responsible for the case until the worker becomes reemployed. Clients 
who are not job-ready may be referred to specialists within the 
National Labor Market Board for counseling or to an adult training 
program. Because Swedish law requires employers to list vacant jobs 
with the public employment service, job-ready clients have access 
through their local employment exchange office to information on the 
full range of employment opportunities available across Sweden. This 
makes it attractive for skilled as well as unskilled job seekers to make 
use of the public employment service. At the same time, employers can 
be confident that employment exchange referrals will not be limited to 
the low end of the skill distribution.
Displaced workers have been characterized throughout this mono 
graph as experienced, frequently well-paid adult workers who have 
been permanently laid off from their jobs. Because of their often 
lengthy tenure with their prelayoff employers, the job search skills of 
the displaced are likely to be rusty and they are unlikely to possess up- 
to-date information on alternative job opportunities. While an argu 
ment can be made that the U.S. Employment Service performs a useful 
function for individuals least able to help themselves (see Jacobson 
1994), it seems clear the ES could become substantially more helpful 
to many displaced workers if it were redirected to serve a broader cross 
section of workers, and if it were able to list more of the good job 
openings available. Following the Swedish model, the latter objective 
could be accomplished by requiring employers to list all job openings 
with the ES except for those intended to be filled through internal pro 
motions or job reassignments. If, as seems likely, this kind of govern 
ment coercion is ruled out, the alternative is to induce voluntary 
employer cooperation by improving the quality of services that both 
workers and firms can expect. In Sweden, a fully computerized job
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placement system in place since the late 1980s provides each employ 
ment exchange office with on-line access to information on job seekers 
and job vacancies across Sweden. An underfunded U.S. Employment 
Service has been slow to utilize computers in developing a referral sys 
tem that is national in scope. As noted by Baily, Burtless, and Litan 
(1993, p. 138),
[A]lthough developing software for interstate job referrals is a for 
midable problem, it is solvable given the dramatic reductions in 
the cost of computation over the past two decades. Moreover, the 
burdens of writing job referral software are hardly unique. Missile 
defense, the space program, and air traffic control all required 
enormous investments in software development. We wonder 
whether the problems of the U.S. Employment Service have 
received less attention because policymakers erroneously believe 
that labor market exchange is a straightforward and relatively 
unimportant public function.
Employment and Immigration Canada (1989b, chs. 5 and 6) summa 
rizes the results of a survey of Canadian Employment Centre staff in 
which they were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of a computerized 
on-line system of processing job orders and worker client data. As 
described in chapter 5, over three-quarters of responding CEC staff 
members cited the on-line system as improving the quality of services 
delivered to both worker clients and employer clients.
Turning to job search assistance, chapter 3 summarized in some 
detail the evaluation evidence gathered for ISA services from the U.S. 
displaced worker demonstrations. ISA services offered in the four 
demonstration projects include various combinations of the follow 
ing: (1) outreach; (2) orientation; (3) assessment and testing; (4) job 
search workshops, resource centers, and job clubs; (5) follow-up coun 
seling; and (6) job development. Evidence from the demonstrations 
indicates quite clearly that ISA speeds up the reemployment of dis 
placed workers. Given their modest cost per worker, moreover, the evi 
dence suggests that ISA services are cost effective.
There is also limited evidence available on the labor market effec 
tiveness of some of the individual ISA services. These include job 
counseling, job clubs, and job development. Using data from the New 
Jersey UI Reemployment demonstration, Anderson (1992) examines 
the reemployment impact of the job counseling provided as part of job
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search workshops offered all treatment group members. In principle, 
job counseling might achieve its desired result in either of two ways: 
(1) helping displaced workers to more correctly assess and revise 
downward their recall prospects, or (2) teaching more efficient job 
search methods. The results of her analysis indicate little support for 
the second possibility, while counseling did appear to accelerate reem- 
ployment by putting workers in closer touch with the realities of the 
job market.
Chapter 5 noted that in Sweden a response to rising unemployment 
(from a very low level) during and immediately after the recession of 
the early 1990s was the expansion of existing job search training activ 
ities to include job clubs. Trehb'rning (1993) reports evidence that these 
job clubs were effective in helping club participants uncover job open 
ings that had not been advertised or listed with the public employment 
service. Similarly, the job development service provided by the Cana 
dian Industrial Adjustment Service has received highly favorable 
assessments over its nearly forty years of existence. An evaluation by 
Employment and Immigration Canada (1993) emphasizes that the pos 
itive labor market impacts of the agency hinge on its job development 
activity. That is, the effectiveness of the Industrial Adjustment Service 
appears to be seriously diluted when program participants are chan 
neled into related services, including retraining.
Still other studies examine, for recipients of unemployment com 
pensation benefits, the effectiveness of linking enhanced ISA services 
to stricter enforcement of work search rules determining continuing 
eligibility for benefits. For the long-term unemployed in Britain, man 
datory attendance at a job search workshop—called Restart courses— 
is reported by the OECD (1992, annex 3.D) to have resulted in a sharp 
decline in the number of unemployment compensation recipients 
claiming benefits. Although this reduction in claimants could be 
reflecting increased reemployment, the OECD suggests that it is more 
likely to be capturing access to other sources of income, in which case 
the benefit claim status of recipients was probably fraudulent. For the 
United States, similar evidence has been obtained for job search exper 
iments carried out in Charleston, South Carolina, New Jersey, and 
Washington State that combined enhanced JSA services and tightened 
UI eligibility checks. Evidence yielded by these three experiments 
indicates that the measured reduction in length of UI receipt was pri-
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marily the result of claimants being dropped from UI rolls either by 
choice or by being formally denied benefits, rather than their leaving 
UI because of improved reemployment opportunities. At the very least, 
these results indicate the importance of linking receipt of UI benefits to 
work search requirements and, for those who need them, enhanced 
ISA services.
An Agenda for Assisting Displaced Americans
The distinction between passive and active labor market programs 
has come up repeatedly in this monograph. Among passive programs, 
the unemployment insurance system in place in the United States is 
quite limited, particularly in the duration of UI benefits, in comparison 
with unemployment compensation systems in most of the other nations 
considered. While U.S. policy makers are currently concerned about 
what appears to be a rising incidence of long-term unemployment 
among the unemployed (see U.S. Department of Labor 1993), the 
problem of long-term unemployment was seen in chapter 2 to be much 
less severe in this country than in most of the others countries exam 
ined. The perspective taken in this final section is therefore one of 
developing an active labor market policy intended to meet the needs of 
displaced workers that builds on the foundation of the existing UI sys 
tem. The one change in the UI system that might be considered is mak 
ing UI benefits available on a longer-term basis to workers enrolled in 
an approved training program lasting longer than six months. Dis 
placed workers may apply for the existing Pell Grant and Guaranteed 
Student Loan programs, but the maximum amount a student can 
receive through these programs is substantially less than regular UI 
assistance. Indeed, Smith (1994, p. 12) argues that an indication of the 
pent-up demand for income support during training is the large number 
of displaced workers who have recently applied for Pell grants. It 
might also be noted that extended UI benefits for eligible displaced 
workers undergoing retraining is a major feature of the proposed 
Reemployment Act of 1994.
The agenda outlined here envisions three levels of active labor mar 
ket services directed toward three categories of displaced workers
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broadly defined according to services required. Since the displaced are 
by definition experienced workers who have permanently lost their 
jobs, the first level of services is a nationwide labor exchange system 
offered by a revitalized and adequately funded Employment Service. It 
is critical to reverse earlier policies restricting the ES to servicing only 
targeted groups such as economically disadvantaged workers. Such 
policies tend to stigmatize workers in the targeted groups. Moreover, 
displaced workers may not be easily distinguished from other unem 
ployed workers, particularly early during their spells of unemploy 
ment. Early contact with the service delivery system is essential to 
prevent a period of idleness during which apathy, bitterness, self-doubt, 
and other negative attitudes have a chance to fester and grow, thereby 
destroying workers' effectiveness in seeking reemployment. A recent 
study of the Canadian Revitalization strategy indicates that a short 
(typically about 11 minute) interview with new UI claimants is suffi 
cient to distinguish the job-ready from claimants who require ISA ser 
vices or retraining before they can be said to be job-ready 
(Employment and Immigration Canada 1989b). Recent innovations in 
the active labor market programs offered in Britain and Australia also 
seek to identify early in the unemployment spell those claimants likely 
to have difficulty finding reemployment without assistance. Such "pro 
filing" is encouraged by 1993 federal legislation authorizing extended 
UI benefits to unemployed American workers.
In an initial visit to his or her local Job Service office, a displaced 
worker should be able to register for UI benefits and begin the job 
referral process. The objective is to minimize the time an individual 
spends filling out forms and waiting in line at different offices and to 
maximize the time he or she has available for engaging in active job 
search. It is interesting to note that both the Job Training 2000 program 
proposed by President Bush and the Clinton administration's proposed 
Reemployment Act of 1994 emphasize the importance of providing 
services in a single location—currently termed "one-stop shopping."7 It 
was noted in chapter 2 that one-stop job centers are an essential feature 
of Germany's employment and training system.
To keep the individual from getting lost within the system, a desir 
able approach is the Swedish procedure in which each client is 
assigned a case manager who is responsible for the case until the 
worker finds a new job. A primary task of the case manager is to select
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an individualized set of services for each client. Although these ser 
vices may be provided within the system by specialists in assessment 
and testing, training, and job development, the case manager is the 
continuing point of contact between the client and the system. Britain's 
scheduling and programming strategy is also designed to develop a 
good working relationship between the job seeker and a particular 
claimant advisor. The overall goal of this first level of the service deliv 
ery system is to make job matching services of the ES sufficiently 
attractive that most job seekers—employed as well as unemployed— 
will make the local Job Service office their first stop as they initiate 
their job search process.
These Level 1 services involving basic orientation, access to labor 
market information, and referrals to potential employers through the 
job matching system should be sufficient for perhaps a minority of dis 
placed workers who are job-ready and who possess basic job search 
skills. But there is likely to be a sizable additional group of the dis 
placed whose job search skills are more seriously deficient or whose 
morale is so low that it inhibits active job search. For these workers, a 
second level of job search assistance services is required. Appropriate 
ISA services include training provided in a job search workshop fol 
lowed by access to either a resource center or a job club. It is also use 
ful to supplement the efforts of individual workers in finding their own 
job leads with job development assistance on the part of Employment 
Service staff members. Finally, a strong linkage should be established 
between receipt of UI benefits and active participation in ISA services.
The ISA services available in Level 2 of the service delivery system 
are relatively cheap and should be freely available to all individuals 
whose case managers feel they would benefit from them. On the other 
hand, the third level of services involving access to training programs 
is substantially more expensive. Careful attention to assessment and 
testing is required to limit access to only those individuals who require 
retraining to qualify for jobs in other industries or to meet the higher 
skill requirements of jobs in their current industries. Clearly to be 
avoided is the criticism of the Swedish training system that substantial 
numbers of workers for whom training is unlikely to improve their 
long-term earnings prospects are warehoused in training programs.
While it is reasonably easy to make the case for including retraining 
in the menu of services that should be made available to displaced
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workers, it is more difficult to specify precisely how an adult training 
system should be put together. One point is clear. The current hodge 
podge of categorical programs should be consolidated into a single 
adult training system. Although it may have made political sense in the 
past to design a specific program for each identifiable group of workers 
displaced due to a particular policy action (e.g., workers displaced 
from their jobs due to Nafta-induced lowering of tariffs), the present 
maze of programs is inefficient, inequitable, and serves only a minority 
of workers in need.
A recurring theme in chapter 4 is that other nations engaged in 
restructuring their adult training systems are paying particular attention 
to increasing the involvement of private-sector employers in the train 
ing process. There appears to be no other satisfactory way to ensure 
that training program graduates will possess skills that are salable (cri 
terion 4). In Sweden, the 1986 reorganization of the adult training sys 
tem was intended to increase responsiveness to market demand by 
decentralizing decision making and requiring the National Employ 
ment Training Board to be financially self-supporting. Similarly, Brit 
ain took action in 1988 to make training locally based rather than 
industry-based and to put decision making under the control of local 
employers. And Canada's Employability Improvement Program 
enacted in 1991 seeks to decentralize decision making by giving local 
Canadian Employment Centre counselors additional flexibility to 
design reemployment plans more closely aligned with the needs of 
individual worker clients.
Possibly the most direct way to strengthen the interest of employers, 
particularly the interest of small employers, in providing additional 
training is to impose a payroll tax which can be avoided only by 
increasing formal training expenditures. This approach was taken by 
the Australian government with the passage of a training tax in 1990 
called the Training Guarantee. A serious disadvantage of a training tax 
policy, however, is the potential adverse impact of an additional payroll 
tax on the hiring of permanent employees. In addition, as emphasized 
by Bishop (1993b), it is not clear that small employers should be 
encouraged to substitute formal training for the kinds of informal train 
ing they excel at providing.
More viable approaches to delivering marketable training are either 
to (1) subsidize the direct purchase by individual displaced workers of
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training services supplied by private-sector employers or institutional 
training providers, or (2) subsidize firm-centered training offered 
through agency-based training programs. 8 The first of these approaches 
has already been implemented at the federal level through the Pell 
Grant/Guaranteed Student Loan programs subsidizing investments in 
postsecondary education. Directed specifically to the displaced, 
another federal program implementing the direct-purchase approach 
provides training vouchers to trade-displaced workers under the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance program (see chapter 3). Training vouchers 
were also an integral part of the 1992 Job Training 2000 proposal of 
the Bush administration. Trade Adjustment Assistance vouchers are 
primarily used to purchase training from vocational/technical schools 
or community colleges, while training vouchers under the Bush pro 
posal could have been exchanged for on-the-job as well as classroom 
training. In Britain, Cappelli (1993b) reports that by 1996 the current 
Youth Training program will be replaced by a system of vouchers 
intended to increase access of youth to entry-level jobs that offer train 
ing opportunities. However, he also notes that while the voucher pro 
gram is still in its pilot stage, it has been difficult to induce employers 
to offer positions.
As indicated by experience gained from the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program, training vouchers have the advantage of increas 
ing the opportunity of displaced workers to enroll in training programs 
offered by our extensive system of public postsecondary institutions, 
thus satisfying criterion 5. That experience is buttressed by evidence 
reported by O'Neill (1977) in a study of the GI Bill. O'Neill's results 
suggest that the voucher-delivery system of the GI Bill allowed eligible 
individuals most in need of training—blacks and educationally disad- 
vantaged veterans in this study—to substantially increase their enroll 
ment in training programs following completion of their military 
service. Indeed, holding prior schooling and a measure of ability con 
stant, black veterans were found to use the GI Bill to a greater extent 
than nonblack veterans.
Given the interest of the displaced in training that is directly related 
to jobs, an increase in their effective demand should enhance the incen 
tive of training institutions to establish closer linkages to local employ 
ers, a process that for community colleges already appears to be well 
under way. Good counseling by Employment Service personnel is a
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necessary condition for displaced workers to make appropriate deci 
sions on training providers and curricula. A national system of occupa 
tional credentials would perhaps also be helpful in guiding individuals' 
choices toward those training institutions that are most effective in pro 
viding skills in recognized occupations and away from the least effec 
tive providers. However, a potential problem involved in formal 
occupational testing is that training instruction will be directed toward 
performing well on standardized tests rather than toward providing 
job-related skills demanded in the local labor market (see Heckman, 
Roselius, and Smith 1993).
The alternative approach to delivering marketable training—the 
employer-centered/agency-based training model— is intended to more 
directly involve employers in the design and implementation of train 
ing programs. At the federal level, this approach is found in the decen 
tralized systems of decision making presently existing in Britain and 
under JTPA in this country. The basic concept is that federal dollars are 
channeled through local boards to subsidize the costs of training pro 
grams proposed by employers. Local boards may be patterned after 
either Private Industry Councils created under JTPA or British Training 
and Enterprise Councils. In either case, substantial employer represen 
tation on the boards is the essential feature, although as chapter 4 
described not all British employers appear to be enthusiastic supporters 
of their local TECs. In both the TEC and JTPA systems, the federal 
government ensures that its policy objectives are satisfied by imposing 
performance standards on local boards which, in turn, may withhold 
partial payment to training providers if these standards are not met. 
Performance standards may be crafted to emphasize training directed 
to the low skilled.
At the state level, chapter 2 pointed to the California Employment 
Training Panel as a leading example of an innovative state-funded 
agency mandated to stimulate the volume of training activity and to 
assist in state economic development. This model encourages employ 
ers to identify training needs and develop training proposals. If a pro 
posal receives Employment Training Panel funding, employers take the 
lead in designing curriculums and establishing program admission and 
completion standards. In exchange for the public funding of their pro 
grams, employers obligate themselves to hire successful program grad 
uates. Along with its employer-driven approach to training, the
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Employment Training Panel is well known for its extensive use of 
stringent performance standards.
Under the employer-centered/agency-based training approach, it is 
likely that many firms will propose cooperative programs established 
jointly with local training institutions. Participation of small and 
medium-sized employers may be increased by making smaller firms a 
priority for funding at the national or local level. To the extent that 
small firms are especially likely to lack in-house training capacity, 
groups of small employers can be encouraged to enter into consortiums 
in which they contract with a local institutional provider to furnish 
training tailored to meet their specific requirements.
A major advantage of the firm-centered/agency-based approach in 
comparison to public education-based systems is the direct involve 
ment of employers. In addition, agency-based programs may be 
quicker to respond to changes in technology and shifts in labor 
demand. They are also able to draw upon a broader range of training 
providers. On the other hand, Osterman and Batt (1993) argue that 
agency-based programs tend to be project-oriented, and thus they do 
not contribute to the development of a strong training system. In their 
words (1993, p. 464),
[T]he most compelling reason for system building is that the train 
ing problem is too big for a project-based approach to have much 
impact. There are too many firms relative to any conceivable level 
of public funding. Instead, scarce funds should be expended to 
build institutions that outlive a particular project and that continue 
to address the issue after the project funds are expended.
From this perspective, the ongoing institutional presence of public 
training institutions is an important advantage. Fortunately, the increas 
ingly entrepreneurial orientation of community college systems in 
developing programs tailored to meet the training needs of specific 
employers is causing public education-based training to more closely 
resemble firm-centered/agency-based programs in terms of direct 
employer involvement. At the same time, community colleges are per 
manent fixtures in their communities. Regarding the value of commu 
nity college education, it is worth noting that a recent major study by 
Kane and Rouse (1993) finds that community college students enjoy
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the same rate of return for every year of credits completed as do stu 
dents at four-year institutions.
The agenda to assist displaced workers developed in this final sec 
tion is both conservative and doable in the sense that the three levels of 
services suggested build directly on lessons learned from experiments 
and demonstration projects carried out in this country and from perma 
nent, nationwide programs implemented in other highly industrialized 
nations. It is also of interest, however, to briefly consider a more radi 
cal proposal that has recently been suggested as an alternative to more 
traditional employment and training programs.
Termed "earnings insurance" by Baily, Burtless, and Litan (1993, p. 
204) and an "earnings subsidy" by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 
(1993b, pp. 160-71), the objective of this proposal is to cushion the 
heavy financial blow associated with displacement by supplementing 
earnings after reemployment. At the same time, the proposal would 
increase the incentive to find a new job quickly. In the more fully 
developed earnings-subsidy program, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sulli 
van suggest that a subsidy be paid to reemployed workers that is based 
on their predisplacement earnings. In this way, the subsidy is largest 
for those workers who bear the greatest losses from displacement. 
Given the level of predisplacement earnings, the incentive to return to 
work is strengthened by reducing the subsidy only gradually (i.e., 
avoiding a 100 percent implicit tax rate) as postdisplacement earnings 
rise to 100 percent of the level of predisplacement earnings. That is, a 
worker who is able to quickly find a new job but at a much lower wage 
than he or she previously earned would be eligible for a sizable earn 
ings subsidy. Under the present UI system, the reemployed worker 
would of course no longer be eligible for benefits.
Despite these attractive features, there are several reasons for ques 
tioning the immediate applicability of a wage-subsidy program to dis 
placed workers in the U.S. labor market. First, evidence from the 
reemployment bonus demonstration projects discussed in chapter 3 
indicates that bonuses offer little promise of speeding up the reemploy 
ment process above the effects of much cheaper ISA services. Second, 
as noted earlier, displaced workers may not be easily distinguished 
from other unemployed workers, especially early in their spells of 
unemployment. An advantage of job search assistance services is that 
their cost is sufficiently low that they can be made available to all
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unemployed workers, whether or not they were displaced from their 
previous jobs. A wage-subsidy program, on the other hand, is likely to 
be substantially more expensive and would thus need to be carefully 
targeted. Third, a recent simulation study carried out by Davidson and 
Woodbury (1994) indicates that a wage-subsidy program would indeed 
provide employment gains to displaced workers, but that these gains 
would come at the expense of other groups of workers. The authors 
also find that the displacement effect is widely dispersed. This evi 
dence on displacement certainly appears to reduce the attractiveness of 
the wage-subsidy proposal as a policy option. Nevertheless, the finding 
that displacement is widely dispersed can be viewed as positive evi 
dence for a wage subsidy from the perspective that the proposal suc 
cessfully shelters the displaced from the full labor market costs associ 
ated with industrial restructuring without dramatically harming any 
other particular group of workers.
Finally, the cost of a wage-subsidy program is potentially quite high. 
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993b, pp. 167-68) offer one cost 
estimate of $9 billion annually, noting that this estimate is meant only 
to be illustrative. By way of comparison, the Clinton administration's 
budget released in February of 1994 for fiscal year 1995 proposed to 
spend slightly under $1.5 billion for displaced worker assistance. This 
consolidated program features both job search assistance and retrain 
ing, with another $250 million proposed for a one-stop career shopping 
program. Also worth noting is that the estimated price tag for the 
administration's proposed Reemployment Act of 1994 is $13 billion 
spread over five years, or about $2.6 billion per year.
Wage-subsidy proposals appear to merit further development and 
study. Given the current state of our knowledge and resources, how 
ever, the more prudent course of action to assist displaced Americans 
in the near term is to proceed as described earlier in developing and 
implementing a more conventional active labor market policy. The 
three major elements of such a policy should be a nationwide labor 
exchange system, job search assistance services that are freely avail 
able to those whose job search skills are deficient or whose morale is 
low, and an adult training program utilizing our postsecondary educa 
tional institutions that is carefully limited to those individuals who 
require retraining to qualify for jobs in new industries or to meet rising 
skill requirements in their current industries.
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NOTES
1. The first industrial revolution took place in England from the late eighteenth through the 
early nineteenth centuries, and the second took place primarily in the United States from the mid- 
to the late nineteenth century.
2. Other categories of active labor market programs distinguished by the OECD are job cre 
ation/employment subsidies, special youth measures, and programs for the disabled. Because of 
their work experience, special youth measures and programs for the disabled are not typically rel 
evant to the displaced. Programs falling under the job creation/employment subsidies category are 
not emphasized in this monograph because their usual purpose is either to maintain employment 
in depressed industries or to provide temporary employment in the public sector. In other words, 
job creation/employment subsidy programs may have the perverse effect of slowing down the 
transition of displaced workers to their higher valued uses in growing industries.
3. Since the late 1970s, the OECD has issued a series of policy statements urging the imple 
mentation of active labor market policies. For example, the OECD (1990, p. 8) recommends that 
[P]riority should be given to active measures such as training, placement and reha 
bilitation programmes for the unemployed, the inactive and those on welfare in 
order to break dependency cycles, reduce inequality in the access to jobs and gen 
erally integrate people into the mainstream of productive activity. These priorities 
should be reflected in the allocation of resources.
The OECD goes on to suggest that, in practice, this priority implies the coupling of measures to 
promote active job search with income support programs designed to avoid work disincentives.
4. Large Japanese establishments are more likely to conduct formal training programs in- 
house in company training centers, while smaller firms tend to rely of courses taught at vocational 
training schools and other outside providers.
5. The 2 percent training tax is part of the authors' three-pronged proposal to increase the level 
and quality of workplace training. The other two prongs are the establishment of nationally recog 
nized credentials to certify occupational skills and the creation of a national apprenticeship sys 
tem directed toward non-college-bound youth.
6. It is interesting to note the report in The Economist (1994b) that in its most recent budget, 
the British government unveiled a scheme for reintroducing apprenticeship training.
7. Also worth noting is that the administration's proposal allowed room for privatizing the pro 
vision of some reemployment services by permitting private-sector firms to bid for the right to 
open and operate the one-stop career centers.
8. Still another approach is to subsidize institutional training providers to supply additional 
classroom training slots to displaced workers. This approach has been taken in programs in both 
Canada with the Direct Purchase option and Australia. While it has the advantage of increasing 
utilization of the existing training infrastructure by the displaced, the disadvantage of this 
approach is that there is no incentive for training institutions to focus their programs on meeting 
the needs of local employers.
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research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to 
employment-related problems at the national, state, and local level. It is an 
activity of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was 
established in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn, 
founder of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of 
employment income during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn 
Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of 
publications. Activities of the Institute are comprised of the following 
elements: (1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional 
social scientists; (2) a competitive grant program, which expands and 
complements the internal research program by providing financial support to 
researchers outside the Institute; (3) a publications program, which provides 
the major vehicle for the dissemination of research by staff and grantees, as 
well as other selected work in the field; and (4) an Employment Management 
Services division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment 
and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute's research, grant, and publication 
programs are to: (1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of 
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knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their 
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Current areas of concentration for these programs include: causes, 
consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and 
income maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work 
arrangements; family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional 
economic development and local labor markets.
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